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INTRODUCTION

The modern U.S. patent system has three purposes: first, to encourage invention by offering potential rewards to the individual inventor;' second, to encourage industry to assume the risks of
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (granting federal authority to establish patent laws).
The foundation for the modern federal patent system begins with the Constitution, which
provides that Congress shall have power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries." Id. This provision reflects the accepted view that individuals have a
right to the fruits of their inventive intellectual accomplishment. See STAFF OF SENATE CONINI.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., IST SESS., PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE PATENT SYSTEM I
(Comm. Print 1957) (describing system of rewards to inventor and society inherent in patent
system). The American government's founders recognized that "[t]he copyright of authors
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financing research, developing products, and introducing new products to the marketplace; 2 and third, to discourage an atmosphere in
which industrial design and technological development are clouded
in secrecy, and scientific progress is hidden from the public.3
This third purpose underscores the patent system's quid pro quo
nature, in which the patent is a social contract or franchise. 4 Disclosure by the inventor, then, is the consideration in the social contract
between the inventor and the government.5 35 U.S.C. § 112 (section 112) sets forth the requirements of disclosure. If the disclosure
is insufficient to enable a skilled person to make and use the claimed
invention, then there is a failure of consideration, and the patent is
6
invalid.
Since its creation in 1982, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has addressed various issues concerning section
112, ostensibly to satisfy its mandate to bring uniformity to the patent law. 7 This Article highlights and discusses the significant Federal Circuit opinions interpreting section 112 since the court's
inception in 1982. This Article is organized according to subject
area, with the more significant opinions discussed in greater detail.
This Article is not intended to be a primer on the law of section 112;
has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to
useful inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors. The public good fully
coincides in both cases with the claims of the individuals." SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,
85TH CONG., IST SESS., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND THE MODERN ECONOMY 1 n.4 (Comm. Print
1957) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 43 at 279 (James Madison)).
2. See SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., IST SESS., THE PATENT SYSTEM AND
THE MODERN ECONOMY 1-2 (Comm. Print 1957) (noting desirability of industry's promotion of
inventions).
3. See id. (discussing importance of patent system to public).
4. See Seymour v. Osborn, 78 U.S. (I1 Wall.) 516, 533-34 (1870) (describing patents as
"public franchises"). In Seymour, the Supreme Court suggested a quid pro quo relationship
between the patentee and society. Id. The benefit to the public is found in the patent system's "tend[ancy] to promote the progress of science and the useful arts." Id. at 533. The
benefit to the individual patentee is found in the system's "compensation to the inventor for
their labor, toil, and expense in making the inventions." Id.
5. See Century Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., 191 F. 350, 354 (8th Cir.
1911) (describing contractual nature of patent process). In Century Electric, the court described a patent as "a contract made by the acceptance by the government of the offer which
the patentee by his application makes to disclose his invention, in consideration that the United
States will secure to him the exclusive use and sale of it for seventeen years." Id. (emphasis
added).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988).
7. See Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1 (1982)) (creating federal appellate court with exclusive subject matter jurisdiction for patent cases); S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1982
U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 15 (stating that Federal Circuit will provide needed uniformity at appellate
level).
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rather, it is a presentation of opinions illustrating the Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 112.8
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION

112

The Federal Circuit's interpretation of section 112 is necessarily
bound by the legislative history of the statute. A brief overview of
the origin of section 112 and its predecessor provisions offers a useful starting point. The quid pro quo nature of patent disclosure is at
the very foundation of patent law, as seen in the original Patent Act
of 1790. 9 Disclosure, including precision in particularly pointing
out what activities fall within the exclusionary right of the patent,
was required not only to teach the methodology of the invention,
but to delineate the invention so the public would know what activities infringed the patent. 10 These two themes evolved into what are
today section 112's paragraphs (1) and (2).
The 1790 Patent Act also made inadequate disclosure a defense in
patent infringement suits. Defendants could argue that the specification "does not contain the whole truth concerning his invention,"
or "contains more than is necessary to produce that effect described" if either "appear[ed] to have been intended to mislead, or
shall actually mislead the public, so as the effect described cannot be
produced by the means specified."" In 1793, Congress amended
the Patent Act, requiring machine inventors to delineate the principle behind, and the practical application of, each invention and to
8. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS ch. 7 (1990) (providing overview of "adequate
disclosure" of patent law, including enablement, description, and best mode requirements).
Various secondary sources discuss section 112 more generally. See WALTER Y.BOYD ET AL., 35
U.S.C. § 112 AND CHEMICAL PATENT PRACTICE, 1990 BASIC CHEMICAL AND BIOTECHNOLOGY

PRACTICE SEMINAR (1990), American Intellectual Property Law Association (providing overview of structure and implementation of section 112).
9. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 2, 1 Stat. 109. The 1790 Act, adopted by the First
Congress, required inventors to file
a specification... containing a description... of the thing... by him.., invented
...which specification shall be so particular ...as not only to distinguish the invention ...from other things before known and used, but also to ensure a workman or
other person skilled in the art of manufacture, where of it is a branch, or where with
it may be nearest connected, to make, construct or use the same, to the end that the
public may have the full benefit thereof, after the expiration of the patent term.
Id.
10. See Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 356, 433-34 (1822) (evaluating patent law's
protection of inventor's improvement over existing machines). In Evans, the Supreme Court
explained the nature of the enabling and distinguishing requirements of patent law. Id. The
Court identified two purposes of the patent specification: to explain the nature of the invention, and to ascertain whether it is deserving of the protection of a patent. Id.
11. Act ofApril 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 6, 1 Stat. 109. See Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218, 248
(1832) (noting validity of arguing defectiveness of opposing party's specification in patent
suits). Grant established that a showing of intent is not necessary to defend successfully
against infringement, but such a showing is necessary for a patent to be declared void on this
basis. Id.
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distinguish it from other inventions. 12 Under the 1793 Act, however, patenting was no more than a clerical function, with no exami3
nation required.'
Minor linguistic changes accompanied the Patent Act of 1836.
The adequate disclosure requirement necessitated that the patent
enable one to "make, construct, compound, and use" the invention.
The inventor was required to define with particularity "the part, improvement, or combination" claimed as the invention.1 4 At the
same time, however, applicants were directed to avoid "unnecessary
prolixity" in their specifications. 15 Dissatisfaction over patenting
without meaningful inquiry prompted Congress to create the Patent
Office and the Commissioner of Patents. The Commissioner had
the authority to refuse patents to those filing deficient applications. 16 Additionally, the 1836 Act modified the defenses section,
removing the provision for declaring inadequately disclosed patents
invalid.

17

The "best mode" provision superseded the "several modes" provision as to machines in the Patent Act of 1870.18 Similar to the
1836 Act, claim requirements specified that the applicant must specify and claim "the part, improvement, or combination" intended as
the invention or discovery.19 Sections 4888 and 4920 of the Revised
Statutes codified the disclosure provisions and the "whole truth"
20
defense.
In 1949, the House Committee on the Judiciary began considering revisions to the patent statutes. 2 1 After reviewing the existing
sixty sections based on the 1790 Act, all proposed changes since
1925, and reports from government agencies and private groups,
12. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 3, 1 Stat. 318. The Act also changed "workman" to
"any person skilled in the art or science," who must be enabled by disclosure to "make, compound, and use" the invention. Id. The description referent changed "particular" to "such
full, clear, and exact terms." Id.
13. See The PatentAct of 1952, 34J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 545, 554 (1952) (noting filing requirements of 1793 Act) [hereinafter The PatentAct).
14. Act ofJuly 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117.
15. Id.
16. See The PatentAct, supra note 13, at 554 (describing provisions of 1836 Act).
17. Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 15, 5 Stat. 117.
18. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198. This Act was part of the work to
reorganize, revise, and consolidate all the United States Codes. See The Patent Act, supra note
13, at 550 (explaining development of United States Code).
19. Act ofJuly 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198.
20. See 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 7.02[4] (1990) (tracing historical development of
American patent law).
21. See The Patent Act, supra note 13, at 546-48 (describing legislative consideration of
patent law changes). Representative Bryson of South Carolina chaired the subcommittee with
jurisdiction to change patent laws. Law Revision CounselJ. Zinn and Patent Counsel L.James
Harris provided legal advice. Id.
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the Committee drafted new patent legislation. 22 The effort
culminated in the enactment, by unanimous consent, of ninety-five

sections of Title 35 in 1952.23

The Patent Act of 1952 created the penultimate section 112.24

The "best mode" requirement, limited previously to machines, was
expanded to include all kinds of inventions. The terms "constructing" and "compounding" in the 1836 Act were omitted. To empha-

size the distinction between the enabling and claiming functions of
disclosure, these provisions were divided into separate paragraphs.

Because failure to disclose adequately the invention is a defense, regardless of intent, the "whole truth" defenses were omitted. 25 The

last paragraph, which is the current section's sixth paragraph, did
not have statutory precedent. 26 Rather, it reflected a growing use of
"means-plus-function" language in claims involving complex

mechanical devices. For these complex inventions, requiring structural recital proved to be too confining. 2 7 The last two amendments
22. See Karl B. Lutz, The New 1952 Patent Statute, 35J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 155, 155 (1953)
(providing account of congressional hearings on patent legislation). The subcommittee considered reports submitted by the Science Advisory Board, the Temporary National Economic
Committee, the National Planning Commission, and the American Bar Association, as well as
legal periodicals, books, and miscellaneous articles. Id.
23. See PJ. Federico, TransitionalProblems of the New PatentAct, 35J. PAT. OFF. Soc'" 325,
326 (1953) (describing development of 1952 Patent Act); Lutz, supra note 22, at 162 (accounting for 1952 Act).
24. Act ofJuly 19, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (1988)). Section 112 of the 1952 Act, which took effect on January 1, 1953,

reads as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor for carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
An element in a claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such a claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id.

25. CHIsuM, supra note 20, § 7.02[4] (citing PJ. Federico, Commentay on the New Patent
Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 55 (1954)).
26. See 35 U.S.C.A. 406 (1952) (explaining amendments to patent law). The Revisor's
Note indicates only that "[a] new paragraph relating to functional claims is added." Id.
27. The last paragraph of section 112 in part constituted an adverse reaction to a 1946
United States Supreme Court decision. See Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Walker,
329 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1946) (requiring that patents for complicated inventions require presentation of clear, concise, and exact description of machine or process). Provisions concerning
complex mechanical devices evolved in response to Halliburon, in which the Supreme Court
invalidated a means-plus-function claim as "too broad." Id. The Commissioner of Patents at
the time the 1952 Act passed said:
It is unquestionable that some measure of greater liberality in the use of functional
expressions in combination claims is authorized than had been permitted by some
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to section 112 occurred in 196528 and 1975,29 when the paragraphs
now comprising paragraphs three, four, and five were added. The
legislative history of these amendments is discussed in Section V of
this Article.
II.

THE SECOND PARAGRAPH 3 0

The second paragraph of section 112 contains two requirements.
The first requirement, relating to the scope of the provision, calls
for "precision and definiteness" in claim language. 3 1 One skilled in
the art must be able to tell, with a reasonable degree of certainty,
whether specific conduct would be inside or outside the scope of the
claims; the "metes and bounds" of the claimed subject matter must
be ascertainable. The second requirement demands that claims be
directed to the subject matter the applicant regards as the invention. 32 While an applicant may claim whatever is regarded as the
invention, subject matter that is not regarded as the invention cannot be claimed. The Federal Circuit has had the opportunity to decide a number of section 112, second paragraph issues.
A.

The "Precision and Definiteness" Requirement

One of the Federal Circuit's earliest cases with respect to the
"precision and definiteness" requirement was In re Marosi.3 3 At issue in Marosi was an invention for making zeolitic compounds that
did not require the use of alkali metals. The claims described the
crystalline metal silicate used in the process as "essentially free of
alkali metal." 3 4 The specification, however, explained that some
chemical impurities may be present, creating residual alkali metal
court decisions, and that decisions such as that in Halliburton . . .are modified or
rendered obsolete, but the exact limits of the enlargement remain to be determined.
See CHisuM, supra note 20, § 7.02[4] (citing P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New PatentAct, 35
U.S.C.A. 1, 25-26 (1954)).
28. Pub. L. No. 89-83, 79 Stat. 259 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 35

U.S.C.).
29.

Pub. L. No. 94-131, 89 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at scattered sections of 35

U.S.C.).
30. See In re Moore, 439 F.2d 1232, 1235, 169 U.S.P.Q. 236, 238 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (stating
that in evaluating patents, initial inquiry is into what is claimed, pursuant to section 112,
second paragraph). Any section 112 analysis moves from the second paragraph to the first
paragraph because claims must be construed pursuant to the second paragraph before the
invention recited by the claims can be analyzed for first paragraph compliance. Id
31. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 (1988); see also In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164 U.S.P.Q.
642, 645 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that, under section 112, second paragraph, language of
claim must be precise and definite regarding subject matter encompassed thereby).
32. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 2 (1988).
33. 710 F.2d 799, 218 U.S.P.Q. 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
34. In reMarosi, 710 F.2d 799, 801, 218 U.S.P.Q. 289, 291 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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content of about four parts per million (ppm) of sodium.3 5 The
Board of Patent Appeals held that the claim limitation, "essentially
free of alkali metal," did not satisfy the second paragraph of section
112.36 According to the Board, there was no teaching or disclosure
to define an upper limit to the claim limitation, even when the
37
claims were read in light of the specification.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) argued
before the Federal Circuit that it was impossible for one skilled in
the art to determine the "essentially free of alkali metal" line between 4 ppm and the 3819 ppm of the prior art. The Federal Circuit responded that the PTO's position was impractical to the extent
that the PTO was requiring Marosi to specify a particular number as
38
the cut-off point between his invention and the prior art.
Marosi's invention, the court stated, did not reside in such a
number. The term "essentially free of alkali metal" had to be read
in light of the specification in order to give the invention its
broadest reasonable interpretation.3 9 Since Marosi's specification
set forth the method for synthesizing zeolites in the absence of alkali
metal, the Federal Circuit, recognizing that relevant industrial
chemicals always contain traces of alkali metals, found the language
40
sufficiently definite.
In another early case, WL. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc.,41 the
Federal Circuit again addressed the question of whether claim language was indefinite. The claim in Gore involved both a method for
treating unsintered polytetrafluorethylene (PTFE), better known as
35. Id. at 802, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 292. The specification defined the claim terminology as
follows:
Free from alkali metal, for the purposes of the invention, means essentially free from
sodium ions. The residual alkali metal content of such zeolites is in principle only
attributable to impurities of the chemicals used as starting materials.... Thus, commercial pyrogenic silica (Aerosil), which, is a particularly suitable starting material,
contains about 4 ppm of Na 20.
Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The Board found the term "essentially free of alkali metal" to be a significant
part of the claimed invention because it served to distinguish the invention over the prior art.
Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 803, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 292. The court stated:
[Marosi] provided a general guideline and examples sufficient to enable a person of
ordinary skill in the art to determine whether a process uses a [starting material]
"essentially free of alkali metal" to make a reaction mixture "essentially free of alkali
metal" to produce a zeolitic compound "essentially free of alkali metal." We are
persuaded that such a person would draw the line between unavoidable impurities in
starting materials and essential ingredients.
Id.
41. 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
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the TEFLON® product sold by Du Pont, and the products that were
produced by the method. 42 The district court concluded that three
terms used in the claim language-"stretch rate," "matrix tensile
strength," and "specific gravity of the solid polymer"-were
43
indefinite.
With respect to the term "stretch rate," the Federal Circuit noted
that there was uncontradicted evidence in the record that, to those
skilled in the art, the term meant the percent of stretch divided by
the time of stretching, and that the latter was measurable, for example, with a stop watch. 44 According to the court, the absence from
the specification of a formula for calculating stretch rate was
45
irrelevant.
As to the language "matrix tensile strength," the district court
found this term indefinite, even though the specification disclosed
how it was to be computed. 4 6 The Federal Circuit did not agree that
the term was indefinite. 4 7 The court observed that it is well settled
that a patent applicant can be his own lexicographer, and that here
the specification clearly taught how to calculate "matrix tensile
48
strength."
The Federal Circuit also held that the district court erred in concluding that the term "specific gravity of the solid polymer" was indefinite. 49 The court found that the specification set forth the
specific gravity values for unsintered and sintered PTFE.50 Further,
the court noted that there was no testimony alleging that these values were not known to persons of ordinary skill in the art or could
51
not be calculated or measured.
In Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,52 the district court
found Rosemount's patent, relating to a pH meter, to be valid and
infringed by Beckman. 53 On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Beckman
argued, inter alia, that the patent was invalid under the second paragraph primarily because the term "close proximity," used to de42. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303, 315
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
43. Id. at 1546, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 304.
44. Id. at 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 315.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1557, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 315.
47. Id. at 1558, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 316.

48. Id.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
2 (Fed.

Id. at 1557, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 315.
Id.
Id. at 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 315-16.
727 F.2d 1540, 221 U.S.P.Q. 1 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1542, 221 U.S.P.Q. 1,
Cir. 1984).
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scribe the position of the electrode relative to the high impedance
material in the pH meter, was indefinite 5 4 Noting that Beckman
used the term "close proximity" in describing its own pH meters in
its briefs and that the prior art also used the term, the Federal Circuit had little trouble agreeing with the district court's finding that
one skilled in the art would understand all of the claim language
when read in light of the specification. Thus, the court held that the
claim language was as precise as the subject matter permitted. 55
StandardOil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co.,56 involved a patent on a
catalytic process for producing acrylamide from acrylonitrile, in
which copper was used as the catalyst.5 7 Standard Oil, the owner of
the patent, sued Cyanamid for infringement. The district court
found not only that the patent was not infringed, but concluded that
one of the claims of the patent was invalid because the term "at least
partially soluble," used to describe the copper ions recited in the
claimed process, was insufficiently precise to meet the requirements
of the first paragraph of section 112.58 Furthermore, the district
court concluded that the term "partially soluble" was too vague to
meet the requirements of the second paragraph.5 9
The Federal Circuit agreed that the claim at issue was invalid
under the second paragraph for failing to distinctly claim the invention. The court determined that the district court misapplied the
statute, pointing out that the first paragraph of section 112 applies
only to the disclosure portion of the specification and not to the
claims. 60 The Federal Circuit found the error to be "harmless,"
however, because the district court applied the right statutory provision in finding the term "partially soluble" too vague to meet the
requirements of the second paragraph. 6 '
54. Id at 1547, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
55. Id
56. 774 F.2d 448, 227 U.S.P.Q. 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
57. Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 774 F.2d 448, 453, 227 U.S.P.Q. 293,
297 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
58. Id. at 451, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 295.
59. Id Neither term was defined in the specification. Although not discussed in the
Federal Circuit's opinion, the district court found there was no generally accepted definition
of the term "partially soluble." Standard Oil Co. v. American Cyanamid Co., 585 F. Supp.
1481, 1486, 224 U.S.P.Q. 210, 217 (E.D. La. 1984), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 774 F.2d
448, 227 U.S.P.Q. 293 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Standard Oil argued that the term "partially soluble"
meant the same as "slightly soluble" and "practically insoluble" (two terms that were well
defined in the literature) and offered expert testimony to prove that point. StandardOil, 774
F.2d at 452, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 296. However, particularly in view of the fact that the literature
defined "slightly soluble" differently from "practically insoluble," the court rejected Standard
Oil's argument that the terms were synonymous. Id. at 453, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 297.
60. Standard Oil, 774 F.2d at 453, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 297.
61. Id.
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In Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc.,62 the court
considered whether the term "substantially equal to" in the patent
claims makes the claimed subject matter indefinite and, therefore,
the claims invalid. 63 The court observed that claims involving words
of degree are often problematic. 64 The court stated that it is the
task of the district court to determine whether the specification provides a standard for measuring degree, such that a person skilled in
the art can understand the claim, in light of the specification. 6 5The
court stated that, because the district court found that "an expert"
would know the limitations of the claims, the claims would not be
invalid even if experimentation was needed to determine the limits
66
of the claims.
In another case involving words of degree, Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai
PharmaceuticalCo.,67 the Federal Circuit considered whether the district court properly held two claims invalid because of their recitation of specific activity limitations of "at least about 160,000."68
Genetics Institute, one of the co-defendants, asserted on appeal that
there was no evidence that claims 4 and 6 of the patent at issue did
not comply with section 112.69
The district court noted that "bioassays provide an imprecise
form of measurements with a range of error. '70 Given this, the district court found the use of the term "about 160,000 IU/AU," coupled with the range of error already inherent in specific activity
limitation, served neither to distinguish the invention over the close
prior art (which described preparations of 120,000 IU/AU), nor to
permit one skilled in the art to know what specific activity values
71
below 160,000, if any, might constitute infringement.
62. 731 F.2d 818, 221 U.S.P.Q. 568 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
63. Seattle Box Co. v. Industrial Crating & Packing, Inc., 731 F.2d 818, 826, 221
U.S.P.Q. 568, 573-74 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

64.

l

65. Id. at 826, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 574. The court noted: "That some claim language may
not be precise, however, does not automatically render a claim invalid. When a word of degree is used the district court must determine whether the patent's specification provides
some standard for measuring that degree." Id.
66. See W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220 U.S.P.Q.
303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that absence from specification of specific formula for calculating reach of claims is irrelevant if one skilled in art would understand how to measure
limits).
67. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
68. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d
1016, 1030 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
69. Id.
70. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., No. 87-2617-Y, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16,110, at *205, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1768 (D. Mass. 1990).
71. Id.
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Furthermore, another of the co-defendants questioned whether
the specific activity value of 138,000 IU/AU, for its own product,
was within the claimed coverage. The district court required that
the original claim limitation, "at least 120,000," be amended to recite "at least about 160,000" because of a prior art publication
showing the specific activity value of 128,620 IU/AU. 72 The district
court found that the addition of the word "about" constituted an
effort to recapture a mean activity somewhere between the original,
albeit anticipated value and 160,000 IU/AU. 78 Finally, the district
court noted that nothing in the specification, the prosecution history, the prior art, the expert testimony, or the inventor's testimony
of record indicated what range of specific activity was covered by the
term "about." 74 In affirming the district court, the Federal Circuit
cautioned that its holding that the term "about" renders claims 4
and 6 indefinite should not be understood to rule out any and all
uses of this term in patent claims. 75 The court speculated that the
76
term could be acceptable in appropriate fact situations.
In both Orthokinetics,Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs,Inc.77 and Hybritech,
Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,78 the Federal Circuit made it clear
that the definiteness requirement of the second paragraph cannot
be used to require more precise language than the relevant technology permits, or is capable of generating. In Orthokinetics, the patent
for a collapsible wheelchair, designed for convenient storage in and
out of an automobile, was at issue. 79 The district court concluded
that the claim limitation, describing the wheelchair as "so dimensioned" as to fit inside an automobile, rendered the claim invalid
under the second paragraph.8 0 The district court reasoned that, as
a result of the imprecision of the term "so dimensioned," one seeking to build a noninfringing wheelchair could not determine
whether the chair would violate the claim without first constructing
72.

Id. at *206, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1768.

73.
74.

Id.
Id.

75. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1218, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030.
76. Id. (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220
U.S.P.Q. 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that "use of 'stretching... at a rate exceeding
about 10% per second' in the claims is not indefinite")).
77. 806 F.2d 1565, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
78. 802 F.2d 1367, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
79. Orthokinetics, Inc. v. Safety Travel Chairs, Inc., 806 F.2d 1565, 1575, 1 U.SP.Q.2d
1081, 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 1575-76, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1090. The claim language was as follows:
Wherein said front leg portion is so dimensioned as to be insertable through the
space between the door frame of an automobile and one of the seats thereof.
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a model and testing the model on vehicles of various sizes."1 The
Federal Circuit rejected this analysis, however, and stressed that it is
not the function of the claims to describe every possible dimension
82
of a claimed feature.
According to the Federal Circuit, the question of claim invalidity
under the second paragraph requires a determination of whether
those skilled in the art would understand what is claimed when the
claim is read in light of the specification.8 3 The Federal Circuit concluded from the patent specification that one of ordinary skill in the
art would easily have been able to determine the appropriate dimen84
sions of the wheelchair using the disputed term.
In Hybritech, an immunometric monoclonal antibody sandwich assay was the subject matter of the patent at issue.8 5 The relevant
claim language referred to "monoclonal antibodies having an affinity for the antigenic substance of at least about 108 liters/mole for
each of said labeled antibody and said antibody bound to a solid
carrier." 8 6 The district court held that the claims were indefinite
because, given the fact that the antibody affinity cannot be consistently estimated, the claims did not disclose how to avoid
87
infringement.
The Federal Circuit reversed, relying on evidence indisputably
showing that calculating affinity was known in the art at the time of
the Hybritech patent's filing.8 8 The court observed that, while there
may not have been any "standard" set of experimental conditions
used to estimate affinities, the claims, when read in light of the specification, reasonably apprised those skilled in the art. The court
went on to conclude that the claim language was as precise as the
89
subject matter permitted.
In Andrew Corp. v. GabrielElectronics, Inc.,90 the district court found
the patent for an improvement in a horn reflector microwave antenna to be invalid for indefiniteness under the second paragraph. 9 1
Furthermore, the district court found that the patent, if valid, would
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 1576, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1090.
83.
84.

85.
81, 83
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.

Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1369, 231 U.S.P.Q.
(Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
Id. at 1370, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 84.
Id. at 1371, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 84.
Id. at 1385, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 97.
Id.

90. 847 F.2d 819, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 2010 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988).
91. Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elecs., Inc., 847 F.2d 819, 821, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 2010, 2011
(Fed. Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 927 (1988).
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be infringed by Gabriel. 9 2 The district court stated that the recited
terms "approach each other," "close to," "substantially equal to,"
and "closely approximate" were particularly indefinite. 93 At trial,
the patentee, Andrew Corporation, asserted that the claims could
94
not reasonably be expressed more precisely.
The district court recognized that prior art patents dealing with
similar technology and using similar terms existed, but still held the
patent invalid. 9 5 The Federal Circuit, reversing the district court,
found that neither the record nor the law supported the position
that one of ordinary skill in the art would not know when certain
or "closely
"substantially
equal"
claimed
terms were
96
approximate."
Significantly, in Andrew Corp., the Federal Circuit rejected the theory that claims must specifically delineate the point at which in-

fringement starts. 97 The court further rejected the proposition that,
if such a point does not correspond to an unexpected change in
properties, the claims are fatally flawed under section 112.98
92.
93.
94.

Id
ld
Id

95. Id. at 823, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2012.
96. ld at 822, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2012.
97.

Ide

98. Id at 822-23, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2013-14. The court found this proposition erroneous
because it would prevent a patentee from obtaining claims that did not coincide with the exact
point at which a change in the physical phenomenon occurs and that such a theory would
require the patentee always to discover that point, no matter how prolonged or expensive the
additional research. Id. The court said such a theory would prevent patent protection when
the change at issue involved naturally gradual or incremental changes at its transition. Id. at
823, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2014. The court stated:
Patentability is not measured against the closest point on the road to invention.
Much technological change that meets the criterion of unobviousness, when viewed
in light of the prior art, has a fuzzy boundary at its point of origin. Technological
differences from prior art usually become more pronounced with distance from the
boundary, but the changes may become manifest gradually. Indeed, the location of
the boundary may well change with the available precision of measurement.
Id. The court further noted that patentability is tested against the "prior art," and that the
patentee is not required to show some technological discontinuity between the claimed invention and the subject matter just outside the claims. Id. The court reasoned that 35 U.S.C.
§ 103 requires only that the claimed subject matter be nonobvious in view of the prior art. Id.
The court stated:
The law imposes no obligation on a patent applicant to determine what is going on
in the technological gap between the claimed invention and the prior art, or to set
the claim limits at the precise technological edge of the invention. A claim is not
fatally indefinite for failing specifically to delineate the point at which the change in
physical phenomenon occurs.
Id.; see McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 423-24 (1891) ("Nothing is better settled in the
law of patents than that the patentee may claim the whole or only a part of his invention, and
that if he only describes and claims a part, he is presumed to have abandoned the residue to
the public.").
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In Slimfold Manufacturing Co. v. Kinkead Industries,9 9 a decision concerning the second paragraph, the Federal Circuit held that a lack of
antecedent support for a claim limitation does not necessarily
render the claim invalid for indefiniteness. 0 0 According to the Federal Circuit, as long as the scope of the claim, when read in light of
the specification, is clear to one of ordinary skill in the art, the definiteness requirement is satisfied.' 0 As issued, Slimfold's claim recited a metal door assembly and included a clause stating
"releasable latch means operatively arranged between said head
portion and said sleeve for releasably retaining said head in a retracted position adjacent said collar."' 0 2 During a subsequent reissue proceeding, the PTO examiner rejected the claim as vague and
indefinite because of the absence of an antecedent basis for the
claimed term "collar." In an effort to overcome the rejection,
Slimfold amended the claim to provide antecedent support by ad03
ding the term "a collar on said sleeve."'
In order to determine whether the reissue claim was substantially
"identical" to the issued claim, the Federal Circuit first had to decide whether the addition of antecedent support was necessary to
render the issued claim definite for purposes of the second paragraph.' 0 4 To determine the definiteness of the original claim, the
Federal Circuit turned to the specification. Noting that claims are
not interpreted in a vacuum, the court reasoned that claims are part
of, and are to be read in light of, the specification. 0 5 Because only
one collar appeared in the specification and it appeared in only one
place, the court concluded that, when read in light of the specifica06
tion, the original claim was definite.'
10 7
In In re Corkill, the Federal Circuit considered the effect of inoperative embodiments on the indefiniteness requirement. The Board
of Patent Appeals agreed with the PTO examiner's position that it
was not clear whether the claimed particle sizes referred to single
zeolite crystals or to agglomerates comprised of smaller crystals.' 0 8
Certain Corkill declarants stated that particles larger than ten microns led to unacceptable deposition on clothing and washing
99. 810 F.2d 1113, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
100. Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., 810 F.2d 1113, 1114, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1563, 1564
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1115, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1565.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1116-17, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1566.
105. Id. at 1117, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1566.
106. Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1567.
107. 771 F.2d 1496, 226 U.S.P.Q. 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108. In re Corkill, 771 F.2d 1496, 1500-01, 226 U.S.P.Q. 1005, 1009 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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machine surfaces.1 0 9 On the other hand, another Corkill declarant
stated that agglomerates up to 100 microns would perform acceptably in some applications, provided that the constituent crystals were
sufficiently small. 10
Corkill argued that simple experimentation would show which
particles worked and, as such, would be covered by the claims. The
PTO argued that even if particles larger than ten microns met the
rate limitation, they would be unsatisfactory for Corkill's purposes
because they would form unacceptable deposits.I'
The Federal Circuit determined that the evidence submitted by
Corkill supported the Solicitor's statement that Corkill's "claims do
not correspond in scope to what they regard as their invention.", 12
The court held that claims which included a "substantial measure"
3
of inoperative embodiments were fairly rejected."
B.

Defining What Applicant Regards As the Invention

The second requirement of the second paragraph demands that
claims define what the applicant regards as the invention.1 1 4 This
requirement dictates that while an applicant may claim whatever is
regarded as the invention, subject matter that is not regarded as the
invention cannot be claimed. The Federal Circuit has not had the
opportunity to consider this second requirement." 5 Since the Federal Circuit has adopted the precedent of its predecessor courts, it is
necessary to consult the opinions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) to gain a historical appreciation for the de6
velopment of this area of the law."1
109. Id. at 1501, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 1009.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Inre Cook, 439 F.2d 730, 734-35, 169 U.S.P.Q. 298, 302 (C.C.P.A. 1971));
see Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576-77, 224 U.S.P.Q,
409, 414 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (noting that although presence of some inoperative substances do
not render claim invalid, significant number of inoperative combinations, requiring undue
experimentation by one with ordinary skill in art, may render claim invalid); see also Diversitech Corp. v. Century Steps, Inc., 850 F.2d 675, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (finding
it improper for district court to redraft claims and then subsequently hold redrafted claims
invalid).
114. See In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 164 U.S.P.Q. 645 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (stating need for
precision in defining subject matter of claim language as required by section 112, second
paragraph).
115. Cf In re Corkill, 771 F.2d 1496, 1500, 226 U.S.P.Q. 1005, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(noting that "claims do not correspond in scope to what they regard as their invention" but
finding indefiniteness was issue on review).
116. SeeIn re Brower, 433 F.2d 813, 167 U.S.P.Q. 48 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (holding that patent
application must disclose invention pursuant to section 112, first paragraph); In rePrater, '115
F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (invalidating patent for failure to claim distinctly
subject matter that applicant regarded as invention).
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THE FIRST PARAGRAPH

The Federal Circuit has addressed several issues under the first
paragraph of section 112.117 The following case discussions have
been grouped according to these different issues.
A.
1.

The Enablement Requirement

Commensurate in scope

The term "undue breadth" is sometimes utilized by the PTO to
reject claims deemed "broader than the scope of enablement" present in the application. 1 8 Undue breadth rejections occur less frequently today than in the past, perhaps because the C.C.P.A.
reversed several Board decisions that were premised on the PTO's
failure to clarify which requirement of section 112 the applicant
failed to satisfy. 119
The Federal Circuit in United States v. Telectronics, Inc. 120 considered the issue of whether enablement is commensurate in scope
with the claim in an inter partes situation. In the case, Telectronics
alleged that the patent for a bone growth stimulator device was invalid for nonenablement because the disclosure did not bear a reasonable relationship to the scope of the claims. 12 ' Telectronics
admitted that the patent disclosed how to practice the invention if
the electrodes were comprised of one metal/current combinationstainless steel and a current in the range of five to twenty
microamperes. Telectronics asserted, however, that the claims were
not limited to that specific metal/current combination, and therefore the full scope of the claims was not enabled by the
22
specification.'
The district court agreed that the disclosure was inadequate for
electrodes made of materials other than stainless steel, and that an
117.. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988). Paragraph I reads as follows:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as
to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most
nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Id.
118. MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 76.03(2); LESTER HoRwrrz, IC PATENT
OFFICE RULES AND PRACTICE (Bender 1990).
119. See, e.g., In re Robins, 429 F.2d 452,456, 166 U.S.P.Q. 552,556 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re
Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d
904, 909, 164 U.S.P.Q. 642, 646 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
120. 857 F.2d 778, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989).
121. United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 779,8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1217, 1218 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989).
122. Id.
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undue amount of experimentation would be necessary for electrodes made of materials other than stainless steel. As a result, the
district court combined both nonenablement concepts of "undue
123
experimentation" and "not commensurate in scope."'
The Federal Circuit, in Telectronics, found that the findings and
conclusions of the district court were insufficient to constitute the
clear and convincing proof needed to find a U.S. patent invalid
based on nonenablement. The court found, as Telectronics admitted, that the patent disclosures were enabling with respect to the
stainless steel electrodes for the current range set out in the specification. 124 The specification showed that the current range was determined by a dose response test. The district court found that one
skilled in this art would know how to conduct such a response study
to determine the appropriate range of current for use with other
materials. Yet the district court, in invalidating the patent, focused
12 5
on the time and expense of such studies.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court, finding that the
time and expense of such studies, standing alone, were unpersua126
sive to show that excessive experimentation would be required.
Because the specification disclosed one embodiment and the general manner for ascertaining current range, the court recognized
that other permutations of the claimed invention could be practiced
without undue experimentation. 1 2 7 Citing In re Fisher128 and In re
Bowen,' 29 the Federal Circuit reversed because it was nonetheless
convinced that the case before it mandated a different result. The
court found no persuasive reason in the record as to why the specification did not realistically enable one skilled in the art to practice
the invention as broadly as claimed.' 3 0
123. Id at 784-85, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1223.
124. Id at 786, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224.
125. Id at 785, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1223 (referring to district court's finding that dose response studies typically cost $40,000 to $50,000 and require six to twelve months).
126. Id (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231
U.S.P.Q. 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)).
127. Id at 786, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1223.
128. 427 F.2d 833, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18 (C.C.P.A. 1970). The court in In re Fisher noted that
"[iln cases involving unpredictable factors, such as most chemical reactions and physiological
activity, the scope of enablement obviously varies inversely with the degree of unpredictability
of the factors involved." In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 838-39, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18, 23-24 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
129. 492 F.2d 859, 181 U.S.P.Q. 48 (C.C.P.A. 1974).
130. Telectronics, 857 F.2d at 786, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1224. The Federal Circuit noted the
district court's finding that the dose response study could be performed by those "expert in
the field. .. doing electrical stimulation experiments." Id.
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In United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,1' the Federal
Circuit again addressed the issue of whether the scope of enablement is reasonably commensurate with the full scope of protection
claimed. The court held that because application sufficiency must
be judged as of the filing date under section 112, Phillips' patent
claims were not invalid because the patent was entitled to the filing
date of its parent application under 35 U.S.C. § 120. Additionally,
the court found that the claims were adequately supported as of the
32
date of the parent application.'
The invention at issue was crystalline polypropylene. Phillips
originally filed the patent application in 1953. In 1956, Phillips filed
a continuation-in-part (CIP) application, finally resulting in the 1983
133
patent-in-suit.
At the district court level, defendants made numerous arguments
to invalidate the Phillips patent; their primary argument was that the
patent was invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as anticipated by a patent filed in 1955. Phillips did not dispute that defendants' reference
predated its CIP application filing date. To overcome the reference,
however, Phillips claimed that it was entitled to rely on the filing
date of its 1953 application under section 120.134

Defendants argued that the 1953 application did not describe the
entire class of compounds falling within the claims of the CIP application. Specifically, defendants asserted that the application specified intrinsic viscosities between a range of 0.2 to 1.0, and thus did
not describe defendants' polypropylenes, all of which had intrinsic
viscosities above 1.0. The district court, however, found that the
claims of Phillips' CIP application did not contain a limitation regarding intrinsic viscosity. 13 5 The district court therefore concluded

that Phillips satisfied both the written description and enablement
requirements of section 112. Under section 120, the district court
held that Phillips was entitled to rely on the filing date of the 1953
parent application.' 36
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, defendants argued that the district court misstated the law. They maintained that if a claim embraces subject matter for which no adequate basis exists in the
underlying disclosure, the claim is too broad. In particular, defend131.
132.

865 F.2d 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
United States Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1249, 9

U.S.P.Q.2d 1461, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
133. Id,
134.
135.

Id. at 1250, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1463.

136.

Id.
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ants contended that the differences in intrinsic viscosity and average
molecular weight made it clear that the scope of enablement of the
1953 application was not commensurate with the scope of the later
37
claim.'
The Federal Circuit noted that, while the adequacy of support is
judged in relation to the scope of the claims, the "application sufficiency" must be judged as of the filing date. 38 Therefore, the court
stated, the claim of the patent should be treated as of the 1953 filing
date. Only if the claim would, at that time, have been correctly rejected for lack of support in the 1953 specification, would Phillips be
denied the use of section 120.'3

9

The Federal Circuit viewed de-

fendants' argument as the same as that improperly relied on by the
PTO in In re Hogan.140 The court concluded that the fact that the
claim covered a later version of the claimed composition related to
14
infringement and not to patentability. '

In determining the sufficiency of support, the Federal Circuit reasoned that the state of the art and the level of skill in the art in 1953
were critical. 14 2 Examining the state of the art in 1953, the Federal
Circuit concluded that no one at that time thought it possible that
propylene monomers could be polymerized into polypropylene with

an intrinsic viscosity of 1.7 to 2.0 and an average molecular weight
approaching 50,000.143 The court, citing In re Koller,14 noted that
while the disclosure of specifics adds to the understanding one
skilled in the art would glean from a generic term, it does not follow
that such added disclosure limits the claim's meaning.14 5
In Hormone Research Foundationv. Genentech, Inc.,'146 the Federal Cir-

cuit considered a district court's error in applying In re Fisherand In
re Hogan. Hormone Research appealed the grant of summary judgment by the district court, which found that Genentech did not in137.

Id. at 1250-51, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.

138. Id. at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464 (citing In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232, 181
U.S.P.Q. 31, 34 (C.C.P.A. 1974)); see In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 604, 194 U.S.P.Q. 527, 535
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (ruling that PTO cannot rely on what occurred in art after filing date to estab-

lish application insufficiency); In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 823, 204 U.S.PQ. 702, 706
(C.C.P.A. 1977) (holding that compliance with section 112, paragraph one, is judged as of
date of application's filing).
139. United States Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
140. Hogan, 559 F.2d at 607, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 538. Hogan involved the same patent at issue
in United States Steel Corp. Id.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
(1991).

United States Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
Id. at 1252, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464.
In re Koller, 613 F.2d 819, 204 U.S.P.Q. 702 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
United States Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
904 F.2d 1558, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. dismissed, 111 S. Ct. 1434
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fringe certain claims of the '833 patent and that these same claims
were invalid for nonenablement. 14 7 Specifically, the district court
granted Genentech's motion because, in its view, the solid-phase
peptide synthesis process disclosed in the specification would not
have been sufficient to produce materials either as lengthy as the
having the
claimed polypeptide sequence or in as pure a form and
48
potency of natural human growth hormone (HGH).1
The Federal Circuit held that the enablement question should not
have been resolved summarily.' 4 9 Although the district court indicated that Genentech produced considerable evidence showing that
the disclosed sequencing method could not have yielded polypeptide sequences as lengthy as those claimed (190 amino acids), the
Federal Circuit found other evidence in the record that raised a genuine issue about this material fact.1 50 Specifically, the Federal Circuit reasoned that several journal articles cited in the record
supported the disclosure in the specification that the claimed
method produced the material documented in the '833 patent and
that such a material exhibited ectogenic activity. Resolving all inferences in favor of the nonmovant, Hormone Research, the Federal
Circuit held that summary judgment was precluded.1 5 1
Further, the court was unconvinced that Genentech was "entitled
to ajudgment as a matter of law."' 5 2 Reversing the summary judgment, the Federal Circuit reasoned that while the district court correctly applied the principles in In re Fisher,15 3 it failed to consider the
effect of In re Hogan' 5 4 on the resolution of the enablement
issues. 155
Applying In re Hogan, the Federal Circuit stated that although
purer compounds might be produced using more advanced technology, that fact does not necessarily mean that the enabling disclosure
147. Hormone Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1559, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d
1039, 1040 (Fed. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, III S. Ct. 1434 (1991).
148. Id. at 1561, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1041.
149. Id. at 1567, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1047.
150. Id. at 1567-68, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1047-48.
151. Id. at 1568, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1047.
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (providing for summary judgment on pleadings where moving party contends opponent presented no genuine issue of material fact).

153.

427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (prohibiting inventor with

insufficiently supported claims to encompass future compositions on larger scale than origi-

nally obtainable, particularly where unpredictable factors such as chemical reactions and
physiological activity are involved, as opposed to more predictable factors such as mechanical
or electrical elements).
154. 559 F.2d 595, 606, 194 U.S.P.Q. 527, 537 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (noting relevance of distinction between predictable and unpredictable fields of invention).
155. Hormone Research, 904 F.2d at 1568, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048 (citing United States Steel
Coip., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1464).
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contained in the specification was insufficient at the time of filing.
The record did not clearly show whether a more advanced recombinant DNA methodology existed at the time the application was filed.
Therefore, the court believed it was necessary for the district court
to conduct further factfinding on the state of the art at the time and
to consider the principles of In re Hogan before appellate review of
the relevant enablement issues could occur. 15 6 Consequently, the
Federal Circuit vacated the part of the summary judgment that
57
found the asserted claims to be invalid.'
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo.,158 the Federal Circuit
considered several issues of alleged nonenablement asserted by
each party against patents owned by the other. The district court's
application of In re Fisherwas considered in one issue. There were
two patents-in-suit. 159 The first was U.S. Patent No. 4,677,195 (the
'195 patent), entitled "Method for the Purification of Erythropoietin
and Erythropoietin Compositions." The '195 patent was assigned
to Genetics Institute, Inc. (GI), one of the co-defendants. This patent claimed both homogeneous erythropoietin (EPO) and compositions thereof, and a method for purifying human EPO using reversephase-high performance liquid chromatography. Only the homogeneous EPO and composition claims were at issue. 160 The second
patent was U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (the '008 patent), entitled
"DNA Sequences Encoding Erythropoietin." The '008 patent was
assigned to Amgen. The claims of the '008 patent covered purified
and isolated DNA sequences that encode EPO and host cells trans61
formed or transfected with a DNA sequence.
After a trial by a magistrate, the district court entered a judgment
based on the findings of fact and conclusions of law set forth by the
magistrate.16 2 With respect to the Amgen patent, the district court
found claims 7, 8, 23-27, and 29 to be invalid for lack of enablement
156. Id. at 1568-69, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048.
157.

Id. at 1569, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048.

158. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
This appeal addresses several other issues as well. For analysis on best mode, see infra notes
666-84 and accompanying text; for analysis of validity under sections 102(g) and 103, and
indefiniteness, see supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text.
159. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1203, 18 U.S.P.Q2d
1016, 1018 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991). Both patents concern purified erythropoietin (EPO). Id EPO is a protein consisting of 165 amino acids that stimulate the
production of red blood cells. Id. It is therefore a useful therapeutic agent in the treatment of
anemias or blood disorders characterized by low or defective bone marrow production of red
blood cells. Id.
160. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q2d at 1018-19.
161. Id. at 1203-04, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1019.
162. Id. at 1205, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1020.
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under section 112. In the alternative, the district court stated that
the claims, if valid, were infringed by GI.16 3
On appeal, Amgen first argued that the district court's holding
that' claim 7 of the '008 patent was not enabled without undue experimentation constituted legal error.'6 Claim 7 involved a generic
claim, covering all possible DNA sequences encoding polypeptides
having an amino acid sequence "sufficiently duplicative" of EPO to
possess the property of increasing the production of red blood
cells. 165 Amgen, citing In re Wands, 166 specifically argued that the

district court erred because it did not properly address factors that
the Federal Circuit held must be considered in determining lack of
67
enablement based on an assertion of undue experimentation.
168
Citing In re Fisher, the Federal Circuit considered at the outset the
"essential question"-whether the scope of enablement of claim 7
169
was- as broad as the scope of the claim itself.
The district court found that over 3600 different EPO analogs
could be made by a substitution at only a single amino acid position,
and over a million different analogs could be made by a substitution
of three amino acids. 170 The language of the '008 patent itself indicated that it embraced a means for the preparation of "numerous"
polypeptide analogs of EPO.' 7 ' The district court then noted that
the number of claimed DNA-encoding sequences that could pro172
duce an EPO-like product was potentially enormous.
Ir its holding of "nonenablement without undue experimentation," the district court also considered the deposition of the head
of Amgen's EPO analog program.'" This witness stated that he was
uncertain as to whether Amgen's fifty to eighty EPO analogs had the
163.' Id. at 1203, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1018.
164. Id at 1212-14, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026-28. Claims 8, 23-27, and 29 were not argued

separately, and were held to stand or fall with claim 7. Id; see In re Dillon, 919 F.2d 688, 692,
16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1897, 1900 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (in banc) (holding that it is not Federal Circuit's
practice to review claims not argued separately before PTO Board, given Board's expertise in
assessing patentability of each individual claim).
165. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026.
166. 858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
167. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026 (citing In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 8
U.S.P.Q2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (noting that "undue experimentation" is reached by weighing many factual considerations relating to claim and state of art)).
168. 427 F.2d 833, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
169. In re Fisher, 427 F.2d 833, 839, 166 U.S.P.Q. 18, 23 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (holding that
section 112, first paragraph, requires that scope of claim bear reasonable correlation to scope
of enablement provided in specification); see CHISUM, supra note 20, § 7.03[7][b] (discussing
enablement requirement under first paragraph of 112).
170. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
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desired biological property. The court also relied on the lack of
predictability in the art, as demonstrated by the testimony of another scientist who testified concerning these qualities. 7 4
The Federal Circuit stated that the district court arrived at the
right decision, but for the wrong reason. Specifically, by focusing
on the biological properties of the EPO analogs, the district court
failed to consider the enablement of the DNA sequence analogs that
were the subject of claim 7.175 For DNA sequences, the Federal Circuit stated that to provide a disclosure sufficient to enable one
skilled in the art to carry out the invention commensurate with the
scope of his claims, enough sequences must be disclosed to justify a
grant of the claims sought. 76 The Federal Circuit concluded that
Amgen's disclosure had not satisfied that requirement.' 77
Additionally, the Federal Circuit stated that it is not necessary for
a court to review all of the Wands factors in assessing the enablement
of a disclosure.' 78 The court instructed that these factors are merely
illustrative, not mandatory. 7 9 The court stated further that the
facts of the particular case determine what is relevant. Here, the
facts showed that Amgen's preparation of DNA sequences was not
sufficiently enabling to support its all-encompassing claims.' 8 0
The court noted that despite extensive statements in the specification concerning all analogs of the EPO gene that can be made,
Amgen's enabling disclosure included only a few particular analogs
and how to make them) 8 ' Although such a disclosure might justify
a generic claim encompassing these and similar analogs, the court
found it inadequate to support a claim to all EPO gene analogs. I8 2
The Federal Circuit found that the district court properly relied on
Fisher in making its decision. 8 3 In affirming the district court, the
Federal Circuit stipulated that, given the complexity of the EPO
gene, the applicant must include more information in the specifica174. Id. at 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027 (noting testimony of Dr. Goldwasser, another
scientist who worked on procedures for purifying urinary EPO).
175. Id.
176. Id. (citing In re Angstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 502, 190 U.S.P.Q. 214,218 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
177. Id.
178. Id. The factors listed in Wands for determining whether a disclosure would require
undue experimentation are the quality of experimentation necessary; the amount of guidance
presented; whether or not working examples are included; the nature of the invention; the
state of the prior art; the relative skill of ordinary experts in the field; the predictability of the
art; and the breadth of the claims. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1404
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
179. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1214, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1027.
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tion, including the identity of various analogs within the scope of
the claim, methods for making them, and structural requirements
18 4
for producing compounds with EPO activity.
Amgen's second challenge on appeal was of the district court's
determination that the '195 patent enabled a person of ordinary skill
in the art to obtain homogeneous EPO, recombinant EPO (rEPO)
and urinary EPO (uEPO) from natural sources having an in vivo specific activity of at least 160,000 IU/AU. 185 Based on expert testimony of both sides, the district court found that those skilled in the
art would consider the claims to refer to in vivo rather than to in vitro
specific activity, despite the absence of an express statement in the
patent. 186
The Federal Circuit stated that it did not consider the district
court's finding that the assay measurement was an in vivo specific
activity to be erroneous, in view of the testimony the district court
heard.18 7 Thus, the question before the Federal Circuit was
whether the district court erred in concluding that the claims requiring 160,000 IU/AU by an in vivo measurement were enabled. On
this latter point, the Federal Circuit concluded that the district court
erred.' 8 8 Specifically, the Federal Circuit found that defendants
produced no evidence that EPO was ever prepared with a specific
activity of at least 160,000 IU/AU in vivo using the disclosed methods. 18 9 In viewing the record, the court referred to GI's report to
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as setting forth a specific
activity of only 109,000 IU/AU for uEPO.' 90 GI originally arrived at
the figure of 160,000 IU/AU by calculation before it had the capacity to derive quantitative information from bioassays. Moreover, the
court noted that the work of others showed that Amgen did not enable the preparation of uEPO having an in vivo specific activity of at
least 160,000, as the claims required. 9 1 Finally, the Federal Circuit
stated that the district court improperly relied on the in vitro test
results of GI's expert because there was a lack of demonstrated cor19 2
relation between these tests to in vivo results.
The court also held that the patent failed to enable purification of
either rEPO or uEPO. The Federal Circuit stated two reasons for
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1028.
Id. at 1215, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029.
Id. at 1216, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1216-17, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1029-30.
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this finding. First, there was no purification attempt set forth in the
'195 patent for uEPO. Second, the only purification attempt on
rEPO failed to produce homogeneous EPO. 19 3 The Federal Circuit
concluded that Amgen had met its burden by successfully showing
94
that these claims had not been adequately enabled.
2.

The "how-to-make" requirement
a.

Satisfying the requirement

Pursuant to section 112, a specification must adequately disclose
to one skilled in the relevant art, how to make, or in the case of a
process, how to carry out, the claimed invention without undue experimentation. 195 In Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 196 the Federal Circuit held that the enablement requirement is satisfied as long
as the specification discloses at least one method for making and
using the claimed invention. The court further held that the failure
to disclose other methods by which the claimed invention may be
97
made does not render the claim invalid.'
Spectra-Physics involved patents directed to a laser and to a method
of making a laser. The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether
the patents enabled one to attach certain copper cups to a ceramic
tube. The specifications identified three suitable attachment techniques: TiCuSil brazing; moly-manganese brazing; and pulse-soldering. The district court concluded that because one of the
techniques, TiCuSil brazing, was not adequately disclosed, the
claims were invalid for lack of enablement. 198 The Federal Circuit
reversed, finding it sufficient that the enablement adequately disclosed at least one other attachment technique that would enable a
person skilled in the art to make the invention. The court found
that the failure to disclose all attachment techniques was not fatal to
enablement under section 112.' 9 9
193. Id at 1217, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1030 (citing In re Rainer, 377 F.2d 1006, 10i2, 153
U.S.P.Q. 802, 807 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (noting that "specification is evidence of its own
inadequacy")).
194. Id.
195. See 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 (defining requirement of enablement in specification of patent application).
196. 827 F.2d 1524, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
197. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1533, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737,
1743 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
198. Id.
199. Id The court stated:
If an invention pertains to an art where the results are predictable, e.g., mechanical
as opposed to chemical arts, a broad claim can be enabled by disclosure of a single
embodiment, and is not invalid for lack of enablement simply because it reads on
another embodiment of the invention which is inadequately disclosed.
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In Christiansonv. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,200 the Federal Circuit considered whether failing to disclose, in each of its nine patents, all the dimensions, tolerances, and production drawings
needed to mass produce the M-16 rifle was a violation of section
112's enablement and best mode requirements. With respect to enablement, the court observed that a patentee who elects to manufacture its claimed invention need not disclose in its patent the
dimensions, tolerances, drawings, and other parameters needed for
mass production. 20 1 The court concluded, therefore, that it was irrelevant whether Christianson was enabled by the patents to engage
20 2
in mass production of the claimed invention.
b. Availability of starting materials
A special problem with the "how-to-make" requirement concerns
the availability of a material or apparatus essential to make the
claimed product or carry out the claimed process. In Hybritech, Inc.
v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc.,203 discussed above in connection with
the second paragraph of section 112, the Federal Circuit reversed
the district court's holding that the patent-in-suit was invalid for failing to satisfy the "how-to-make" requirement. 20 4 The district court
held that the patent did not teach how to make the monoclonal antibodies employed in the claimed immunometric monoclonal antibody sandwich assay. 20 5 The Federal Circuit found this holding
especially problematic because the district court explicitly found
that the prior art taught the availability of monoclonal antibodies.
Given the district court's findings concerning the teachings of the
prior art, the Federal Circuit reversed the invalidity holding based
20 6
on section 112, first paragraph.
200. 822 F.2d 1544, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S.
800 (1988).
201. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1562, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
1241, 1254-55 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 800 (1988). The Federal
Circuit observed that: "Patents are not production documents, and nothing in the patent law
requires that a patentee must disclose data on how to mass-produce the invented product, in

patents obtained on either individual parts of the product or on the entire product." Id.
202. Id at 1563, 3 U.S.P.O.2d at 1255.
203. 802 F.2d 1367, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
204. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384, 231 U.S.P.Q.
81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)).
205. Id. at 1371, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 84.
206.

Il

at 1385, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 95.
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The "how-to-use" requirement

In Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp.,207 the Federal Circuit confronted
the issue of whether the incorrectness of a patentee's theory explaining the operation of the claimed invention can render the invention invalid for lack of utility and for lack of an enabling
disclosure. 20 8 The invention at issue in Raytheon was directed to a
"common cavity" oven capable of conventional thermal cooking,
microwave cooking, and pyrolytic self-cleaning. Prior art ovens with
these three modes of operation encountered problems, especially
with a phenomenon known as "autoignition." 20 9
The patentee developed an oven with proper ventilation during
the microwave, thermal, and self-cleaning modes and encountered
no fouling problems. Unfortunately, the patentee's theory of operation set forth in the specification to explain the absence of fouling,
namely, the continuation of convection during autoignition, was incorrect. Evidence introduced at trial established that, during the period of autoignition, continuation of convection did not, and
physically could not, happen. Because the district court interpreted
certain claims as requiring a means for continuing convection during autoignition, it held the claims invalid under sections 101 and
112.210

The Federal Circuit began its discussion in Raytheon by citing the
district court in Linde Air Products Co. v. Graver Tank & Manufacturing
Co. 2 1 ' in which the court recognized that an otherwise valid patent
covering a meritorious invention should not be struck down simply
because of the patentee's misconceptions about scientific principles
concerning the invention. 21 2 The Federal Circuit held, however,
that certain process claims are invalid because the misconception is
embodied in the claim. The court stated: "To make a claim for a
...
process in which these erroneous ideas are incorporated is to
stake out a process ... which does not in point of fact exist within
207. 724 F.2d 951, 220 U.S.P.Q. 592 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
208. Raytheon Co. v. Roper Corp., 724 F.2d 951, 953, 220 U.S.P.Q. 592, 593 (Fed. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); see Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate, Inc., 720 F.2d
1565, 1570, 219 U.S.P.Q. 1137, 1140 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that inventor's theory and
belief as to how invention operates is unnecessary to meet enablement requirement of section
112). According to Fromson, an inventor "need not comprehend the scientific principles on
which the practical effectiveness of his invention rests." Id.
209. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 953, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 593.
210. Id. at 955, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 594.
211. 86 F. Supp. 191, 75 U.S.P.Q. 231 (N.D. Ind. 1947), rev'd, 167 F.2d 531, 77 U.S.P.Q.
207 (7th Cir. 1948), af'd, 336 U.S. 271 (1949).
212. Raytheon, 724 F.2d at 956, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 596 (citing Linde Air Prods. Co. v. Graver
Tank & Mfg. Co., 86 F. Supp. 191, 197, 75 U.S.P.Q. 231, 235 (N.D. Ind. 1947), rev'd, 167 F.2d
531, 536-37, 77 U.S.P.Q. 207, 212 (7th Cir. 1948), aft'd, 336 U.S. 271, 277-79 (1949)).
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the invention." 2 13 Accordingly, in Raytheon, the Federal Circuit
found that "because the impossible cannot be enabled, a claim con21 4
taining a limitation impossible to meet may be held invalid."
The Federal Circuit further stated that an invention with a claim
requiring a means to attain an impossible result must be found inoperative, and the claim must be declared invalid under section 101 or
section 112.215 Thus, the court affirmed the invalidity holding with
respect to claim 1 of the patent because it construed the claim as
including a "means for continuing convection during autoignition,"
whereas the evidence established that this "does not and physically
21 6
cannot happen."
This limitation did not appear in the other claims that the district
court held to be invalid. Raytheon, the accused infringer, argued
that because the claims must be read in light of the specification,
and because prevention of back flow was the essence of the patentee's invention, all claims must be read to include the limitation that
appeared in claim 1. The Federal Circuit rejected that contention,
reasoning that while claims are to be interpreted in light of the specification, not everything expressed in the specification must be read
21 7
into all of the claims.
The Federal Circuit found to be erroneous both the district
court's interpretation of the claims as requiring the prevention of
autoignition and the district court's conclusion that because
218
autoignition occurred, the claims were invalid for lack of utility.
The Federal Circuit noted, however, that the claims merely required
the prevention of "explosive reactions" and not the prevention of
autoignition. The court further noted that "[i]t is only when greater
amounts of air enter the cavity that autoignition might escalate into
an 'explosion.' "219 The court found that the patentee did not claim
to prevent autoignition; the patentee claimed only to prevent explosions by restricting the air path to limit excess air to a level below
2 20
that productive of explosions.
213. Id. at 956, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 596 (quoting Linde Air Products, 86 F. Supp. at 197, 75
U.S.P.Q. at 235).
214. Id. (citing Linde Air Products, 86 F. Supp. at 197, 75 U.S.P.Q. at 235).
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 957, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 597.
218. Id. at 958, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 597-98.
219. Id., 220 U.S.P.Q. at 598.
220. Id. at 958, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 598. The district court also held the patent-in-suit invalid
because the ovens marketed by Roper (as set forth in claims interpreted by the district court
as requiring prevention of back flow and autoignition) failed to accomplish all objectives
stated in the patent. Id. The Federal Circuit noted, however, that claims do not have to
satisfy all the objectives stated in the patent. Id. When a properly claimed invention meets at
least one stated objective, utility under section 101 is clearly shown. Id. The court found the

650

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSrrY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:621

In Newman v. Quigg, 22 1 the Federal Circuit considered whether the
patent application for an energy generation system that purportedly
had higher energy output than input was sufficient to teach one
skilled in the art how to use the invention. The invention at issue
related to a method and device for increasing the availability of usable electrical energy or usable motion, or both, from a given
mass. 22 2 The examiner rejected the applicant's claims under section
112, first paragraph. 22 3 The Board affirmed this rejection, stating
that the claimed device was a "perpetual motion machine" and that
perpetual motion is impossible because it violates both the first and
second laws of thermodynamics. 2 24 Newman appealed the Board's
rulings to federal district court pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 145.225 At
trial, the district court held that the claimed invention was unpatentable under sections 101 and 112.226
On appeal of the district court's holding of lack of enablement,
the Federal Circuit stated that while it is not essential that an inventor correctly set forth the theory behind the invention, the applicant
must teach how to achieve the claimed result. 2 27 Because the district court found that the applicant's device and method, when used
in accordance with the teachings of the specification, did not produce the claimed result, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
claimed invention accomplished the major objective of preventing explosive reactions. Id. at
958-59, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 598.
221. 877 F.2d 1575, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173
(1990).
222. Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1577, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2173 (1990).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. The district court, in turn, referred the matter to a special master. Id. The
master reported to the court that applicant's results appeared to conflict with the laws of
thermodynamics and that the theory for the invention was suspect. Nevertheless, the master
found the evidence in support of applicant's claimed results to be overwhelming and reported
to the court that applicant should be entitled to a patent if he otherwise meets the requirements of the patent statutes. Id.
The Commissioner of the PTO objected to the master's report and requested, as the master
recommended, that the district court refer the application back to the PTO for review by
another examiner. Id. at 1578, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1342. The second examiner rejected the
claims under sections 101, 102, 103, and 112. Id. Additionally, the applicant was ordered,
under penalty of abandonment, to submit working models of three embodiments of the invention to the National Bureau of Standards (NBS) for testing. Id. The PTO declared the application abandoned when the applicant, Newman, did not comply with the order. Id. at 1579,
11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1342. At the district court's suggestion, the Commissioner ordered the applicant to produce a model of the invention so that an inter partes test could be conducted at
NBS. Id. at 1580, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1343. Newman did eventually produce a model of his
invention as directed. Id. at 1581, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1344.
226. Id. at 1577, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1341.
227. Id. at 1581-82, 11 U.S.P.O.2d at 1345.
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court's holding that Newman did not meet the requirements of sec2 28
tion 112, first paragraph.
4.

Undue experimentation

The PTO or the accused infringer has the burden of giving reasons, supported by the record as a whole, why a specification is not
enabling for purposes of either "how-to-make" or "how-to-use."
There is no enablement defect, however, where, given the specification's teachings, one of ordinary skill in the relevant art could make
'22 9
or use the claimed invention without "undue experimentation.
In Cross v. Iizuka,23 0 the Federal Circuit considered the sufficiency
of enabling disclosures and addressed the issue of "undue experimentation." This case involved an interference in which both parties had made inventions directed to imidazole derivative
compounds which inhibit the synthesis of thromboxane
synthetase. 23 l Both Cross and Iizuka claimed the benefit of foreign
priority applications under section 119, and each contended that the
other's foreign priority application failed to comply with the disclosure requirements of section 112.232
The examiner accorded both parties the benefit of the filing dates
of their respective foreign applications. 23 3 Noting that the utility alleged in each application was of a "pharmacological nature," the
examiner concluded that it was unnecessary to establish utility with
tests and dosages with respect to humans. The examiner further
noted that one of ordinary skill in the art would be able to deter228. Id. at 1582, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1345.
229. See, e.g., Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 941, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1321, 1328 (Fed. Cir.) (addressing enablement provision of 35 U.S.C. § 112 and
finding that determinations of invalidity for lack of enablement is question of law which must
be answered using facts and supported by clear and convincing evidence), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 296 (1990); In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1402 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(explaining that patent does not need to explain what is well known in art but rather must
enable person skilled in art to make and use claimed invention); Lindemann Maschinenfabrik,
GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 1463, 221 U.S.P.Q. 481, 489 (Fed.
Cir. 1984) (stating that enablement is legal issue and question is whether disclosure is sufficient to allow one skilled in art to practice claimed invention); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576, 224 U.S.P.Q. 409, 413 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (concluding that patent disclosure which requires some experimentation will not preclude enablement as long as amount of experimentation is not unduly extensive); W.L. Gore & Assocs.,
Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (finding
that patent is invalid only when undue experimentation is needed to practice invention), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
230. 753 F.2d 1040, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
231. Cross v. lizuka, 753 F.2d 1040, 1042, 224 U.S.P.Q. 739, 740-41 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Thromboxane synthetase is an enzyme which leads to the formation of thromboxane A
(TXA), a highly unstable, biologically active compound thought to be active in platelet aggregation. Id.
232. Id. at 1042, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 741.
233. Id.
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mine specific dosages for biological purposes without undue experimentation. 23 4 Although both parties complied with the disclosure
requirements, the examiner declared Iizuka the senior party because
its foreign priority application had a filing date earlier than that of
Cross. 23 5 Cross appealed to the Board on the issue of the sufficiency of Iizuka's application. 23 6 The Board affirmed, holding that
Iizuka's priority application contained an adequate "how-to-use"
23 7
disclosure.
The issue before the Federal Circuit was whether the Board erred
in holding Iizuka's foreign priority application sufficient to meet the
"how-to-use" requirement. 2 38 The court upheld the Board's decision and noted that although Iizuka's foreign priority application
failed to reveal dosage levels, the record clearly showed evidence
that those of ordinary skill had sufficient information, as of the critical date, to determine the approximate dosage for the desired pharmacological activity. 23 9
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of "undue experimentation" inAtlas Powder Co. v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.24 0 and W.L.
Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc. 24 1InAtlas Powder, the patent at issue
related to an improved water-resistant emulsion "blasting agent,"
consisting of a water-in-oil emulsion of ammonium nitrate, fuel oil,
and a water-in-oil emulsifying agent that served as a blasting agent
in the presence of occluded air. 2 42 Du Pont argued, inter alia, that
the patent was invalid under the first paragraph of section 112 be234. Id.
235. Id. at 1042-43, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 741.
236. Id. at 1043, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 741.
237. Id., 224 U.S.P.Q. at 742.
238. Id. at 1043-44, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 743.
239. Id. at 1051-52, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 748. The court distinguished this situation from the
situation in In reGardner, 427 F.2d 786, 166 U.S.P.Q. 138 (C.C.P.A. 1970), observing that
Gardnerdealt with a therapeutic use, not a pharmacological activity. Cross, 753 F.2d at 104243, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 741.
240. 750 F.2d 1569, 224 U.S.P.Q. 409 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
241. 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
The facts of Gore are discussed supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. In Gore the district
court invalidated both patents for "indefiniteness" because "trial and error" would be required to determine the stretch rate ofpolytetrafluroethylene (PTFE). W.L. Gore & Assocs. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1557, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 851 (1984). The Federal Circuit ruled that the district court erred in this determination
because the specifications were directed to "enablement" as opposed to "indefiniteness."
The court stated: "Assuming some experimentation were needed, a patent is not invalid because of a need for experimentation." Id. (citing Minerals Separation, Ltd. v. Hyde, 242 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1916)). The court also held that "[a] patent is invalid only when those skilled in
the art are required to engage in undue experimentation to practice the invention." Id. (citing
In reAngstadt, 537 F.2d 498, 503-04, 190 U.S.P.Q. 214, 218 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). There was no
evidence, and the court made no finding, that undue experimentation was required. Id.
242. Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1569, 224
U.S.P.Q. 409, 409-10 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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cause the specification listed only ingredients that could form
"thousands of emulsions," and that it failed to teach which combinations would work. 243 The district court rejected Du Pont's argument and concluded that it would have been impossible for the
patentee to have listed all operable emulsions and exclude inoperable ones. 24 4 Moreover, the district court observed that one of ordinary skill in the art could easily select the proper ingredients by
245
applying a basic principle of emulsion chemistry.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court and repeated
the well-established rule that the mere presence of possibly inoperative combinations does not necessarily invalidate claims. 2 46 According to the Federal Circuit, invalidation would occur only if the
number of inoperative combinations was so large that, in effect, it
forced one of ordinary skill in the art to conduct unduly extensive
experimentation in order to practice the claimed invention. 24 7 The
court found, based on the facts before it, that such a situation did
248
not exist.
In Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick
Co.,249 the invention related to hydraulic shears used to cut scrap
metal into small, uniform pieces for recycling. The district court
held the patent non-enabling because it did not disclose a hydraulic
and electrical system for controlling the operation of the rams that
crushed and compacted the scrap.2 50 American Hoist argued that
undue experimentation was shown by the great deal of time it spent
251
in designing its split ram shear.
The Federal Circuit reversed because the evidence of record established that hydraulic and electrical systems for metal scrap shears
were well known to those skilled in the art and that selection and
2 52
connection of those elements was simply a matter of "plumbing."
The court observed that the time American Hoist spent in its design
efforts was only slightly more than the time Lindemann spent de2 53
signing the entire split ram shear, including the control system.
The court found no evidence to suggest that this time resulted from
243. Id. at 1576, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 413.
244. Id. at 1572, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 411.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 1576, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 414.
247. Id. at 1576-77, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 414.
248. Id.
249. 730 F.2d 1451, 221 U.S.P.Q. 481 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
250. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GmbH v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d
1451, 1452, 221 U.S.P.Q. 481, 483 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
251. Id.
252. Id. at 1463, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 489.
253. Id.
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any difficulty in designing a suitable hydraulic-electrical control system due to an inadequate description in the disclosure. Furthermore, the court noted that American Hoist spent some of this time
attempting to create a different connection device, when the patent
already disclosed a simple connection pin. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded that no undue experimentation was required in prac2 54
ticing the claimed invention.
In In re Wands, 25 5 the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of undue
experimentation in connection with a patent sought for monoclonal
antibodies. The applicant appealed the Board's affirmance of the
examiner's rejection of the patent application for lack of enablement
based on undue experimentation. 2 56 The application involved immunoassay methods for the detection of hepatitis B surface antigen
by using high-affinity monoclonal antibodies of the immunoglobin
M (IgM) isotype. 257 The examiner found that the data presented by
Wands to show the production of the antibodies was unpredictable
and unreproducible, requiring undue experimentation to make the
antibodies. 25 8 The method for producing the antibodies used in
Wands' claimed method was disclosed in U.S. Patent No. 4,271,145
(the '145 patent) and was incorporated by reference into the appli259
cation on appeal.
There was no contention that the starting materials were not
available to the public, and the PTO conceded that the methods
used to prepare and screen hybridomas were either well known in
the art or adequately disclosed in both the '145 patent and the current application. 26 0 Therefore, the only question was whether undue experimentation was needed to produce the high affinity
26
monoclonal antibodies. '
The Federal Circuit noted that the necessity of undue experimentation is not a single, simple factual determination. Instead, undue
experimentation is reached by weighing many factual considerations
including: (1) the quantity of experimentation necessary; (2) the
amount of direction or guidance presented; (3) the presence or absence of working examples; (4) the nature of the invention; (5) the
state of the prior art; (6) the relative skill of those in the art; (7) the
predictability or unpredictability of the art; and (8) the breadth of
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

Id.
858 F.2d 731, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 733, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1400, 1401 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Id.
Id. at 739, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1405-06.
Id. at 733, 8 U.S.P.Q2d at 1401.
Id. at 736, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404.
Id.
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the claims. 26 2 In a declaration, Wands stated that only a few of the
263
antibodies from the processes were chosen for further screening.
The remainder of the antibodies and the hybridomas (those that
produce the antibodies) were then saved by freezing. 2 64 Only nine
antibodies were analyzed further, and of those nine, only four were
2 65
found to fall within the claims of the application.
The Board focused on the fact that the stored hybridomas were
not tested and that only 4 of the total 143 hybridomas had actually
been shown to fall within the claims. 26 6 Therefore, based on statistics showing a two percent success rate, the Board concluded that a
person skilled in the art would have to engage in undue experimentation to make antibodies that fell within the claims.2 67 Wands, on
the other hand, argued that four of the nine, or forty-four percent of
the hybridomas actually tested, produced antibodies which fell
within the claims. 268 According to Wands, the remaining 134
unanalyzed and stored cell lines should not have been presumed
failures. 2 69 Wands submitted a second declaration, stating that another fusion experiment had been performed and the result was yet
270
another hybridoma producing a high-affinity antibody.

The Federal Circuit agreed with Wands, stating that it was unduly
harsh to classify the stored cell lines as failures which demonstrated
that the claimed method was unpredictable or unreliable. 271 The

court noted that, in the monoclonal antibody art, an experiment is
not the screening of a hybridoma, but the entire procedure of making a monoclonal antibody against a particular antigen. 272 Wands
carried out the entire procedure three times and each time made at
least one antibody satisfying all the claim limitations. 273 This evi-

dence, the court concluded, rebutted the PTO's challenge to the en2 74
ablement of the disclosure.
In Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.,275 the Federal Circuit
held that the district court properly found certain claims invalid on

262. Id. at 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1404.
263. Id at 738, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1405.
264. Id. Wands, in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1991), disclosed that the
hybridomas that had been stored were not tested. Id.
265. Id266. Id. at 739, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1405.
267. Id., 8 U.S.P.0.2d at 1405-06.
268. Id., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1406.
269. Id.
270. Id271. Id.
272. Id. at 740, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1407.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q02d 1321 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).

656

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:621

the basis that the patent applicant concealed the best mode for carrying out the invention of those claims. 2 76 The court held that the
district court should not have held other claims invalid for lack of
enablement for failure to provide an enabling disclosure of the
software program used to carry out the claimed invention. 2 77 The
invention was directed to a programmable processor-based batch
data entry terminal which provided an improved way of entering,
verifying, and storing data. 2 78 According to the invention, data is
keyed in and printed on a screen where an operator can make visual
checks and edits. Because entry and verification of data are done at
the source by persons who understand the data, the system removes
a source of error in data processing. A storage area holds the data
until a complete and correct record is obtained, after which it is
2 79
transferred to a magnetic tape cassette.
With respect to the enablement requirement, the district court
held certain claims invalid because the patent specification did not
contain an enabling disclosure of the software program used to
carry out the claimed invention. 28 0 Before ruling on the propriety
of the district court's actions, the Federal Circuit reiterated two wellestablished principles of patent law. First, an analysis of the enablement issue requires a determination of whether a person skilled in
the pertinent art, using both the knowledge available to such a person and the disclosure in the patent document, could make and use
the invention without undue experimentation. Second, it is not fatal
if some experimentation is needed because the patent document is
not intended to be a production document. 28 ' For the legal standard to be applied to cases in which a computer program is challenged, the court stated that enablement is determined from "the
viewpoint of a skilled programmer using the knowledge and skill
with which such person is charged. ' 28 2 The court also noted that
the amount of disclosure required to enable the practice of this type
of invention would vary according to such factors as the nature of
the invention, the role of the program in carrying it out, and the
complexity of. the programming involved. 28 3 The patentability of
276. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931, 933, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1322 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 941, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1328.
281. Id., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329.
282. Id.
283. Id. (citing In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 817, 204 U.S.P.Q. 537 (C.C.P.A. 1980), re:d.
denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981)).
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the invention was not in the details of the program writing, the court
explained, but in the apparatus and method that was based on a
combination of components and steps. 2 84 Important to the court on
this issue was the fact that experts for each side testified that "an
experienced programmer could, without unreasonable effort, write
a program to carry out the invention of the ... patent." 28 5
The Federal Circuit acknowledged that there have been circumstances where production of the computer program was not routine. 28 6 In reversing the district court's lack of enablement holding,
however, the Federal Circuit found that such circumstances were
not shown or suggested in the present invention, and that the great
weight of the expert testimony on both sides indicated that a
programmer of reasonable skill could write a satisfactory program
28 7
with ordinary effort.
5.

Provingenablement
a. Claim interpretationin determining enablement

Before an enablement analysis can be undertaken, the claims must
be properly construed. Several Federal Circuit opinions have resolved the enablement issue through proper claim construction. In
Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 288 the Federal Circuit
considered the enablement and written description requirements
for a patent covering a boresonic method of an apparatus for inspecting turbine rotors in electrical generators by use of ultrasonic
waves to detect discontinuities within the rotors. 28 9 The district
court ruled that the patent met the requirements of section 112, giving three reasons for such a finding. First, anyone with the skills
required in the art of ultrasonic testing could have determined how
to make and use the patented invention simply by reading the patent specification. Second, the evidence established that the specifi284. Id.
285. Id., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329. The district court referred in its opinion to an expert
who testified that one skilled in the art of computer programming could not tell where the
program format would be loaded, what a typical program format would be, what characters
would be used, or what would be the range or limitations of the format program. Id. at 942,
15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1329-30. Certain sections of this expert's testimony were refuted on crossexamination. Id.
286. Id. at 942, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega ServoControl, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791, 218 U.S.P.Q. 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
287. Id. at 943, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1330.
288. 808 F.2d 1490, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052
(1987).
289. Alco Standard Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 808 F.2d 1490, 1493, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
1337, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 483 U.S. 1052 (1987).
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cation adequately described the claimed invention. Third, the
290
language of the specification supported the claim.
On appeal, each party's argument centered around the language
of the claims pertaining to "correlating" and "combining" the information derived from the ultrasonic scans. The Federal Circuit
noted that the prosecution history of the patent demonstrated specific and definite meanings of the words "correlating" and "combining," and that one skilled in the art of the invention would have
understood these meanings. 29 1 The court accepted the meaning of
"correlate" as set forth in the specification and the meaning of
"combine" as set forth in the specification and the October 19, 1975
amendment (generally, to gather all the ultrasonic blips that have
been correlated for one defect and use those blips to derive information about the nature of the defect that any single blip might not
have revealed). 2 9 2 The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court's holding, that one skilled in the art would have known how to
correlate and combine the ultrasonic scan data from a reading of the
293
patent disclosure, was not erroneous.
In DeGeorge v. Bernier,294 the Federal Circuit decided whether a
claim was properly construed in determining an award of priority in
an interference action. The Board held that the claim language of
the patent at issue defined a combination of a word processor and a
two-counter comparison paragraph indent (TCCPI) circuit, rather
than a TCCPI circuit alone. Further, the Board found that the senior party, DeGeorge, was not entitled to its application filing
date. 29 5 Reversing the Board's holding, the court found that a
broad construction of the claim as referring to a TCCPI circuit only,
was proper. Further, the court found that the DeGeorge disclosure
adequately described the TCCPI circuit for purposes of enablement
under this construction. 296 The court explained that the enablement analysis conducted by the Board was hampered by its errone297
ous interpretation of count one as including a word processor.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the disclosure of the detailed,
claimed TCCPI circuitry satisfied the enablement requirement with290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Idl at 1495, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1340.
Id at 1495-96, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1340-41.
Id at 1496, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1341.
Id.
768 F.2d 1318, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
DeGeorge v. Berrier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1320, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 760 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 1323, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 762.
Id.
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out a detailed disclosure of all related, unclaimed circuitry with
29 8
which the TCCPI might be interfaced.
In Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 299 the Federal Circuit considered how the claims of the patent differed from disclosure of the
parent application, in order to determine if Hughes could avoid the
effect of a publication under section 102(b) by invoking section
120.300 The patent at issue, the Williams patent, resulted from a
CIP application to the parent application.3 0 1 The Williams patent
recited a practical system for altitude control of a spin-stabilized
3 02
satellite.
The Federal Circuit ruled that to avoid invalidity under section
102(b), the Williams patent must have been entitled to the parent
application's filing date and, to gain the benefit under section 120,
the parent must have been enabling under section 112 with respect
to the invention set forth in the claims of the patent. 30 3 The Federal
Circuit noted that the trial judge's use of language relied on by the
government in its appeal was not the language finally set forth in
the claims.3 0 4 The court further stated that that language may be
viewed as a sufficient enablement present in the parent application
because the CIP application merely added an "amplication of the
language in the parent application." 305 The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the Court of Claims' holding that the Williams patent was
not invalid under section 102(b) and was valid under section 112;
the patent was entitled to the patent applications filing date, and was
under section 112, since the patent was enabling with respect to the
30 6
invention set forth in the claims.
b.

Use of post-filing date evidence

Use of documentary evidence dated after the application is not
relevant to prove enablement, unless that documentary evidence reflects the state of the art at the time the application was filed.3 0 7 In
298. Id. at 1324, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 763.
299. 717 F.2d 1351, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
300. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 717 F.2d 1351, 1358, 219 U.S.P.Q. 473, 478
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
301. Ia at 1352, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 474.
302. Id. at 1353, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 474.
303. Ia at 1358-59, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 478.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Compare W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q.
303, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (concluding that section 112 requires inventor to explain best mode
of practicing invention known to him at time application is filed) with Gould v. Quigg, 822
F.2d 1074, 1078, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1302, 1304 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding information introduced
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W. L. Gore & Associates v. Garlock, Inc.,308 the Federal Circuit had an
opportunity to comment on the attempted use of post-filing date art
to invalidate a patent. In Gore, the district court concluded that the
patents did not enable one skilled in the art to make and use the
invention because the specification did not define "stretch rate,"
and because different formulae for computing stretch rate were developed and presented at trial. 30 9 The Federal Circuit held that with
respect to "stretch rate," the district court erred in focusing on formulae developed subsequent to the time the applications were
filed. 310 The court further stated that there was uncontradicted evidence in the record that at the time the application was filed "stretch
rate" meant, to those skilled in the art, the percent of stretch divided by the time of stretching.3 1 ' Accordingly, the court found that
the absence from the specification of a formula for calculating
stretch rate was irrelevant, as were any formulae developed subse3 12
quent to the filing dates.
As Gould v. Quigg 3 13 illustrates, however, an applicant or patentee
is not precluded from introducing post-filing date evidence in all
instances. The patent in Gould involved laser technology, specifically gas discharge light amplifiers employing atomic and subatomic
particle collisions in gases to amplify light by simulated emission of
radiation.3 1 4 The patent-in-suit resulted from a series of continuation and divisional applications dating back to 1959. Gould's application was rejected by the PTO for lack of enablement under section
112, and the rejection was affirmed by the Board.3 15 Gould then
filed a section 145 action and introduced new evidence not
presented to the PTO.3 1 6 In light of that new evidence, the district
3 17
court set aside the PTO's decision.
In appealing the district court's findings, the PTO argued that the
Board's affirmance of the examiner's decision should be upheld beto demonstrate level of ordinary skill in art admissible despite being dated after application
was filed).
308. 721 F.2d 1540, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984);
see supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text (discussing facts of Gore).
309. W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q, 303, 315
(Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 851 (1984).
310. Id. at 1557, 220 U.S.P.Qat 315-16 ("[S]ubsequently developed and therefore irrelevant formulae cannot be used to render non-enabling or indefinite that which was enabling
and definite at the time the application was filed.").
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. at 315.
313. 822 F.2d 1074, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
314. Gould v. Quigg, 822 F.2d 1074, 1075, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1302, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
315. Id. at 1076, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1303.
316. Id.
317. Id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1303.
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cause the examiner had a reasonable basis for doubting the enablement of Gould's application, and because Gould presented no
evidence to the Board or the district court to rebut this prima facie
case.3 1 8 The PTO also contended that the district court erred in
relying on the testimony of Gould's technical expert. 3 19 According
to the PTO, Gould's expert based his opinion on knowledge acquired by him after 1959, the relevant inquiry date. 3 20 The Federal
Circuit deferred to the trial judge, however, who expressly stated
that he viewed Gould's expert to have more impressive credentials
and to be more credible than the PTO's expert. 32 1 The court further stated that it was not improper for Gould's expert to refer in his
testimony to a technical article published after Gould's filing date
because the later-dated publication was not offered as evidence to
3 22
supplement the disclosure of the earlier-filed application.
Rather, the later-dated publication was offered as evidence of the
level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the application, and as
323
evidence that the disclosed device would have been operative.
The Federal Circuit concluded that it was entirely proper to refer to
the post-filing date publication for these purposes.3 24 While acknowledging that enablement is a question of law, the court noted
that the ultimate legal question of enablement is often based on
"numerous factual underpinnings."3 2 5 Because the factual underpinnings of the district court's opinion were not shown to be clearly
erroneous, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding
3 26
that Gould's application was enabling.
c.

Use of expert declarations

In In re Buchner,3 27 the Federal Circuit considered the sufficiency
of an expert declaration to overcome a rejection for nonenablement. The PTO found that the declaration set forth only a conclusion unsupported by factual documentation to provide adequate
indication that the technology was well known as of the effective fil318.

Id. at 1077, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1304.

319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 1078, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1304. Further, the Federal Circuit stated: "Perhaps one
reason the district court credited Dr. Franken's [Gould's expert] testimony over that of Dr.
Feldman [the PTO's expert] is that Dr. Franken was a person skilled in the art at the time of
Gould's filing date." Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1077, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1303-04.
326. Id. at 1079, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1305-06.
327. 929 F.2d 660, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1331 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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ing date.3 28 The claimed invention related to a higher order digital

transmission system that communicated a plurality of separate digital streams over a common channel and included a transmitter and
receiver.3 29 The receiver further included a phase comparator that
had four inputs and one output, and a divider that had two inputs
3 30
and one output.

The PTO rejected Buchner's application on the ground that it
failed to describe how to make and use the phase comparator and
divider without undue experimentation. 33 ' Although the examiner
found that the application adequately described the functions of
these two elements, it rejected the application because the design
structures of the two elements were not disclosed.33 2 The examiner
asserted that the comparator was atypical because it was not a twoinput phase comparator and because the divider was not a typical
one-input divider.333 Applicant Buchner then offered the testimony
of an expert, Professor Jan Louis de Kroes, who stated that the
phase comparator and the divider were well known to those of ordinary skill in the art as of the filing date of a foreign priority application. The expert also stated that these elements were "routinely
built," providing details concerning the structure and function of
these elements.334
The Board found a reasonable basis for the examiner to question
the sufficiency of the disclosure. The Board further found that the
declarant's assertions that these elements were "well known" and
"routinely built" were conclusory statements unsupported by any
other evidence.335 The Board stated that if the phase comparator
and the divider were so "well known" and "routinely built" as of the
effective filing date, the expert should have been able to document
33 6
his conclusions.
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Buchner argued that the declaration of the expert, de Kroes, unequivocally established a fact that
33 7
could not be dismissed without evidence of a contrary inference.
The court noted that an examiner may reject a claim if it is reasonable from the facts to conclude that one skilled in the art would be
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

In re Buchner, 929 F.2d 660, 661, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1331, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 660-61, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1331-32.
Id.
Id. at 661, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1332.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unable to carry out the claimed invention. In the instant case, the
court concluded that it was reasonable for the examiner to question
whether the claimed invention could have been carried out based on
the disclosure because the elements at issue were integral to the
practice of the invention and neither the application nor the prior

art described their structure. Consequently, the Federal Circuit
held that Buchner had the burden of overcoming the rejection. 338

Despite the fact that the declaration provided significant detail
with respect to the structure and function of the elements in question, the Federal Circuit stated that it was not sufficient to provide
such "well-known" information only through an expert.3 39 Moreover, the court stated that it is necessary for an expert's opinion on
ultimate legal issues to be supported by something more than conclusory statements. 340 The court observed that in the present case,
de Kroes did not provide adequate support for his conclusion. The
court found that de Kroes only described how he would construct
the divider and phase comparator and failed to demonstrate that
such construction was well known to those of ordinary skill in the
art.3 4 1 Thus, the court concluded that the Board did not err in af-

firming the examiner's rejection of all claims under section 112, first
paragraph.3
d.

42

Use of extrinsic evidence

In White ConsolidatedIndustries, Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc.,s4 the
Federal Circuit dealt with a patentee's attempt to rely on extrinsic
evidence to show that it complied with enablement requirements.
The patent in White was directed to a numerical control system for
machine tools in which a computer program controlled the operation of a machine tool.3 44 The computer program, termed a "part
program," was a series of instructions defining the operations performed by particular parts of the machine. The "part program"
could be written in numerical control language or machine-readable
form.345
338.

Id

339.
340.
341.

Id. (citing In re Smyth, 184 F.2d 982, 990, 90 U.S.P.Q. 106, 112 (C.C.P.A. 1951)).
Id.
Id. In quoting the Board, the court stated that if the phase comparator and divider

arrangement were so "well known" and "routinely built" as of the effective filing date, "the
declarant should have [had] no trouble documenting the same ....
" Id.
342. Id. at 662, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1332.
343. 713 F.2d 788, 218 U.S.P.Q. 961 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
344. White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 789, 218
U.S.P.Q. 961, 961-62 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
345. Id.
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When the instructions were written in a numerical control language, a "processor" or translator was required to convert the instructions into a machine-readable form.3 4 6 The specification of the
patent stated that the translator may be a known translator, and offered SPLIT as an example.3 4 7 At the time the application was filed,
SPLIT was a trade secret of Sundstrand, White's predecessor in interest, and was available only by purchase from Sundstrand. The
district court concluded that at the time the application was filed,
SPLIT was the only language that worked in the patented system,
and therefore the failure to disclose SPLIT rendered the patent
3 48
non-enabling.
White did not argue that SPLIT was undisclosed in the specification. Rather, White argued that the specification was enabling because it stated that a known or standard translator, "for example
SPLIT," could be used and that the application specified the characteristics of such a translator.3 4 9 White argued that because there
were other known translators that were interchangeable with SPLIT,
the specification satisfied the enablement requirement.3 5 0 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that in order to claim an element of
the invention as a trade secret and still satisfy the section 112 enabling requirements, there must be known equivalent elements
available to those skilled in the art.3 5 1 Applying this test to the facts
before it, the Federal Circuit concluded that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that suitable substitutes to SPLIT were known
3 52
and widely available to those skilled in the art.
White attempted to rely on evidence suggesting that there were
other "take-off" translators of SPLIT.35 3 The Federal Circuit indicated, however, that the availability at the time the application was
filed of other translators did not in itself provide a basis for finding
that a person skilled in the art, on reading the specification, would
know that another translator would be suitable.3 54 White's argument was further weakened by statements made by Sundstrand, one
week after the patent application was filed, in which Sundstrand ex346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Id. at 789, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 962.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 790, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 962-63.
Id., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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pressed doubt that other translators would be compatible with the
55
one used in their systems.3
An additional argument advanced by White asserted that SPLIT
was available, although only upon purchase from Sundstrand. 3 56
The Federal Circuit dismissed this argument, stating that the availability of SPLIT from Sundstrand could not cure the patent's invalidity because it did nothing to cure the inadequacy of the enabling
description. 357 The court noted that while the "language translator" itself was not the claimed invention, it was an integral part of
the system and its disclosure was essential to enable those skilled in
358
the art to make and use the device.
In conducting a policy analysis, the Federal Circuit hypothesized
that if it allowed Sundstrand (now White) to maintain SPLIT as a
trade secret, White could actually enjoy exclusionary rights beyond
the seventeen-year life of the patent through its control of access to
SPLIT-a result contrary to the objectives of the patent system.3 5 9
Accordingly, the court ruled that Sundstrand (White) was obligated
to disclose the details of SPLIT, unless its equivalent was known and
available to those skilled in the relevant art or its equivalent could
3 60
be acquired without undue experimentation.
The Federal Circuit noted that the required experimentation
must be reasonable and rejected White's argument that one skilled
in the art could obtain a suitable substitute to SPLIT by conducting
experimentation. The only evidence on this point was the testimony
of a computer programmer who estimated that development of a
language translator would require from one and one-half to two
years of effort, a time period which the court viewed as clearly
36
unreasonable. '
White argued that the computer programmer's estimate was
faulty because it ignored the fact that suitable substitutes for the
translator were available at the time the application was filed. The
Federal Circuit rejected this contention, stating that the language in
the patent specification, which merely mentioned the need for a
"known translator.., as for example SPLIT," did not identify which
language translators could be used.3 6 2 The court also noted that
White failed to present any evidence showing that one skilled in the
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.

Id.
Id. at 790-91, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 963.
Id. at 791, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 963.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 963-64.
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art could select or develop a suitable translator without undue ex3 63
perimentation and delay.
The Federal Circuit stressed that it does not look with favor on
those who maintain important aspects of their patented invention as
trade secrets. 3 64 Although White provided evidence in the form of a
magazine announcement that another translator, APT, was available
prior to the filing date of its patent application, the court nonetheless found this reliance on extrinsic evidence insufficient to show
that one skilled in the art would know that APT could be used as a
substitute for SPLIT.3 65 The court ruled that because the announcement did not mention APT's compatibility with SPLIT, the
announcement did not prove any recognized knowledge in the art
that could save the validity of a patent application without an en3 66
abling disclosure.
e.

Review ofjury findings

In Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball International,Inc. ,367 the Federal Circuit reviewed a jury verdict finding a patent invalid for failure to
describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the
art to make and use it. The patents at issue, the '799 and '806 patents, dealt with organs that electronically reproduced the notes and
tones of a pipe organ.36 8 In response to an interrogatory as part of
its special verdict, the jury found the claims of the '806 patent invalid on nonenablement grounds, concluding that the '806 patent
failed to describe the invention in sufficient detail to enable a person
skilled in the art to make and use it.369 The Federal Circuit stated
that although enablement is deemed to be a question of law, it is
amenable to resolution by the jury.3 7 0 The court said that the relevant inquiry for appellate review of a jury's verdict is whether "a
reasonable jury could have made the underlying factual findings
363. Id., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 964. Additionally, White's reliance on publications issued after
the filing date to establish the suitability of other translators was unavailing because a suffident disclosure must exist as of the application filing date. Id
364. Id. at 790-91, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 963-64.
365. Id.
366. Id at 791, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 964. The court reached the same conclusion with respect
to a technical paper on the patented system presented by one of the inventors at an IEEE
machine tool conference prior to the filing date of the patent application. Id. at 791-92, 218
U.S.P.Q. at 964.
367. 839 F.2d 1556, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1769 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
368. Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball Int'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556, 1557,5 U.S.P.0.2d 1769,1770
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988).
369. Id. at 1565-66, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1776-77.
370. Id. at 1566, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1777 (citing Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827
F.2d 1524, 1533, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1742-43 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987)).
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necessary to provide substantial evidence in support to the jury's
37
conclusion."
The court's analysis focused on whether the '806 patent provided
enough information to build the "recognition logic block 172" from
figure 11 of the specification.? 7 2 Both parties presented conflicting
evidence as to the sufficiency of the enabling disclosure. Kimball
provided experts who testified that the '806 patent was non-enabling because it lacked information necessary to build the circuit
and lacked information on the function of some of the parts. Allen
Organ's witnesses contended that block 172 could be provided by a
standard off-the-shelf item and that it readily could be designed by
373
one of ordinary skill in the art.
Allen Organ argued that there were two flaws in the jury instructions. First, the court did not instruct the jury that every minute
detail of the patent need not be disclosed. Second, the court did not
3 74
advise the jury of the underlying factual issues to be resolved.
Dismissing these .arguments, the Federal Circuit stated that pursuant to Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Allen Organ
waived its objection to the jury instruction because it failed to raise
it in a timely fashion before the district court.3 75 Because Allen Organ previously agreed to the jury instruction, the instruction became part of the law of the case.3 76 The court concluded that a
reasonable jury could have reached the conclusion it did, and that
the district court did not err in denying Allen Organ's motion for
3 77
judgment not withstanding the verdict with respect to this issue.
f

Deposit of biological material

Although it had been previously established that deposited biological material need not be available to the public as of the filing
date, the Federal Circuit's decision in In re Lundak3 78 clearly established that a deposit in an independent depository need not be
made as of the filing date of the application. 3 79 In Lundak, the in371. Id. (citing Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1551-52, 220 U.S.P.Q.
193, 200-01 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 1566, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1777 (citing Will v. Comprehensive Accounting Corp.,
776 F.2d 665, 675, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1120 (1986) and Bio-Rad Lab., Inc. v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 739 F.2d 604, 615, 222 U.S.P.O. 654, 662 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038
(1984)).
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. 773 F.2d 1216, 227 U.S.P.Q. 90 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
379. In re Lundak, 773 F.2d 1216, 1222, 227 U.S.P.Q. 90, 95 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
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ventor deposited the biological material in an independent depository seven days after filing the patent application. 38 0 The PTO
examiner rejected Lundak's claims under the first paragraph of section 112 as non-enabling for failure to meet the criteria of the Man38
ual of Patent Examining Procedure (MPEP) section 608.01(p)C.
Among other requirements, the MPEP requires that a deposit necessary for complying with the requirements of section 112 include an
adequate disclosure of the biological material "no later than the ef'38 2
fective U.S. filing date of the application.
Lundak appealed the examiner's rejection to the Board, arguing
that his deposit of the cell line with colleagues in laboratories at the
University of California and elsewhere met section 112's requirements. 38 3 The Board, however, affirmed the rejection, holding that
the university laboratory deposit was inadequate to meet the requirements of section 112 because the laboratories were not "recognized depositories" that would guarantee permanent availability.
The Board also held that the deposit made with the American Type
Culture Collection (ATCC) could not be used to overcome the examiner's section 112 rejection. The ATCC deposit was made after
the application filing date, and thus was "new matter" that could not
38 4
be added to the application under section 132 of the patent laws.
The Federal Circuit reversed, reconciling the present case with In
re Argoudelis38 5 and Feldman v. Aunstrup3 8 6 in a review of the law relating to the deposit of biological material for compliance of section
112, first paragraph. The Federal Circuit found that the deposit
with the university laboratory satisfied the PTO's concern regarding
access during pendency of the application.3 8 7 The court held that
section 112, first paragraph, does not require a sample to be trans380. Id. at 1219, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 92; see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE
§ 608.01 (p) C. The manual provides as follows:
[Tihe applicant, no later than the effective U.S. filing date of the application, (should
make] a deposit of a culture of the microorganism in a depository affording permanence of the deposit and ready accessibility [sic] thereto by the public if a patent is
granted, under conditions which assure (a) that access to the culture will be available
during pendency of the patent application to one determined by the Commissioner
to be entitled thereto under 37 CFR 1.14 and 35 U.S.C. 122, and (b) that all restrictions on the availability to the public of the culture so deposited will be irrevocably
removed upon the granting of the patent ....
Id.
381. Lundak, 773 F.2d at 1218, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 92.
382. Id. at 1219, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 92.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. 434 F.2d 1390, 168 U.S.P.Q. 99 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
386. 517 F.2d 1351, 186 U.S.P.Q. 108 (C.C.P.A. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976).
387. Lundak, 773 F.2d at 1222, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 95 (citing Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d
1351, 1355, 186 U.S.P.Q. 108, 112-13 (C.C.P.A. 1975)).
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ferred to an independent depository prior to the filing date of the
patent application.38 8 The court stated that while the PTO maintained its statutory right to request "specimens or ingredients" from
the applicant, it was immaterial whether the request was to be filled
by a third party entrusted with the specimen or the applicant
38 9

himself.

The Federal Circuit also held that the addition of information related to the post-filing date deposit in an independent depository
did not constitute new matter prohibited under section 132.390 In
reaching this decision, the court found it irrelevant that the cell line
was under the control of an independent depository as of the filing
date because "an accession number and deposit date add nothing to
the written description of the invention. '3 9 1 The court held that
such additions were not the type of "new matter" which section 132
was designed to guard against.3 92 Moreover, because constructive
reduction to practice does not turn on possession, the court ruled
that Lundak's application constituted a constructive reduction to
practice that would establish the application filing date as the prima
facie date of invention.3 9 3 The Federal Circuit also addressed
whether the absence of an independent depository would allow inventors to misrepresent post-filing date deposit information to the
PTO. The court concluded that "[t]here is no greater or less risk of
3 94
dishonesty in this procedure than in any other."
388. Id.
389. Id., 227 U.S.P.Q. at 94-95.
390. Id. at 1223, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 96.
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Id. The new PTO deposit regulations address this concern by requiring that when a
post-filing date independent deposit is made:
IThe applicant shall promptly-submit a verified statement from a person in a position to corroborate the fact, and shall state, that the biological material which is deposited is a biological material specifically identified in the application as filed,
except if the person is an attorney or agent registered to practice before the Office,
in which case the statement need not be verified.
37 C.F.R. § 1.804(b) (1991). One way an inventor can assure compliance is to set up standard
procedures to document controlled possession of biological material. Such procedures can
include placing biological material in an in-house, locked container with restricted and recorded access. Such a procedure is not, however, required for compliance.
394. Lundak, 773 F.2d at 1223, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 96.
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6. Statements concerning enablement as a basisfor a finding of
unenforceability
In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. ,35 the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's finding of inequitable
conduct based on Scripps' statements to the reissue application examiner concerning enablement.3 9 6 The invention at issue concerned a substance called Human Factor VIII:C, a complex protein
that occurs naturally in normal blood and is essential to blood clotting.3 9 7 The claims in suit included product-by-process claims as
well as product claims. 3 98 The process portion of the product-byprocess claims recited separation of the Factor VIII:C/VIII:RP complex from other materials in blood, followed by separation of Factor
VIII:C from Factor VIII:RP.3 9 9 The procedure provided for a puri40 0
fied, but dilute, Factor VIII:C.
The district court granted Genentech's motion for summary judgment of unenforceability of the claims on inequitable conduct
grounds. 40 1 During prosecution of the reissue application, the examiner raised a number of issues relating to the proposed product
claims, including one specifically targeted to the purity of the Factor
VIII:C. 40 2 The examiner requested a showing of the mathematical
relationship between specific activity and fold purification. 40 3 The
inventors provided this and other data requested by the
4 04
examiner.
In response to the inventors' argument that they had obtained
human Factor VIII:C at "levels closely approaching the theoretical
limit," the examiner withdrew his objection to the scope of the
product claims. 40 5 The reissue application, with the added product
claims, was allowed to issue. The district court held, however, that
the evidence did not support the inventors' statements about the
purity of the product. On this basis, the district court adjudged all
40 6
the claims unenforceable for inequitable conduct.
395. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991). This appeal addressed several
issues, including best mode, compliance with the reissue statutes and regulations, anticipation, infringement, and alleged charges of inequitable conduct.
396. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1574, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1001, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
397. Id at 1568-70, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003-05.
398. Id at 1570, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1005.
399. Id. at 1569, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1004.
400. Id
401. Id. at 1568, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1003.
402. Id. at 1571, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
403. Id. at 1572, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 1571-72, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1006.
406. Id. at 1572, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1007.
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Focusing on evidence on the record to determine whether the inventors had in fact obtained gels showing essentially pure Factor
VIII:C, without certain impurities, the Federal Circuit observed that
the district court erred in requiring more scientific precision than
did any of the scientists who testified on the issue. 40 7 The Federal
Circuit recognized that the standard offered in the statute referred
to persons of skill in the relevant art, and therefore ruled that
Genentech failed to provide any evidence to show that those skilled
in the field could not make or use the invention by following the
40 8
disclosures provided by Scripps.
Further, the Federal Circuit noted that in its inequitable conduct
analysis, the district court made no findings on the issue of intent,
an element which is essential to a ruling of inequitable conduct as a
matter of law. 40 9 Consequently, the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court's grant of partial summary judgment of unenforceabil4 10
ity of the reissue patent for inequitable conduct.
B.

The "Written Description" Requirement

The "written description" requirement ensures that the inventor
has possession of the specific subject matter claimed as of the filing
date of the application. In general, the issue arises when, after filing, amended or new claims are presented by the patent applicant.
The issue can also arise in the situation where a patent applicant
seeks the benefit of a filing date of an earlier patent application with
respect to a claim presented in a later patent application.
In Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar,4 11 the Federal Circuit addressed the
scope and utility of this requirement. The court considered whether
a design application provided "written description" support for two
later-filed utility applications under section 120. Mahurkar filed the
'081 design application for a "Double Lumen Catheter," which was
subsequently abandoned. 41 2 After filing the '081 design application, Mahurkar filed a "Canadian Industrial Design" application,
which included the same drawings as the '081 application and an
additional textual description. 41 3 This application resulted in the issue of the design patent. More than one year after the issuance of
the Canadian Industrial Design patent, Mahurkar filed the first of
407. Id. at 1573, 18 U.S.P.Q2d at 1007.
408. Id. at 1573-74, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1007-08.
409. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1008.
410. lId at 1574, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1008.
411. 935 F.2d 1555, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
412. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1557-59, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1111, 1112-13
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
413. Id. at 1558, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1112.
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two utility applications that would give rise to the patents-in-suit.
Both utility applications included the same drawings as the '081 design application and both claimed priority to the '081 design application. 4 14 While the examiner noted in the first utility application
that "the prior application is a design application," the examiner did
not dispute the fact that the first utility application was entitled to
the earlier filing date. 4 15 In the second utility application, the examiner noted that the application was fully supported by the appli4 16
cant's '081 design application.
Charged with infringement of the two utility applications, VasCath argued on a motion for summaryjudgment that under section
120, the two utility applications were not entitled to the filing date
of the '081 design application because its drawings did not provide
an adequate "written description. ' 41 7 If so, the Canadian Industrial
Design application would render the two utility patents invalid
under section 102(b). 418 Concluding that the '081 design patent did
not provide an adequate written description, the district court held
the utility patents invalid under section 102(b). 41 9 Recognizing the
absence of clarity in Federal Circuit law pertaining to this issue, the
district court stated, "unfortunately, it is not so easy to tell what the
law of the Federal Circuit is with respect to the written description
4 20
requirement."
The Federal Circuit responded and set forth a relatively thorough
discussion of the "written description" requirement. The Federal
Circuit first noted the three circumstances in which the "written description" requirement is triggered: (1) where claims not presented
in the application when filed are presented thereafter; (2) when the
benefit of sections 119 or 120 is sought for a later-filed application;
and (3) in the interference context, where the issue is whether the
specification of one party of the interference can support the
42 1
claim(s) corresponding to the count(s) at issue.
Citing In re Wright,42 2 the Federal Circuit said that to the uninitiated it may seem anomalous that a separate written description requirement is contained in the first paragraph of section 112, where
414. Id.
415. Id. at 1559, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1113.
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. (noting that for purposes of summaryjudgment motion, Vas-Cath conceded that
'081 design drawings provided enabling disclosure for two utility applications).
419. Id.
420. See id.
at 1560, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp.
517, 522, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1353, 1356 (N.D. Il1. 1990)).
421. Id.
422. 866 F.2d 422, 9 U.S.P.Q2d 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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the second paragraph of section 112 expressly requires that the applicant conclude the specification "with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention." 4 2 3 The court provided two
explanations, however, for the written description requirements of
section 112. First, the court stated that the written description requirement was a part of the patent statutes at a time before claims
were required by the statute. 42 4 Second, the court provided a policy-based rationale for the inclusion in section 112 of the first paragraph written description requirement and the second paragraph
"definiteness" requirement, as set forth in Rengo Co. v. Molins
Machine Co.4 25 In Rengo, the Third Circuit stated that the definiteness requirement "shapes the future conduct of persons other than
the inventor, by insisting that they receive notice of the scope of the
patented device while the written6 description requirement ensures a
42
definite scope for the patent."
The Federal Circuit next reviewed some of the most significant
decisions of one of its predecessor courts, the Court of Customs and
4 27
Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.). The court noted that in In re Ruschig,
the C.C.P.A. recognized the severability of the written description
requirement from the enablement provision. 4 28 Furthermore, in In
re DiLeone,42 9 the C.C.P.A. recognized the possibility that the specifias broadly as it is
cation could enable the practice of an invention
430
claimed, yet still not describe that invention.
In In re Lukach,4 31 the C.C.P.A. also recognized a subtle distinction
between a written description adequate to support a claim under
423. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1560-61, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1114-15 (quoting In re Wright,
866 F.2d 422, 424, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
424. Id.
425. 657 F.2d 535, 211 U.S.P.Q. 303 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981). In Rengo,
the "adequate description" requirement was expressed in the following manner:
[Tihere is a subtle relationship between the policies underlying the description and
definiteness requirements, as the two standards, while complementary, approach a
similar problem from different directions. Adequate description of the invention
guards against the inventor's overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention
in such detail that thus future claims can be determined to be encompassed within
his original creation.
Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551, 211 U.S.P.Q. 303, 321 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1055 (1981).
426. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115 (quoting Rengo, 657 F.2d at
551, 211 U.S.P.Q. at 321).
427. 379 F.2d 990, 154 U.S.P.Q. 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967).
428. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115 (citing In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d
990, 154 U.S.P.Q. 118 (C.C.P.A. 1967)).
429. 436 F.2d 1404, 168 U.S.P.Q. 592 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
430. See 'as-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115 (citing In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d
1404, 168 U.S.P.Q. 592 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
431. 442 F.2d 967, 169 U.S.P.Q. 795 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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section 112 and a written description sufficient to anticipate the
claimed subject matter under section 102(b). 43 2 In Lukach, the question was whether a United States "grandparent" application sufficiently described the later-claimed invention or whether the
appellant's intervening British application, which was a counterpart
to the United States application, anticipated the claimed subject
matter. The decision hinged on the difference between "claim-sup' '4
porting disclosures" and "claim-anticipating disclosures. 1 3
The Federal Circuit itself has addressed the written description

requirement, and has, according to the Vas-Cath panel, established a
fairly uniform standard for determining compliance with the requirement. 43 4 The court did, however, recognize some confusion in
its decisions concerning the extent to which the written description
requirement is separate and distinct from the enablement requirement. For example, in In re Wilder 43 5 the Federal Circuit flatly stated
that the two requirements were separate, while in Kennecott Corp. v.
Kyocera International,Inc. ,436 the court stated that, while the purpose
of the written description requirement is to define what is needed to
fulfill the enablement criteria, "these requirements may be viewed
separately, but they are intertwined." 43 7 The Federal Circuit stated
that to the extent that Kennecott conflicts with Wilder, decisions of a
three-judge panel of the court cannot overturn prior precedential
432. See Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1115 (citing In re Lukach, 442 F.2d
967, 169 U.S.P.Q. 795 (C.C.P.A. 1971)).
433. In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967, 970, 169 U.S.P.Q. 795, 797 (C.C.P.A. 1971). Other written description cases decided by the C.C.P.A. stressed the fact specificity of the issue. See, e.g.,
In re Driscoll, 562 F.2d 1245, 1250, 195 U.S.P.Q. 434, 438 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (stressing that
question of compliance with description requirement of section 112 depends on unique facts
of each case); In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 191 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (examining application of written description requirement to invention centering around process
for making freeze-dried instant coffee); In re Smith, 458 F.2d 1389, 1395, 173 U.S.P.Q, 679,
683 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (indicating fact specificity necessary to make a determination regarding
opportunities of rejection of patent application for compounding of glossy water-base emulsion paint); In re DiLeone, 436 F.2d 1404, 1404, 168 U.S.P.Q. 592, 593 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (addressing rejection of patent application for new and unobvious class of polymides useful in
making molded articles).
434. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1117 (citing In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d
1008, 1012, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1618 (Fed. Cir. 1989) as support for application of clearly
erroneous standard for determining compliance). Concerning the written description requirement, the court stated that "[alithough [the applicant] does not have to describe exactly
the subject matter claimed ....
the description must clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in
the art to recognize that [he or she] invented what is claimed." Id.
435. 736 F.2d 1516, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985).
436. 835 F.2d 1419, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988).
437. See Jas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1563, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1117 (citing In re Wilder, 736 F.2d
1516, 1520, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985) and
Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1421, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194, 1197 (Fed.
Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988)).
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decisions. 438 Thus, in Vas-Cath, the court reaffirmed the distinction
4 39
between the two requirements.
The Federal Circuit then turned to the district court's analysis.
The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that drawings
alone may be sufficient to provide a "written description," citing
prior decisions relevant to this issue.4 40 The Federal Circuit, however, did not agree with the district court's legal standard for "written description" compliance or with its conclusion that no genuine
issues of material fact were in dispute. 4 4 1 With respect to the legal
standard, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court's concern
with "what the invention is"was misplaced. The Federal Circuit
further found that the district court's requirement that the '081 design application drawings "describe what is novel or important" was
legal error, because with a combination patent there is no recogniz4 42
able or essential "element, 'gist' or 'heart' of the invention.
Focusing on the ratio range set forth in the claim of "substantially
greater than one-half but substantially less than a full diameter," the
district court stated that this range did not follow inevitably from
the '081 drawings. 443 To demonstrate the teachings of the '081
drawings with respect to this ratio, Mahurkar submitted the declaration of Dr. Stephen Ash. 44 4 The Federal Circuit held that this, without more, gave rise to a genuine issue 5of material fact that was
44
inappropriate for summary disposition.
Furthermore, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court
erred in taking into account Mahurkar's other patents which involved different range limitations. 44 6 The Federal Circuit also
found that the district court erred in applying a legal standard that
required the drawings of the '081 design application to necessarily
438. Il
439. Id. at 1563-64, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1117.
440. Id at 1564, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1118; see, e.g., KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor, Inc.,
778 F.2d 1571, 1574, 228 U.S.P.Q. 32, 33 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that there is no statutory
prohibition against reliance on design application for purposes of section 120); In re Berkman,
642 F.2d 427, 429, 209 U.S.P.Q. 45, 46 (C.C.P.A. 1981) (recognizing that design applications
may be satisified through drawings, but finding those at issue insufficient to meet section 112,
first paragraph); In re Wolfensperger, 302 F.2d 950, 951, 133 U.S.P.Q. 537, 537 (C.C.P.A.
1962) (holding that Board's statement that drawings alone cannot form basis of valid claim is
too broad to be valid and is contrary to well-settled and long-established Patent Office
practice).
441. V'as-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1565, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1118.
442. See id. (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345
(1961)).
443. Id. at 1559, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1113.
444. Id. at 1567, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119. Vas-Cath submitted no technical evidence to
refute Ash's conclusions. Id.
445. Id. at 1566-67, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1119.
446. Id.
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exclude all diameters other than those within the claimed range,
stating that it was questionable whether any drawing could ever do
so. Finally, absent a separate discussion of the remaining claims, the
Federal Circuit assumed that the same erroneous legal standard was
applied by the district court to the remaining claims. 447 Consequently, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary
448
judgment as to all claims.
In re Kaslow 4 49 was another Federal Circuit case concerning the
written description requirement. The invention in Kaslow related to
a method for automatically redeeming discount coupons at retail
store checkout counters. 4 50 Part of the claim included the step for
"transmitting the summarized data obtained at each supermarket to
a central computer linked to said supermarkets to provide an audit
of the overall volume of coupon traffic."' 45 ' The system used existing optical scanners and computer systems at supermarket checkout counters to scan or read universal product code (UPC) symbols
4 52
and recognition code symbols impressed on discount coupons.
Following a public use proceeding in which the examiner rejected
the claims under sections 102(b) and 103, Kaslow amended his
claims. 45 3 He emphasized that in order to provide an audit, the
memory at each supermarket identifies discount coupons according
to individual manufacturers and transmits this data from each supermarket to a central computer. 45 4 The examiner also rejected the
claims under section 132 because Kaslow did not disclose the audit
procedure in the specification. 4 55 The Board affirmed both of the
examiner's rejections and treated the section 132 rejection as if it
had been made under the first paragraph of section 112.456
The Federal Circuit affirmed, stating that the test for determining
compliance with the written description requirement is whether the
447. Id at 1567, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1120; see In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909 n.4, 164
U.S.P.Q. 642, 646 n.4, (C.C.P.A. 1970) (stating that disclosure standard may vary according
to claim).
448. Vas-Cath, 935 F.2d at 1567, 19 U.S.P.O.2d at 1120.
449. 707 F.2d 1366, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1089 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
450. In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1368, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1089, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 1371, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1094; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.292 (1991) (outlining requirements for, and burdens of proof involved with, public use proceeding); see also MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 720-720.05; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("A person shall be

entitled to a patent unless .... the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States ... .
454. Kaslow, 707 F.2d at 1371, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1094.
455. Id. at 1372, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1095.
456. Id.
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application, as originally filed, reasonably conveys to one skilled in
the art that the inventor, at that time, possessed the claimed subject
matter. 45 7 Applying this test, the Federal Circuit concluded that the
4 58
specification did not support the amended claim language.
Although Kaslow argued that the word "check" and the later-added
"audit" meant the same thing, the Federal Circuit disagreed, concluding that the words did not describe any particular auditing or
checking procedure to be carried out as part of the invention. 4 59
The court found that the claim language simply implied some mechanism or step as part of the invention and that nowhere in the specification was either the step or method for performing an audit
460
described.
In Bigham v. Godtfredsen,46 1 an interesting written description issue
arose in an interference context. The invention at issue and the
subject of count one of the interference was certain penicillanic
''
compounds having a side chain containing the substituent "X. 462
The substituent "X" was further defined as a "chloro, bromo, iodo,
alkylsulfonyloxy having from 1-4 carbon atoms, benzenesulfonyloxy
and toluenesulfonyloxy. ' '4 63 On Godtfredsen's motion, the PTO
split count one into separate counts two and three. The basis for
the motion was that the various substituents were patentably distinct
from each other. In count two, "X" was identified as iodo or
bromo, and in count three, "X" was identified as "chloro, alkylsulfonyloxy
having
from
1-4
carbon
atoms
and
4
toluenesulfonyloxy." 64
To prove a constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter of count two, Godtfredsen relied solely on his British priority
457. Id. at 1375, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 1096 (stating that presence or absence of literal support
in specification of claim language is not test for compliance with written description
requirement).
458. Id. The court found no support for allowing the claim language from the following
passages of the specification:
More particularly, it is an object of the invention to provide a merchandise coupon
having UPC indicia thereon which minimizes the possibility of misredemption and
affords a running account of the number of valid coupons accepted, thereby simplifying auditingand redemption procedures.
With the present invention, the summarized data may include data relating to the
coupons honored in the various stores linked to the central computer, so that a check
may be made on the overall volume of coupon traffic and the relative trading of the
coupons issued by various manufacturers.
Id. (emphasis in original).

459. Id.
460.
461.
462.
1988).
463.
464.

Id.
857 F.2d 1415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1266, 1266 (Fed. Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1416, 8 U.S.P.Q2d at 1267.
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application, which showed the claimed compounds and disclosed
the substituents as "halogens." 46 5 His priority application also contained a specific example where "X" was chloro. Bigham's United
States application, filed several months after Godtfredsen's British
application, named chloro, bromo, and iodo and contained specific
examples where "X" was chloro. Bigham also proved actual reduction to practice of the chloro compound before Godtfredsen's British filing date. 46 6 The Board awarded priority of count three to
Bigham based on his prior actual reduction to practice, but awarded
priority of count two to Godtfredsen, finding that the disclosure of
"halogen" EH/VG in his British application was a constructive reduction to practice of fluoro, chloro, bromo, and iodo.467
On appeal to the Federal Circuit, Bigham argued that Godtfredsen's disclosure of halogen in his British application did not meet
the requirements of section 112, first paragraph, with respect to the
bromo and iodo substituents. For purposes of discussion, the court
assumed that the bromo and iodo species were, in fact, patentably
distinct from the other species. 4 68 The Federal Circuit observed
that while the term "halogen" is, in most circumstances, sufficient to
describe all members of the class, this rule does not apply where the
count is based on a patentable distinction between the members of
the class. 4 69 The court concluded that Godtfredsen could not, on
one hand, claim that bromo and iodo were patentably distinct from
each other for purposes of bifurcating count one, and then argue
the contrary, that the term "halogen" encompassed all species, in
another count.4 70 Thus, in view of the Board's holding of a patentable distinction between the counts, the Federal Circuit held that the
disclosure of halogen and chloro did not serve as an adequate written description of the bromo and iodo compounds. Bigham was
therefore also awarded priority as to count two. 4 7 1
In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,472 the Federal Circuit considered whether the subject matter of
a claim added during prosecution was in the possession of the inventor at the time of filing, i.e., whether the "written description"
requirement was satisfied. The administrative law judge (ALJ)
465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
470.
471.
472.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id at 1417, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
871 F.2d 1054, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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found that it was not. 47 3 Citing In re Wright, the court reiterated that
if the scope of a claim is amended to justify an assertion that the
claim is directed to a "different invention" than the original claim, it
is proper to inquire whether the newly claimed subject matter is described in the patent application. 474 The court noted that the examiner recognized the "word boost" feature as the point of novelty,
and also noted that the ALJ recognized that those skilled in the art
were able to construct circuits with mid-point precharging without
referring to the specification of the patent at issue. 4 75 In reversing
the ALJ's finding, the court concluded that the ability of the artisan
to construct the invention by referring to well-known, standard references does not prove that the subject matter of the claim was not
47 6
in the possession of the inventor at the time of filing.
1.

In a reissue context

In re Peters4 77 involved an invention related to improvements in
structural elements of a flat panel television display device. Each of
several support walls in this device had a metal tip compressed between it and the front wall. 4 78 The tip was disclosed in the specification as having a thickness at its base substantially equal to that of the
support wall and tapering toward the front wall. 4 79 After Peters received a patent on his device, he realized that his claims were unduly
restrictive. Consequently, he sought to broaden the claims in a reissue application to have them read on tapered and nontapered tips.
The examiner, however, rejected the claims in the reissue on the
grounds that they were unsupported by the original disclosure. The
48 0
Board affirmed.
In reversing the Board, the Federal Circuit found that the dis48 1
closed tip configuration in the original disclosure was not critical.
The court noted that the tip shape was not used to distinguish it
from the prior art, nor was it used previously to reject the claim.
The court concluded that one skilled in the art would readily under473. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1061,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257, 1262 (Fed. Cir. 1989). Specifically, the ALJ found that the patent disclosure did not reasonably convey to the artisan that the mid-point charging or sensing concept
was in the inventor's possession at the time of filing. Id.
474. Id. at 1061-62, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1262-63 (citing In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 424, 9
U.S.P.q.2d 1649, 1651 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).

475. Id. at 1062, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1263.
476.

Id.

477.
478.
479.
480.
481.

723 F.2d 891, 221 U.S.P.Q. 952 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
In re Peters, 723 F.2d 891, 892, 221 U.S.P.Q. 952, 953 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id. at 893, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 953.
Id.
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stand that in practicing the invention, it was not important whether
48 2
the tips were tapered.
The Federal Circuit also found that there was much more to the
claimed invention than the tips and that no other element of the
claimed invention was related to the tapered shape of the tips. Accordingly, the court concluded that the broadened reissue claims
merely omitted an unnecessary limitation that had restricted one element of the invention as originally claimed. 48 3
The Federal Circuit further noted that while the original patent
stated that it would be desirable for the tip ends to be as thin as
possible to avoid "optical interference," this did not equate to a requirement that the tip base be wider than the ends. The original
patent stated that the tips needed only to withstand forces of atmospheric pressure loading. The court further explained that if the
Board's approach was accepted, it would be applicable to every
broadened reissue claim which, by definition, would encompass an
embodiment not specifically described in the specification. 48 4
Where the limitation is critical, however, a lack of written description is fatal, and rejection is much more likely. This was illustrated
by In re Wilder,4 8 5 in which the Federal Circuit distinguished Peters.
Wilder involved an invention that was a mechanism for indicating the
location of information recorded on a dictating machine. 4 6 The
person speaking into a dictating machine indicated the location of
instructions on a recording medium, such as magnetic tape, by recording a control tone at the beginning or end of the instructions.
A transcribing machine scanned the tape and detected the control
tones. The locations of the control tones were stored in an electronic circuit. Lights on a linear array correlated with the location of
the control tones on the tape. The transcriptionist could locate specific information by advancing the tape until an indicator light
aligned with a light in the array. 48 7
When the patent was put into reissue, the Board affirmed the rejection of certain claims of the reissue application as being subject
matter not disclosed in the original patent. 48 8 While the original
claims required that the light be scanned "in synchronism with the
scanning of said record medium," the reissue claims had no such
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. Id at 894, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 954.
485. 736 F.2d 1516, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985).
486. In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1517, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1204 (1985).
487. Id.
488. Id.
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limitation. 48 9 Consequently, while the original claims were directed
to a species, the reissue claims were directed to the genus of indicating mechanisms that visually identified positions on a recording me490
dium when the recording medium was scanned.
4 91
The Federal Circuit upheld the Board's decision on appeal.
The court explained that while the claimed subject matter need not
be described identically in the original and reissue applications, the
original disclosure must convey to those skilled in the art that the
applicant invented the subject matter later claimed. 49 2 Wilder admitted that synchronous scanning equipment was the only embodiment of the invention disclosed in the original patent, but argued
that the general description of a drawing and the broadly phased
title of the specification demonstrated that other embodiments were
contemplated. 4 9 3 The Federal Circuit concluded that the broadly
worded title of the original patent and the customarily broad description of the drawing did not satisfy the written description re4 94
quirement of section 112.

To satisfy the description requirement, Wilder attempted to rely
on the stated objects of the invention. 49 5 The Federal Circuit rejected this argument and agreed with the Board, stating that the objects of the invention did little more than outline goals that Wilder
hoped the claimed invention would achieve, and it did not describe
the way the claimed invention could actually be achieved. 4 96 The
court distinguished the case from its earlier decision in In re Peters, in
which the appellants successfully rebutted the PTO's rejection
under section 112, by proving that the broadened reissue claims
49 7
merely omitted an unnecessary limitation.
489.
490.
491.

Id.
Id- at 1517-18, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 371.
Id. at 1521, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 373.

492.

l at 1520, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 372;seeIn re Koslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375, 217 U.S.P.Q.

1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting that proper inquiry is whether invention as whole would
have been obvious to person having ordinary skill in art).
493. Wilder, 736 F.2d at 1520, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 372. Specifically, Wilder contended that
one of the drawings indicated that the dictation apparatus illustrated in the drawings was "one
in which the present invention finds novel application." Id The title of the patent was
"[I]nstruction Indicating Apparatus For A Record And/Or Playback Device." Id.
494. Id. (explaining that "subjective desire" to claim as broadly as possible not enough to
establish that broader invention being claimed in reissue application was adequately described in original patent).
495. Id. One of the recited objects stated: "[I]t is an object of the present invention to
provide improved indicating apparatus for indicating the location of particular information on
a record medium which overcomes the aforementioned problems." Id. at 1520-21, 222
U.S.P.Q. at 372.
496. Id. at 1521, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 372.
497. Id.
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In In re Weiler,4 98 the Federal Circuit held that the fact that subject
matter of the patent claims in question can be found somewhere in
the overall disclosure of the patent does not entitle the applicant to
such claims in a reissue application when the applicant fails to claim
the subject matter in the original patent application, and when the
subject matter of the reissue patent claims is clearly independent of,
and distinct from, the original patent claims. 4 99 In its analysis, the
court considered the effect of compliance with section 112 on the
determination of the "intent to claim" and the error requirements
of the reissue provisions. 500
In the original application, the examiner held that the Weiler application contained three independent and distinct inventions and
required restrictions between claims 1-7 (assay method), claims 8
and 11 (an organic compound), and claims 9 and 10 (a protein compound). 50 1 Claims 1-7 were elected and the claims were allowed
without amendment. No divisional application was filed on the
other non-elected inventions. 5 02 Weiler filed a reissue application,
stating that claims 8-11 were inadvertently abandoned. 505 Claim 13
(method for developing citrus fruit strains low in limonin content by
use of limonin-specific antibodies) and claim 19 (a gamma gobulin
factor with antibodies reactive with limonin) were finally rejected
and appealed. 50 4
The Board agreed with the examiner's view that failure to file a
timely divisional application, even for non-elected claims, is deliberate and not an error in the prosecution of the first application. 50 5
The Board held that the subject matter of claims 13 and 19 "was not
claimed at all in the original application," and that nothing in the
patent showed evidence of an "intent to claim" that subject
50 6
matter.
Referring first to the given support for the reissue claims, the Federal Circuit stated that the question of support in the disclosure is a
threshold section 112 inquiry and that without such support, the inquiry ends. 5 07 The court then noted that in broadening claim reissue applications, one may look to see whether the disclosure
498. 790 F.2d 1576, 229 U.S.P.Q. 673 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
499. In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1580-81, 229 U.S.P.Q. 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
500. Id. at 1581, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 676.
501. Id. at 1578, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 674.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id.
505. Id. (citing In re Orita, 550 F.2d 1277, 193 U.S.P.Q. 145 (C.C.P.A. 1977)).
506. Id. at 1580, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 675 (citing In re Rowand, 526 F.2d 558, 560, 187
U.S.P.Q. 487, 489 (C.C.P.A. 1975)).
507. Id.
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"reasonably conveys to one skilled in the art that the inventor had
possession of the broad invention at the time the original application was filed." 50 8 That inquiry, however, did not apply because the
court found that Weiler did not claim the subject matter of the reissue claims in the original application.5 0 9 The court stated that the
applicant cannot assert error in failing to claim something that was
not disclosed at all. 5 10 The court noted that when an applicant
makes some disclosure, as Weiler did, and claims one invention and
ignores the other inventions, it is difficult to find error in the failure
to claim those ignored on the sole basis that they were disclosed. 51 1
With respect to the "intent to claim" requirement, the Federal
Circuit recognized that while occasionally including section 112
considerations, this requirement resolves ultimately into the question of error. 51 2 Discussing In re Mead,5 1 3 the court analogized evi5 14
dence of intent-to claim with the written description requirement.
The court stated that the absence of compliance with section 112's
written description requirement forecloses a finding of "intent to
claim," and thus precludes a grant of the reissue. The court continued, stating that the converse is not true because compliance with
section 112, by itself, does not establish intent and error in a failure
to claim. 5 15 The court held there was no "error," effectively striking
51 6
the reissue application.
2. Essential material
In Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp.,517 the patent-in-suit
related to a "speed-reduction gear train for the transmission of
power in which a pinion with a relatively small number of teeth
meshes and drives a parallel gear with a relatively large number of
teeth." 51 8 The specification disclosed both a single tooth and
508. Id., 229 U.S.P.Q. at 676 (citing In re Peters, 723 F.2d 891,894, 221 U.S.P.Q 952,954
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
509. Id.
510. Id. at 1580-81, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 676.
511. Id. at 1581, 229 U.S.P.Q. at 676 (stating that such holding would strip statutory requirement that applicant point out and distinctly claim subject matter that applicant regards
as his invention).
512. Id., 229 U.S.P.Q. at 676-77.
513. 581 F.2d 251, 198 U.S.P.Q. 412 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
514. Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1581, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 676-77; see In re Peters, 723 F.2d 891, 894,
221 U.S.P.Q. 952, 954 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (discussing "intent to claim" requirement).
515. Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1581-82, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 677.
516. Id.
517. 747 F.2d 1446, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1161 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985).
518. Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446,1448, 223 U.S.P.Q. 1161,
1161 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1136 (1985).

684

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:621

double tooth pinion as embodiments of the invention. 51 9 The specification taught that to practice the invention, "the disclosed pinion
is 'preferrably [sic] combined' with a helical wheel gear made according to 'German Industrial Standard 58400 draft September
1963.'-"520 The German Standard was mentioned at six places in
the specification and specifically claimed in one of the dependent
52
claims. 1
Quaker City, the assignee of the patent, later instituted suit
against Skil. The case was tried to a jury, which found the patent
valid and infringed. Due in large part to testimony by the inventor
characterizing the German Standard as "necessary" to design the
invention, the district court set aside the verdict and entered judgment for Skil on the ground that the patent failed to comply with the
disclosure requirements of section 112.522 The district court reasoned that the German Standard constituted "essential material"
which was unavailable, and that reference to an unavailable, nonpatent foreign publication to supply "essential material" was clearly insufficient to comply with section 112.523
The Federal Circuit affirmed, agreeing that the German Industrial
Standard was essential. 5 24 It stated that the inventor's testimony
concerning the necessity of the German Standard "negates the reasonableness of a conclusion that the standard was not essential for
an adequate disclosure." 5 25 Although Quaker City argued that "all
data of any significance" from the German Standard closely paralleled American standards, the court found the argument unavailing,
in light of the concern expressed by Quaker City's patent attorney
during prosecution of the patent. 5 26
519.

Id. at 1449, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 1162.

520.

Id

521. Id. During prosecution, Quaker City's patent attorney recognized there was a problem with the description of the standard. Nevertheless, he decided against a more complete
description because the examiner raised no obligation. Id.
522. Id at 1450-51, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 1163-64.
523. Id. at 1451-52, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 1164. Despite repeated requests by Skil during discovery, Quaker City was unable to produce a copy of the German Industrial Standard. Id.
524. Id at 1455, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 1167.
525. Id.
526. Ia The Federal Circuit flatly rejected Quaker City's argument that the German Standard was incorporated by reference, noting that incorporation by reference ofmaterial necessary for an adequate disclosure which is unavailable to the public has never been permitted
under section 112. Id.
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Supplementing the written description
a. Expert testimony

In Martin v. Mayer,5 27 the Federal Circuit found that an applicant's
specification relating to a high frequency attenuation cable having
an electrically conductive outer jacket surrounding inner layers of
absorptive, dielectric, and conductive media, did not support a claim
requiring a "harness comprising a plurality" of such cables. 52 8 In
Martin, the issue of compliance with the description requirement
arose in the context of an interference proceeding to determine priority of invention.
Mayer, the senior party, copied claims from Martin's patent. The
key issue was whether Mayer had a "right to make" the interference
counts. The only arguable support for a harness in Mayer's specification was a statement that "it is evident that a multiple wire coaxial
structure can be achieved by the same means." 52 9 Martin offered
the deposition testimony of an expert and other evidence to the effect that "multiple wire coaxial structure" referred to a single cable,
and that cables and wires were understood in the art to mean differ53 0
ent things.
Mayer prevailed on the counts relating to cables and on count six,
which specified a "harness" of such cables. In determining that
Mayer's specification supported the harness limitation, the Board
relied on the fact that a harness of electrical cables was "conventional." 5 3 ' It discounted the expert testimony, noting that the disputed language was "easily understood" and that "expert testimony
will not be received in an interference when it attempts to interpret
or explain a disclosure."5 3 2 Martin appealed the Board's decision
on the "harness" count only.
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that Mayer failed to present
a prima facie case, by clear and convincing evidence, of compliance
with the first paragraph of section 112. 5 3 3 First, the court found error in the Board's decision to discount the testimony of Martin's
expert, stating that there is no bright-line rule that requires the exclusion of expert testimony in an interference. 34 The court distinguished situations in which a party attempted to explain its
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.

823 F.2d 500, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Martin v. Mayer, 823 F.2d 500, 504, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1333, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 505, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337.
Id. at 504, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337.
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disclosure. Moreover, the Federal Circuit found that, regardless of
whether harnesses of some cables were conventional, Mayer's specification did not fulfill the purposes of the written description requirement with respect to the particular harness of claim 6.535
b.

Inherency as providing a basis

In Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera International,Inc.,536 the Federal Circuit
found sufficient written description for a physical property limitation in a product claim based on the previous disclosure of structures in examples in the parent application that inherently
possessed the same physical property. 5 37 The claims of the patentin-suit, which issued from a CIP application, were directed to a highalpha silicon carbide ceramic body "having a predominantly
equiaxed microstructure. ' 5 3 8 While the parent application was also
directed to a high-alpha silicon carbide ceramic body, the parent application did not explicitly mention the equiaxed microstructure.
The CIP application contained a substantial part of the disclosure of
535.

lId at 505, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337. The court stated:
The issue is not whether one skilled in the art would have been able to make a
harness using knowledge of the art, but rather did [the inventor's] application sufficiently describe a harness of cables with conductive outerjackets. Section 112 does
not require that the specification contain that which is known to those skilled in the
art. But it does require specificity as to the claim limitations that characterize the
interference count. It is "not a question of whether one skilled in the art might be
able to construct the patentee's device from the teachings of the disclosure....
Rather, it is a question whether the application necessarily discloses that particular
device."
Id at 504-05, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1337 (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533, 536, 136
U.S.P.Q. 647, 649-50 (C.C.P.A. 1963)) (emphasis in original).
536. 835 F.2d 1419, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988).
537. Kennecott Corp. v. Kyocera Int'l, Inc., 835 F.2d 1419, 1423, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194,
1199 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1008 (1988). The parties did not dispute the
following facts:
(1) the high (over 95%) alpha silicon carbide ceramic body described in the parent
application had an equiaxed microstructure;
(2) the parent application did not mention the equiaxed microstructure of the
high-alpha silicon carbide ceramic body, nor did it state the requirements for forming such microstructure;
(3) the inventors knew the product disclosed in the parent application had an
equiaxed microstructure;
(4) it was known that ceramics from high-alpha silicon carbide could have this
structure;
(5) all the examples using high-alpha silicon carbide in the parent application produced a ceramic body having an equiaxed microstructure;
(6) the method set forth in the parent application using the high-alpha silicon carbide invariably produced a ceramic having the equiaxed microstructure; and
(7) the photomicrographs in the CIP were of the product made and described in
the parent application and produced in the original examples.
538.

Id. at 1420, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1196.
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the parent application, plus a description and photomicrographs of
53 9
the equiaxed microstructure.
The dispositive issue at the district court level was whether the
claims of the patent had written description support in the earlier
filed parent. It was crucial for Kennecott to obtain the benefit of the
earlier filing date to avoid a section 102(b) "on sale" bar.540 Specifically, a sale of the claimed invention occurred in early 1977, more
than one year before the May 1, 1978 filing date of the CIP application. The earlier application had a filing date of June 5, 1975.
Thus, if Kennecott could obtain the date benefit of the prior application, it would avoid the "on sale" bar. The district court concluded that there was no written description support, and it denied
Kennecott the benefit of the prior date under section 120.541 Consequently, the district court found Kennecott's patent invalid because of the "on sale" bar, granted summary judgment, and
54 2
dismissed Kennecott's claim of patent infringement.
The district court also concluded that for the parent specification
to meet the written description requirement of section 112, one
reading the specification must know from the "four corners" of the
specification itself, i.e., without referring to information outside the
specification, that Kennecott's claimed ceramic body has an
equiaxed microstructure. 543 The district court held that although
the specification of the parent application met the enablement requirement of section 112, it did not meet the written description
requirement. 5 44 To the district court, it was immaterial that the
product disclosed in the parent application was the same as that
54 5
claimed in the patent-in-suit.
The Federal Circuit discussed the purpose of the written description requirement of the first paragraph of section 120. Citing In re
Wilder, the Federal Circuit stated that the written description must
communicate "that which is needed to enable" one skilled in the
relevant art to make and use the claimed invention. 54 6 The court
further noted that the written description requirement ensures that
539. Id.
540. Id. at 1419, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1194.
541. Id at 1421, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1197.
542. Id.
543. Id
544. Id.
545. Id
546. Id. (citing In re Wilder, 736 F.2d 1516, 1520, 222 U.S.P.Q. 369, 372 (Fed. Cir. 1984),
ceri. denied, 469 U.S. 1209 (1985)).
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the inventor had "possession of the later-claimed invention on the
547
filing date of the earlier application."
Noting the undisputed fact that the only written description in the
patent-in-suit not present in the parent application disclosure was
the description of the structure and pictures of the product's microstructure, Kennecott argued that the "added description of the
property of a previously-disclosed product does not deprive claims
to that product of the benefit of a prior disclosure of the product." 54 8 In view of its concessions for purposes of summary judgment, Kyocera was left with the argument that because the parent
specification was silent as to the microstructure of the product, and
because one would not know whether the product had an equiaxed
microstructure merely by reading the specification, the specification
was inadequate in law to support claims that required an equiaxed
54 9
microstructure.
Citing In re Edwards,550 the Federal Circuit noted that "earlier and
later applications need not use identical words, if the earlier application shows the subject matter that is claimed in the later application,

with adequate direction as to how to obtain

it."551

The Federal Cir-

cuit found the facts in Edwards to be strongly analogous to the facts
of Kennecott because the parent application's examples all produced
a ceramic with an equiaxed microstructure. 5 52 Furthermore, the
court pointed out that in In re Reynolds, 553 the question was whether
words describing a function inherent in the claimed product could
be added to the specification by amendment or whether such description was "new matter." 5 54 In Reynolds, the C.C.P.A. concluded
that the express description of the inherent property could be added
to the specification with the effect of the original filing date because
it was not "new matter." 55 5 The Federal Circuit also cited In re
Kirchner,55 6 in which the C.C.P.A. recognized that an invention may
be described in different ways or may comply with section 112 in
557
different ways, and still meet the requirements of section 120.
547. Id. For a discussion of the substance of this quote, see supra notes 411-25 and accompanying text.
548. Kennecott Corp., 835 F.2d at 1421, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1197.
549. Id.
550. 568 F.2d 1349, 196 U.S.P.Q. 465 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
551. Kennecott Corp., 835 F.2d at 1422, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1197 (citing In re Edwards, 568
F.2d 1349, 1351-52, 196 U.S.P.Q. 465, 467-68 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
552. Id., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1198.
553. 443 F.2d 384, 170 U.S.P.Q. 94 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
554. Kennecott Corp., 835 F.2d at 1422, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1198.
555. Id.
556. 305 F.2d 897, 134 U.S.P.Q. 324 (C.C.P.A. 1962).
557. Kennecott Corp., 835 F.2d at 1422, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1198 (discussing In re Kirchner,
305 F.2d 897, 904, 134 U.S.P.Q. 324, 330 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
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Although recognizing that in Kirchner the later addition was to the
specification only, the Federal Circuit pointed out that in In re Nathan 5 58 later-added limitations to the claims were found not to con559
stitute new matter.
In light of the precedent, the Federal Circuit concluded that explicitly disclosing an inherent property of a product in a subsequent
patent application does not deprive that product of the benefit of an
earlier filing date. 560 Given Kyocera's concessions of the factual
premises of inherency, the Federal Circuit held that Kennecott was
entitled to the section 120 date benefit and reversed the district
court's grant of summary judgment against Kennecott. 561
4.

Absence of precise wording in the specification

In In re Wright,562 the Federal Circuit reversed the PTO's section
112 rejection, holding that there was adequate written description
support for the applicant's claim limitation despite the fact that it
was not set forth expressly in the specification. 56 3 Wright's invention involved a method of forming images using photosensitive
microcapsules. 5 64 During the prosecution of his application, Wright
added a limitation which stated, in effect, that the microcapsules
were distributed on the support "but not permanently fixed
thereto."'5 65 The examiner rejected the claim under section 112,
contending that the term "not permanently fixed" was not supported in the disclosure and was therefore new matter. 5 6 6 While the
Board viewed the examiner's rejection as being actually based on a
lack of written description support, it based its affirmance on different reasons. The Board considered the term "not permanently
fixed" as being subject to different interpretations, and noted that it
could be interpreted as meaning that the microcapsules were positioned on the support temporarily, or for a "relatively protracted"
5 67
period.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit dismissed the Board's discussion
of whether the meaning of the term "permanently fixed" was clear,
commenting that the Board's inquiry went to the scope of the
558. 328 F.2d 1005, 140 U.S.P.Q. 601 (C.C.P.A. 1964).
559. Kennecott Corp., 835 F.2d at 1422, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1198 (construing In re Nathan, 328
F.2d 1005, 1008-09, 140 U.S.P.Q. 601, 604 (C.C.P.A. 1964)).
560. Id. at 1423, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1199.
561. Id.
562. 866 F.2d 422, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
563. In re Wright, 866 F.2d 422, 425, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1649, 1652 (Fed. Cir. 1989).

564.
565.
566.
567.

Id. at 423, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1650.
Id. at 423-24, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1650.
Id. at 424, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1651.
Id. at 425, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1652.
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phrase, rather than to whether the specification had adequate support. 56 8 Finding the meaning of the term clear, the court treated the
rejection as having been made under the written description requirement of the first paragraph. The Federal Circuit noted that the
examiner apparently did not understand that the claimed subject
matter need not be described in haec verba for the specification to
comply with the written description requirement. Reading the specification in light of the claims and the prior art, the court concluded
5 69
that the phrase was adequately described in the specification.
The court based its conclusion on two specific teachings in
Wright's specification. First, the examples warned that it was important that the microcapsules not be "disturbed" until the image was
formed 57 0 Although not explicitly stated, the implication was that a
microcapsule cannot be "disturbed" if it is permanently fixed. Second, the last step of Wright's method called for the removal of the
microcapsules. 5 7 1 Again, the implication was that if the microcapsules were to be removed, they could not be permanently fixed. To
the court, these teachings clearly supported Wright's added
572
limitation.
In Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co,Inc. ,573 the Federal Circuit decided that certain claims of the Flier patent were entitled to the effective filing date of a prior parent application because, with respect
to the claims in question, the parent application complied with the
written description requirement of the first paragraph. 5 74 Far-MarCo argued that the allegedly infringed claims contained "new matter" compared to the parent application, at least with respect to the
protein content of the starting material, total and added moisture,
temperature ranges, and the situs of fiber formation. 575 Far-Mar-Co
also contended that although the parent application could enable
one skilled in the art to practice the claimed invention, it did not
meet the written description requirement with respect to these limitations. 57 6 In support of its arguments, Far-Mar-Co cited several
cases that it claimed demonstrated that ranges found in the appli568. Id.
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Id.
572. Id.
573. 772 F.2d 1570, 227 U.S.P.Q. 177 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
574. Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 1572, 227 U.S.P.Q. 177, 177
(Fed. Cir. 1985). The Flier patent claimed the first successful process, and resultant product,

for directly and continuously restructuring oil seed particles, preferably soy particles, into a
textured, chewable, fibrous, meat-like food product. Id.
575.
576.

Id. at 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 179.
Id.
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cant's claim language must correspond exactly to ranges disclosed
in the parent application. 577 The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating
that these cases precluded a determination that one skilled in the art
could derive the claim limitations from the parent application under
different factors not on point.5 78 In reviewing the district court's
finding on each of the asserted disclosure deficiencies, the Federal
Circuit held that the district court did not clearly err in determining
that the patent's disclosure adequately supported the claim limita579
tions at issue.
In Litton Systems, Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp.,s580 the Federal Circuit de-

clined to accord the filing date of a parent application under section
120. The court reasoned that the issuance of a patent from a CIP
application, filed in response to a PTO "new matter rejection," estopped the patentee from arguing that the PTO's rejection was erroneous. 581 Specifically, Litton was precluded from arguing that
claim limitations in the patent, which were the basis for overcoming
a "new matter rejection" that had been made in the parent application, were inherent in the disclosure of the parent application. The
court found that Litton acquiesced in the "new matter rejection" by
filing a CIP application, which ultimately issued as a patent.58 2 The
Federal Circuit asserted that the filing of a CIP application to overcome a PTO rejection does not, however, give rise to an unrebuttable presumption of acquiescence in the rejection. 58 3 As with any
other basis for asserting patent invalidity, Whirlpool had the burden
of overcoming the presumption of validity by clear and convincing
evidence that the filing of a CIP, and its issuance as a patent, constituted an acquiescence by the patentee in the PTO's rejection. 58 4
577. Id.; see In re Blaser, 556 F.2d 534, 537, 194 U.S.P.Q. 122, 124 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (examining addition of critical limitation); In re Sichert, 566 F.2d 1154, 1162-63, 196 U.S.P.Q. 209,
215 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (focusing on unpredictability of art); In re MacLean, 454 F.2d 756, 758,
172 U.S.P.Q. 494, 496 (C.C.P.A. 1972) (exposing failure to distinguish one process from another); In re Lukach, 442 F.2d 967,969, 169 U.S.P.Q. 795, 796-97 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (explaining
failure to define essential term); In re Ahlbrecht, 435 F.2d 908, 911, 168 U.S.P.Q. 293, 296
(C.C.P.A. 1971) (questioning use of list that did not contain claimed substance). The court
also noted that one of its predecessors held "that a claim may be broader than the specific
embodiment disclosed in a specification is in itself of no moment." Far-Mar-Co,772 F.2d at
1575-76, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 179-80 (quoting In re Rasmussen, 650 F.2d 1212, 1215, 211
U.S.P.Q. 323, 326 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
578. Ralston Purina, 772 F.2d at 1575, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 179-80.
579. Id. at 1575-77, 227 U.S.P.Q. at 179-81.
580. 728 F.2d 1423, 221 U.S.P.Q 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
581. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1438, 221 U.S.P.Q. 97, 106
(Fed. Cir. 1984).
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
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The fact that the patentee ultimately permitted the CIP, based on
additional material, to issue as a patent established a prima facie
cause of acquiescence by Litton. The patent owner then had the
burden of coming forward with countervailing evidence. 58 5 Moreover, the testimony of the patent owner's witnesses showed that acquiescence did occur. 58 6 Litton therefore acquiesced and was
estopped from relying on the benefit of the filing date of its parent
58 7
application.
5.

Obtainingthe benefit of an earlierdate under sections 119 or 120

In In re Gosteli,58 8 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's holding
that Gosteli's claims were not entitled to the benefit of the foreign
priority date under section 119 because the foreign application did
not adequately support the claims under the first paragraph of section 112.589 The United States patent application of Gosteli et. al.
(Gosteli) contained independent Markush-type genus claims 48 and
49, each covering thousands of chemical species, and dependent
subgenus claims 50 and 51, each consisting of twenty-one specific
chemical species. 590 The examiner rejected claims 48 through 51
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by a Menard United
States patent which disclosed, but did not claim, a first species
within the scope of claims 48 and 50, and a second species within
the scope of claims 49 and 51. 5 9 1 Gosteli unsuccessfully attempted
to antedate Menard by the following two methods: first, by claiming
the benefit, under section 119, of their Luxembourg patent application's foreign priority date, which was earlier than Menard's effective date as a reference; and second, via Rule 131 declarations. 59 2
585. Id. at 1439, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 107.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. 872 F.2d 1008, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
589. In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008, 1008, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1614, 1614 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
590. Id. at 1009, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1615.
591. Id.
592. Id. A Rule 131 declaration provides:
[W]hen any claim of an application or a patent under reexamination is rejected on
reference to a domestic patent which substantially shows or describes but does not
claim the same patentable invention ...the owner of the patent under reexamination
... shall make oath or declaration as to facts showing a completion of the invention
in this country before the filing date of the application on which the domestic patent
issued .... then the patent.., cited shall not bar the grant of a patent to the inventor
...
unless the date of such patent.., is more than one year prior to the date on
which the inventor's.., application was filed in this country.
37 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1991). The affidavit or declaration ofa prior invention provided for in this
regulation allows an inventor to overcome the cited patent which has resulted in the rejection
of a patent application. Id.

1992]

INTERPRETING SECTION

112

693

The Board denied Gosteli the benefit of their priority date because claims 48 through 51 contained considerable subject matter
that was not specifically disclosed in the Luxembourg application. 59 3
Even though the Luxembourg application disclosed the two specific
chemical species set forth in the intervening Menard reference, the
Board held that the Luxembourg application did not satisfy the written description requirement of section 112, first paragraph, for
claims 48 through 51. Therefore, the effective filing date of claims
48 through 51 was not the Luxembourg filing date, but rather the
United States filing date. 59 4 Accordingly, Gosteli could not antedate
Menard under section 119.
Gosteli's Rule 131 declarations attempted to establish a constructive reduction to practice in this country, based on their foreign priority date of the two species disclosed by Menard. The Board
rejected Gosteli's Rule 131 declarations because they did not include evidence indicating that the invention was completed in the
59 5
United States prior to Menard's filing date.
The parties agreed that Menard was not an effective anticipatory
reference if Gosteli was entitled to its Luxembourg priority date. 59 6
The Solicitor also conceded that the applicants were entitled to
claims covering the two species disclosed both in Menard and in the
Luxembourg priority application, or to any other claim properly
supported by the Luxembourg disclosure under the first paragraph. 5 97 The Federal Circuit concluded that claims 48 through 51
were entitled to the benefit of their foreign priority date under section 119 only if their Luxembourg priority application fully supported those claims under section 112, first paragraph. This is the
same treatment that is given applications claiming the benefit of earlier filed United States applications under section 120.598
In its analysis, the Federal Circuit first addressed the government's argument that In re Ziegler 59 9 should be overruled. The government asserted that Ziegler's fundamental premise, namely "that a
foreign application need show support for only so much of the
claimed invention as is disclosed in the prior art reference to achieve
a priority date for the entirety of the claimed invention," conflicted
593.

Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1009, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1615.

594. Id. at 1010, 10 U.S,P.Q.2d at 1615.
595.
596.

Id
Id.

597.

Id. at 1011, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1616.

598.
599.

Id.
347 F.2d 642, 146 U.S.P.Q. 76 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
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with several other C.C.P.A. decisions.600 The court, however, did
not find a conflict because all of the claims in Ziegler's United States
application were properly supported under the first paragraph by
60
Ziegler's foreign priority applications. '
The court next addressed Gosteli's argument that they could
"swear behind Menard, under Rule 131, by establishing a constructive reduction to practice in this country based on their foreign pri-

ority date of the two species disclosed by Menard. ' ' 60 2 Citing In re
Mulder,60 3 Gosteli argued that they could use their foreign priority
date to establish the reduction to practice component for a Rule
131 (b) showing.6 0 4 Therefore, citing the rationale in In re Stempel, 60 5
Gosteli believed that they needed only to show priority with respect
606
to as much of the invention as Menard disclosed.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, stating that the requirements and
operation of section 119 differ from those of Rule 131.607 Whereas
Rule 131 provides a mechanism for removing prior art references,
section 119 is concerned only with an applicant's effective filing
date.6 0 8 Section 119 operates independently of the prior art, and
thus the showing required for section 119 appropriately differs from
60 9
a Rule 131 showing.
The Federal Circuit then distinguished Gosteli's position from
that in Mulder on two grounds. First, Gosteli's Rule 131 declarations did not mention acts in this country, whereas Mulder relied on
United States activities to remove prior art. Second, there was no
600. Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1011, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1617 (construing In re Ziegler, 347 F.2d
642, 643, 146 U.S.P.Q. 76, 76 (C.C.P.A. 1965)); see, e.g., In re Scheiber, 587 F.2d 59, 62, 199
U.S.P.Q. 782, 784-85 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (rejecting attempt to claim earlier filing date under
section 120 due to lack of specificity in application); In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262 n.6,
191 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1976) ("All § 119 requires is that the foreign application
describe and seek protection for 'broadly the same invention' as described in the U.S. application claiming its benefit."); Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 881, 178 U.S.P.Q. 158, 159
(C.C.P.A. 1973) (concluding that foreign application must satisfy requirement of 35 U.S.C.
§ 112, first paragraph, if it is to be basis of claim under section 119).
601. Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1011, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1617. The court, however, agreed that
Ziegler did contain some language inconsistent with the C.C.P.A.'s later decisions in Kawai,
Wertheim, and Scheiber, noting that those later decisions control because that court always sat en
bane. Id.
602. Id
603. 716 F.2d 1542, 219 U.S.P.Q. 189 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
604. Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1011, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1617 (citing In re Mulder, 716 F.2d 1542,
1544-46, 219 U.S.P.Q. 189, 192-94 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
605. 241 F.2d 755, 113 U.S.P.Q. 77 (C.C.P.A. 1957).
606. Gosteli, 872 F.2d at 1012, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618 (citing In re Stempel, 241 F.2d 755,
760, 113 U.S.P.Q. 77, 81 (C.C.P.A. 1957)).
607. Id In noting the difference, the Federal Circuit cited In re Scheiber, 587 F.2d 59, 6162, 199 U.S.P.Q. 782, 784 (C.C.P.A. 1978), which explained a similar contrast between section 120 and Rule 131. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.

19921

INTERPRETING SECTION

112

695

dispute that Mulder complied with the section 112 requirements subsumed in section 119. The court thus affirmed the Board's holding
that Gosteli could not use the Rule 131 declarations to swear behind
Menard. 610
Finally, the court addressed the question of whether Gosteli's
Luxembourg application provided a sufficient written description of
the entire subject matter of claims 48 through 51. The court reiterated the general rule that although the claimed subject matter does
not have to be exactly described, the description must clearly allow
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that Gosteli invented
what is claimed. 611 Finding that the PTO presented unrebutted evidence of a number of differences between the disclosure of the Luxembourg priority application and claims 48 through 51, the court
held that Gosteli did not satisfy the written description requirement.6 1 2 Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's
3

decision. 61
In Utter v. Hiraga,614 the Federal Circuit decided whether Hiraga
could obtain the benefit of his Japanese filing date under section
119, and consequently gain priority in the subject interference. 615
The Board concluded that Hiraga's Japanese application complied
with the enablement and written description requirements as to the
subject matter of the interference count.6 16 On appeal, Utter ar-

gued that the Board erred by ignoring Hiraga's burden to show that
his disclosure met these requirements, and by holding that Hiraga's
Japanese and United States applications met the enablement and
written description requirements. 617 Utter argued to the Federal
Circuit that the examiner erroneously relieved Hiraga of his burden
by suggesting that Hiraga add the claim corresponding to the interference count to his application, and that the Board compounded
61 8
that error by not mentioning any burden of proof in its opinion.
610.

I.

611. Id. (citing In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257, 262, 19 U.S.P.Q. 90, 96 (C.C.P.A. 1976)).
612. Id. at 1012, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1618.
613. Id.
614. 845 F.2d 993, 6 U.S.P.O.2d 1709 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
615. Utter v. Hiraga, 845 F.2d 993, 996-97, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1709, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The contested invention involved scroll compressors. Scroll compressors, which are used in
air conditioners, have two spirals interfitted with each other. One spiral is fixed while the
other orbits to compress pockets of fluid by pushing them inward around the ever-narrower
space between the spirals. In the "radially" configured scroll compressor at issue, the outer
surface of the orbiting spiral meets the inner surface of the fixed spiral as it pushes the fluid
pockets around. Id.
616. Id.
617. Id.
618. Id.
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The Federal Circuit first stated that the party who relies on an
earlier-filed application under sections 119 or 120 has the burden to
show that the foreign or parent application supports the later-added
claims under sections 112, first paragraph. 6 19 This is true regardless of whether that party is the junior or senior party in an interference. 620 Second, because written description is a question of fact,
the Federal Circuit reviewed the Board's finding of fact under the
clearly erroneous standard. 62 ' The court found nothing persuasive
in the record to support the claim that the Board's conclusion was in
error. 6 22 Finally, with respect to enablement, a question of law, the
court similarly found nothing persuasive in the record to support
the claim that the Board's conclusion was legally in error. 6 23 The
62 4
Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's decision.
In In re Salmon, 62 5 the Federal Circuit considered whether a design
patent application was entitled to the benefit of the disclosure of a
parent design patent application. If so, the parent application
would be treated as antedating the references on which the Board
relied in denying the reissue application as obvious. 6 26 The Federal
Circuit stated that the provisions of sections 112 and 120 require
that for section 120 to apply, the first application must disclose "the
invention" claimed in the second application. 6 27 Applying this rule
to the facts of Salmon, the court stated that the stool design claimed
in the second application must be the same design disclosed in the
parent application. 628 The court held that the design for a stool
with a round seat in the later application was not disclosed in the
parent application, which disclosed only a stool with a square
seat. 6 29 Because the stool design claimed in the second application
was not the same design disclosed in the parent application, the patent owners were not entitled to the benefit of the earlier filing date
63 0
of the parent application.
619. Id. at 998, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1713.
620. Id. at 997-98, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1713 (citing Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc.,
772 F.2d 1570, 1574 n.2, 227 U.S.P.Q. 177, 178 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
621. Id. at 998, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714.
622. Id. at 999, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714.
623. Id. at 998, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1714.
624. Id. at 999, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1715.
625. 705 F.2d 1579, 217 U.S.P.Q. 981 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
626. In re Salmon, 705 F.2d 1579, 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. 981, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
627. Id.
628. Id.
629. Id. at 1581-82, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 983-84.
630. Id.
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The court said that Salmon was unlike In re Zahn,63 1 upon which
appellants relied. 63 2 In Zahn, the applicant claimed only the design
for the shank of a drill bit, not the design for the entire drill. 6 33 The
question before the C.C.P.A. was whether a patent could issue for a
design for only part of an article. The court held that it could. 6 34 In
Salmon, however, the Federal Circuit found no indication that the
appellant claimed the design for only the tubular support of the
stool and not the entire stool as shown in the drawings, which in63 5
cluded its square seat.
C.

The "Best Mode" Requirement

The "best mode" requirement is the third requirement of section
112, first paragraph. In essence, the requirement requires the applicant to set forth the best mode for carrying out the invention known
to him at the time of filing the application. The Federal Circuit addressed this provision in the cases that follow.
In Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp.,636 the Federal Circuit held
a claim invalid for failure to disclose the best mode where an inventor knew of a preferred hardness of a constituent material of a
claimed invention and specially ordered such material to make the
only embodiment of the claimed invention, but failed to disclose the
material hardness or the supplier and tradename of the preferred
compound anywhere in the specification. 63 7 The patent claimed a
sealing member in the form of a grommet or plug button designed
to seal an opening in, for example, a sheet metal panel. 63 8 Specifically, the claim stated the grommet covered by claim 6, the only
claim being asserted, may be composed either of two materials that
differ in hardness or of a single material that varies in hardness, with
the material forming the base portion of the grommet having a durometer hardness reading of less than 60 Shore A and the material
forming the locking portion having a durometer hardness reading of
more than 70 Shore A. 6 39 Chemcast sued Arco for infringement of
claim 6 of its patent. Arco counterclaimed that the patent was inva631. 617 F.2d 261, 204 U.S.P.Q. 988 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
632. Salmon, 705 F.2d at 1581, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 983 (distinguishing In re Zahn, 617 F.2d
261, 204 U.S.P.Q. 988 (C.C.P.A. 1980)).
633. Zahn, 617 F.2d at 268, 204 U.S.P.Q. at 995.
634. Id. at 267, 204 U.S.P.Q. at 994.
635. Salmon, 705 F.2d at 1582, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 984.
636. 913 F.2d 923, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
637. Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 930, 16 U.S.P.O.2d 1033, 103839 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
638. Id. at 924, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1034.
639. Id. at 924-25, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1034.
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lid on several grounds, including failure to comply with section
112.640
The district court held the patent invalid because of a failure to
disclose the best mode requirement and a failure to satisfy the requirements of section 112, second paragraph, by not particularly
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter of the invention.r4 1 Both parties appealed. The Federal Circuit vacated the district court's best mode holding on grounds that the district court
relied on an incorrect legal standard. 64 2 The court reversed the district court's holding that claim 6 did not meet the particularity
64 3
requirement.
On remand, the district court again invalidated the patent for failure to satisfy the best mode requirement and made forty-seven factual findings detailing what the inventor considered to be the best
mode of practicing his claimed invention at the time of filing and
what the specification, as filed, disclosed to one of ordinary skill in
the art.64 4 According to the district court, the patent failed to disclose the particular type, the hardness, the supplier, and the trade
name of the material used to make the locking portion of the
grommet. 64 5
The Federal Circuit began its analysis of the district court's judgment on remand by reviewing some principles concerning the best
mode requirement. 64 6 One objective limitation noted by the court
on the extent of the disclosure required to comply with the best
mode requirement was that the disclosure be directed to those
640.
641.
642.

Id. at 925, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1035.
Id.
Id

643.

Id

644. Id (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 2005 (E.D. Mich.
1989)).
645. Id. (citing Chemcast, 12 U.S.P.O.2d at 2008).
646. Id The Federal Circuit stated:
The best mode inquiry focuses on the inventor's state of mind as to the time he filed
his application-a subjective, factual question. But this focus is not exclusive. Our
statements that "there is no objective standard by which to judge the adequacy of a
best mode disclosure," and that "only evidence of concealment (accidental or intentional) is to be considered," assumed that both the level of skill in the art and the
scope of the claimed invention were additional, objective metes and bounds of a best
mode disclosure.
Id. at 926, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1035-36.
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skilled in the art.6 4 7 A second objective limitation recognized by the
648
court was the scope of the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit summarized its discussion by stating that a
proper best mode analysis must first determine whether the inventor, at the time of the filing of the patent application, knew of a
mode of practicing the claimed invention that the inventor considered to be better than any other.64 9 This wholly subjective inquiry
resolves whether the inventor must disclose any facts in addition to
those sufficient for enablement. 65 ° If the inventor in fact contemplated such a preferred mode, a comparison between what the inventor knew with what the inventor disclosed must occur. This
objective inquiry resolves whether the disclosure was adequate to
enable one skilled in the art to practice the best mode or, in other
words, whether the inventor "concealed" his preferred mode from
651
the "public."
Chemcast argued that the district court erred in its best mode
analysis by failing to focus on the claimed invention and by incor647. Id. at 926-27, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036 (citing Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849
F.2d 585, 587, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); see, e.g., Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd.
Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1692, 1696 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that inventor violated best mode requirement by failing to disclose specific surface treatment that he
knew was necessary in order to ensure satisfactory performance of his invention, even though
how to perform treatment itself was known in art); Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827
F.2d 1524, 1536, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987) (finding that inventors of laser violated best mode requirement by failing to disclose details of
their preferred TiCuSil brazing method, which were not contained in prior art); W.L. Gore &
Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. 303, 316 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(deciding that no best mode violation occurred when inventor did not disclose only mode of
calculating stretch rate he employed, because that mode would have been used by those of
ordinary skill in art at time of filing application), cert. dened, 469 U.S. 851 (1984); In re Sherwood, 613 F.2d 809, 816, 204 U.S.P.Q. 537, 544 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (ruling that no best mode
violation occurred where specification disclosed underlying concepts and mathematical equations that together with "menial tools known to all who practice th[e] art," would produce
contemplated best mode digital computer program, even though inventor possessed more
information concerning his contemplated best mode than he disclosed in specification), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 994 (1981).
648. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036 (citing Randomex, Inc., 849 F.2d at
588, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053) (explaining that, in Randomex, inventor's intentional concealment
of his cleaning fluid formula did not violate best mode requirement because his "invention
neither added anything nor claimed to add anything to the prior art respecting cleaning
fluid."). See Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1352, 1359 (7th Cir.) (asserting that district court erred in defining scope of invention when it
held that inventor violated best mode requirement by omitting specifications and tolerances
necessary to make claimed rifle parts interchangeable with M-16 rifles already in existence),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989); DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1325, 226 U.S.P.Q.
758, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (holding that Board's finding that inventor violated best mode requirement in failing to identify at filing specific engineering level of MT/ST [word processor]
with which it was contemplated that disclosed species should be employed was clearly erroneous, because properly construed claim did not include word processor).
649. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 927-28, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036.
650. Id. at 928, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036.
651. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1036-37.
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rectly determining that the inventor concealed a better mode than
the inventor disclosed. 652 In particular, Chemcast argued that because the patent claim did not call for any specific material for making the locking portion of the grommet, any failure to disclose the
particular material that the inventor thought best did not violate the
best mode requirement. 6 53 The Federal Circuit dismissed this first
argument by stating that Chemcast's argument confused the best
mode inquiry with an enablement inquiry. 6 54 The court stated that
a patent applicant must disclose the best mode of carrying out the
claimed invention, not merely a mode of making and using what is
claimed. Further, the court noted that a specification can be enabling, yet fail to disclose an applicant's contemplated best mode.6 55
In fact, the court acknowledged cases where inventors violated the
best mode requirement by failing to disclose nonclaimed elements
that were, nevertheless, necessary to practice the best mode of carrying out the claimed invention. 6 56
The Federal Circuit also dismissed Chemcast's second argument
that the inventor had not concealed a better mode than the inventor
had disclosed. 6 5 7 The court noted that the district court devoted no
fewer than thirteen factual findings to what inventor Rubright knew
58
as of the filing date of the application. 6
Proceeding to the second step of the analysis, the Federal Circuit
reviewed the application disclosure. 6 59 In its review of the application disclosure, the Federal Circuit concluded that one skilled in the
art simply could not divine therefrom the inventor's preferred material hardness. 66 0 The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court's
finding that "the specification of the open-ended range of materials
652. Id., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037.
653. Id
654. Id.
655. Id.
656. Id. (citing Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 419, 8 U.S.P.O.2d
1692, 1695 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (describing best mode violation for failure to disclose unclaimed
fluoride surface treatment that was necessary for satisfactory performance of claimed seal));
see Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1536, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737, 1745
(Fed. Cir. 1987) (finding best mode violation for failure to disclose braze cycle which constituted preferred means of attachment, even though no particular attachment means was
claimed).
657. Chemcast, 913 F.2d at 928-29, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037-38.
658. Id. 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037. In particular, the district court found that the inventor
knew that the preferred hardness of the material used to construct the grommet was 75-+/-5
Shore D, and that the inventor purchased all of this material under the trade name R-4467
from Reynosol Corporation, which spent 750 man-hours developing the compounds specifically for Chemcast. Id. at 929, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037. Furthermore, the district court found
that at the time Rubright filed the application, the only embodiment known to him was a
grommet composed of R-4467. Id.
659. Id. at 929, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1037-38.
660. Id. The application disclosed the following:
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of 70 Shore A or harder conceals the best mode 75 Shore D material
in part because materials of Shore A and Shore D hardnesses are
recognized as different types of materials with different classes of
physical properties. ' 6 6 1 The court held that section 112 obligated
Rubright to disclose the specific supplier and trade name of his preferred material for three reasons: (1) Chemcast had used only R4467; (2) certain characteristics of the grommet material were
claimed elements of the patented inventions; and (3) Rubright himself did not know the formula, composition, or method of manufac6 62
ture of R-4467.
Finally, the Federal Circuit dismissed as irrelevant Chemcast's remaining arguments that the failure to disclose Reynosol R-4467 was
justified because Reynosol considered the formulation of R-4467 a
trade secret and had offered the compound only to Chemcast, and
that the inventor developed his preferred mode with the requirements of a particular customer in mind. 66 3 The court noted that the
fact that the inventor's preferred mode had been developed by Reynosol with the requirements of a particular customer in mind did
not excuse the inventor's concealment.6 6 4 The court stated that the
inventor must disclose information necessary to carry out the best
mode, whether the information is characterizable as "manufacturing
'6 65
data," "customer requirements," or even "trade secrets.
In Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai PharmaceuticalCo. ,666 the court considered
whether the '008 patent was invalid for a "best mode" violation
based on the inventor's failure to disclose the best mammalian host
The annular open portion []of the ceiling member []is preferably comprised of a
rigid castable material, such as a castable resinous material, either a thermal plastic
or thermal setting resin or any mixtures thereof, for example, polyurethane or
polyvinylchloride. The [locking] portion []also should be made of a material that is
sufficiently hard and rigid so that it cannot be radially compressed, such as when it is
inserted in the opening []in the panel [].Materials having a durometer hardness
reading of 70 Shore A or harder are suitable in this regard.
Id. Additionally, the Federal Circuit noted that the material hardness (75 Shore D) and supplier/trade name (Reynosol compound R-4467) were not explicitly disclosed anywhere in the
specification. Id. at 929, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038.
661. Id.
662. Id.
663. Id. at 930, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1038 (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega ServoControl, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791, 218 U.S.P.Q. 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
664. Id.
665. Id. But cf. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 870 F.2d 1292, 1302, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1352, 1360 (7th Cir.) (stating that inventor need not disclose manufacturing data
or requirements of particular customer if that information is not part of best mode of practicing claimed invention), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 822 (1989).
666. 927 F.2d 1200, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1016 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991); see
supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text (discussing facts of case in detail).
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cells known to him as of the filing date of the patent application. 6 67
The district court found that the use of a specific genetically heterogeneous strain of Chinese hamster ovary (CHO) cells, which produced EPO at a rate greater than that of other cells, represented the
best mode of practicing the claimed invention. 6 68 Moreover, the
district court found that this strain was disclosed in the claim's example 10 and that the inventor knew of no better mode.66 9 Genetics
Institute (GI) argued on appeal that the best mode was not adequately disclosed in example 10 because one skilled in the art could
not duplicate this best mode without the inventor first having depos670
ited a sample of the specific cells in a public depository.
The Federal Circuit began its analysis by reviewing its recently
formulated two-pronged "best mode" requirement analysis. 6 7 1 The
Federal Circuit then agreed with the district court that the defend672
ants had not met the burden of proving a "best mode" violation.
The district court had found that the claims at issue required the use
of biological materials that could be prepared in laboratories from
readily available biological cells by following the description in example 10.673 The district court also found that the starting materials were publicly available, described in the specification, and did
not require undue experimentation for their preparation in order to
carry out the best mode. 6 74 Further, the district court relied on testimony that the invention, as it related to the best mode host cells,
could be practiced by one skilled in the art following example 10.675
The Federal Circuit stated that this was not a case where the invention may be incapable of being practiced without access to an
organism; if the cells can be prepared without undue experimentation from known materials based on the description in the patent
specification, a deposit is not required. 6 76 Nonetheless, the defendants also contended that the examiner's rejection of the application
that matured into the '008 patent, for failure to make a publicly ac667. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharmaceutical Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1209-12, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1016, 1023-26 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 169 (1991).
668. Il at 1209, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1023.
669. Id.
670. Id. at 1210, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024.
671. Id. (citing Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Indus. Corp., 913 F.2d 923, 927, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
1033, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
672. Id.
673. Id. at 1210, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1024-25.
674. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
675. Id. at 1211, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
676. Id.; see Feldman v. Aunstrup, 517 F.2d 1351, 1354, 186 U.S.P.Q. 108, 111 (C.C.P.A.
1975) (stating there is no best mode compliance problem when micro-organisms used are
known and readily available to public), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 912 (1976).
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cessible biological deposit, supported its argument. 6 77 Addressing
this contention, the court noted that the PTO only recently pre6 78
scribed guidelines concerning the deposit of biological material.
Furthermore, in response to a question as to whether the deposit
requirement was applicable to the best mode requirement, as distinct from enablement, the court noted the PTO's statement that
"[i]f a deposit is the only way to comply with a best mode requirement, then a deposit must be made." 6 79 The court stated that it
could not see any inconsistency between the district court's decision, which it affirmed, and the PTO guidelines. 68 0
Next, the defendants asserted that its own scientists were unable
to duplicate the inventor's genetically heterogeneous best mode cell
strain. 68 ' The court stated that what is required is the adequate disclosure of the best mode, not a guarantee that every aspect of the
specification be precisely and universally reproducible. 68 2 Finally,
defendants argued that the inventor's failure to deposit the transfected cells, notwithstanding that he was-willing to deposit essentially worthless cell material, was evidence of deliberate
concealment.68 3 The court stated, however, that the deposit of the
host cells containing the rEPO gene was not necessary to satisfy the
best mode requirement. The fact that some cells were deposited,
6 84
but not others, was irrelevant.
In Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp.,685 the alleged infringer
argued that the applicant knew in advance of filing the patent application that standard audio tape was not the best mode for carrying
out the invention. 68 6 Based on the testimony of the patent owner's
former Vice President of Engineering, the district court found that
the applicant purchased tapes and cassettes of its own design and
specifications and that were different from standard audio tapes in
their yield strength and magnetic characteristics. 68 7 The patent
677. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1211, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025.
678. Id.; see 37 C.F.R. § 1.802(b) (1991) (codifying deposit requirement for biotechnology
material inventions).
679. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1211, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025; see52 Fed. Reg. 34,086 (1987)
(describing best mode requirement as safeguard against people who seek to obtain patent
protection without making full disclosure).
680. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1211, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1023.
681. Id. at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1025-26.
682. Id., 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026; see In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 773, 135 U.S.P.Q. 311, 316
(C.C.P.A. 1962) (stating that requirement of adequate disclosure is satisfied when one skilled
in art could reproduce patented invention without undue experimentation).
683. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1212, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1026.
684. Id.
685. 908 F.2d 931, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).
686. Northern Telecom, Inc. v. Datapoint Corp., 908 F.2d 931,940, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1321,
1328 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 296 (1990).

687. Id.

704

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:621

owner argued that 3M commercial audio tape on the market at the
time met its specifications. Although the Federal Circuit found this
fact perhaps relevant to enablement, it did not establish that the
best mode "contemplated by the inventor" was in fact disclosed. 688
The Federal Circuit consequently affirmed the district court's deter68 9
mination of a best mode violation.
Another case dealing with the quality of disclosure in a best mode
context, Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp.,690 involved a patent for a
portable apparatus for cleaning computer disk packs. In conjunction with the cleaning apparatus, the patent disclosed but apparently
did not claim the use of a cleaning solution, such as a 91%o alcohol
solution or a nonresidue detergent, such as Randomex Cleaner No.
50281.691 Although the inventor knew of no better nonresidue detergent solution than the Randomex Cleaner No. 50281, the inventor intentionally omitted the formula for No. 50281 from the
disclosure. 69 2 The district court, in a jury trial, held that without
revealing the formula, the application's reference to "Randomex
Cleaner No. 50281" did not satisfy the best mode requirement, even
though a chemical analysis of the solution would have revealed the
formula. The district court concluded that Randomex kept the
formula secret in order to sell No. 50281 to users of the Randomex
apparatus. 693 After purchasing several of these portable disk cleaners, the defendant became dissatisfied with the Randomex cleaning
solution and created its own cleaning solution for use instead.
Thereafter, Randomex sued for patent infringement. 69 4
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding no best mode violation. 69 5
The Federal Circuit held that the district court mistakenly focused
on the users of the device rather than on those of ordinary skill in
the art and therefore had unduly focused on jury question three as
the best indicator of whether the best mode had been disclosed. 69 6
The Federal Circuit stated that the answer to this jury question was
688. Id; see Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 419, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1692,
1697 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1536, 3
U.S.P.Q2d 1737, 1745 (Fed. Cir.) (distinguishing aim of enablement requirement of disclosing invention to public so as to enable one skilled in art to make and use it from aim of best
mode requirement of disclosing best mode of carrying out invention as contemplated by inventor at time of execution of patent application), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
689. Northern Telecom, 908 F.2d at 941, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1328.
690. 849 F.2d 585, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
691. Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 586, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d 1050, 1051 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
692. Id. at 588, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1052-53.
693. Id. at 588-89, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053.
694. Id. at 586, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1051.
695. Id.
696. Id. Jury question three read:
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useless in determining whether the inventors failed to meet the best
mode requirements. 6 9 7 Rather, the Federal Circuit found jury question two to be more closely related to best mode, even though it was
poorly framed and directed more toward enablement than best
mode. 6 98 Question 2 read: "Was the patent's disclosure with respect to cleaning fluid so inadequate that a person skilled in the art
who did not use plaintiff's named cleaner would have to engage in
an undue amount of experimentation, a) To use the invention? b)
To find the best mode to use the invention?" 6 9 9 Although the jury
answered questions (a) and (b) in the negative, the district court
nonetheless entered a judgment of invalidity of the patent based on
70 0
a failure to disclose the best mode.
In overturning the district court's decision, the Federal Circuit focused on the issue of whether question two was so legally deficient
that the jury would have failed to make the underlying inquiries necessary to support its finding that the inventor fulfilled the best mode
requirement. 70 1 In addressing this issue, the Federal Circuit relied
on a statement by the Board that an applicant is not required to
point out which of the embodiments is the best mode, but only that
the disclosure include the best mode. 70 2 The Federal Circuit felt
that the quality of disclosure was not so poor as to effectively constitute concealment of the best mode. 70 3 Disclosure of a trade name
70 4
may be unacceptable when suitable substitutes are not available.
In this case, because commercial substitutes were readily available in
the prior art, disclosure of the trade name, identified as a
nonresidue solution, satisfied the best mode requirement. 70 5
The Federal Circuit found a best mode violation in Dana Corp. v.
IPC Ltd. Partnership,70 6 however, where it reviewed a patent related
to a valve stem seal. IPC defended against Dana's infringement suit
by arguing that the patent was invalid for failure to disclose the best
Did the applicants deliberately refrain from informing the users of the invention of
the best cleaner formula with the intent that, to a substantial extent, users would be
led to purchase plaintiff's cleaner rather than to experiment themselves to find the
best?
Id. The jury answered this question in the affirmative. Id.
697. Id. at 589, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 586, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1051.
700. Id. at 586-87, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1051-52.
701. Id. at 589, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1053.
702. Id., 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1054 (quoting Ernsthausen v. Nakayama, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1539,
1549 (Bd. Pat. App. Int. 1985), aff'd, 809 F.2d 787 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
703. Id. at 589-90, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1054.
704. Id. (citing White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Vega Servo-Control, Inc., 713 F.2d 788, 791,
218 U.S.P.Q. 961, 963 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
705. Id.
706. 860 F.2d 415, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1692 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
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mode, because Dana did not identify a fluoride surface treatment of
the seals. This treatment was recognized as the best method for carrying out the invention known to the inventor at the time the appli70 7
cation was filed.
The jury found no best mode violation, and the trial court refused
to grant aJNOV motion based on best mode invalidity.70 8 To grant
IPC's JNOV motion, the Federal Circuit had to find as a matter of
law that, on the evidence presented at trial, reasonable minds could
9
not have found that the best mode requirement was satisfied. 70
The Federal Circuit thus focused on the state of mind of Wilson, the
inventor, at the time the application for the patent-in-suit was
filed. 7 10 One item of evidence involved Wilson's report of tests
designed to determine the effect of surface treatment and the most
effective design in controlling leakage. 71 1 The Wilson report concluded that no design was acceptable when using nontreated rubber
and that fluoride surface treatment was necessary for the satisfactory
71 2
performance of the seal.
Additionally, IPC pointed to a letter from Wilson's superior to
Dana's patent counsel which indicated that the fluoride surface
treatment was not disclosed in the patent application.7 13 Dana's
patent counsel omitted disclosure of the fluoride treatment because
Dana did not believe it was a part of the case. 7 14 Thus, the evidence
in the record indicated that at the time of filing Wilson thought that
the best way of carrying out his invention included the fluoride surface treatment. 7 15 Citing a technical journal article and expert testimony, Dana argued that the fluoride treatment need not be
disclosed because such treatment was known to the public for years
prior to the filing date of the patent application.7 1 6 The district
court agreed, concluding that the best mode requirement could be
satisfied by reference to what the prior art disclosed. 71 7
The Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court erred
as a matter of law by allowing a reference to articles or experts as
evidence of the skill in the art to meet the best mode require707. Dana Corp. v. IPC Ltd. Partnership, 860 F.2d 415, 417, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1692, 1694
(Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1067 (1989).
708. Id.
709. Id. at 417-18, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1694-95.
710. Id at 418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
711. Id
712. Id.
713. Id.
714. Id.
715. Id. at 419-20, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1696.
716. Id. at 418-19, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695.
717. Id. at 419, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1695-96.
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ment. 7 18 The court reiterated that, separate and distinct from enablement, the best mode requirement entails a comparison of the
facts known to the inventor regarding the invention at the time the
application is filed with the disclosure in the specification2 1 9 As discussed, the evidence in the record clearly indicated the inventor's
belief that the best way of carrying out the invention included the
fluoride treatment. The Federal Circuit found that the lack of such
disclosure in the patent resulted in the failure to satisfy the best
mode requirement. The Federal Circuit thus held that the defendants' JNOV motion on best mode invalidity should have been
7 20
granted and the patent declared invalid.

The requirement of disclosing the best mode known to the inventor at the time of filing applies even if the best mode constitutes an

improvement to the invention that is separately patentable by someone else. The Federal Circuit commented on this matter, in dicta, in
Aktiebolaget KarlstadsMekaniska Werkstad (AKMW) v. United States International Trade Commission,7 21 which involved an appeal from an International Trade Commission (ITC) determination that the
importation of certain paper-making machines violated section 337
of the Tariff Act. The ITC found that the imported goods infringed
two patents, one of which was the Hill '269 patent.7 2 2 In essence,
the '269 patent disclosed and claimed a head box for a paper-making machine having self-positionable trailing elements that extend
723
all the way across the head box slice chamber.
Appellant AKMW asserted that the '037 patent issued to Hill, a
named co-inventor of the '269 patent, was prior art to the '269 patent. The '037 patent was a continuation of a continuation-in-part of
a division of the application which matured into the patent reissued
as the '269 patent. The '037 patent disclosed, but did not claim, a
self-positionable trailing element extending the full width of the
slice chamber. 7 24 The Federal Circuit concluded that the assignee
of the '269 and '037 patents had admitted that Hill's work, which
was prior art to that of the joint inventors, was limited to a head box
having self-positionable trailing elements, but not full-width trailing
72 5
elements.
718. Id.
719. Id.
720. Id. at 420, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1696-97.
721. 705 F.2d 1565, 217 U.S.P.Q. 865 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
722. Aktiebolaget Karlstads Mekaniska Werkstad (AKMW) v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 705 F.2d 1565, 1566, 217 U.S.P.Q. 865, 866 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
723. Id. at 1569, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 868.
724. Id. at 1572, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 870.
725. Id. at 1574, 217 U.S.P.Q. at 871.
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Appellant further argued that the description of the full-width
trailing members in the '037 patent, in which Hill was named as the
sole inventor, demonstrated that Hill himself invented a head box
incorporating such full-width trailing members. 72 6 The court dismissed this argument by stating that there is no presumption, or any
reason to assume, that everything disclosed in a patent specification
72 7
has been invented by that particular patentee.
In Hybritech, Inc. v. MonoclonalAntibodies, Inc.,728 the Federal Circuit
reversed a district court's holding of invalidity based on failure to
disclose the best mode and concluded that there was no evidence of
concealment. The claimed invention in Hybritech required the use of
certain monoclonal antibodies. 729 The district court apparently relied on certain testimony by various Hybritech employees that sophisticated, competent people at Hybritech performed various
screening processes for producing monoclonal antibodies. 7 30 According to the Federal Circuit, it was not plausible that this evidence, by itself, amounted to proof of concealment of a best mode
for screening or producing monoclonal antibodies. Because a best
mode violation requires evidence that the applicant knew of and
concealed a better mode than the applicant disclosed, the court re73
versed the district court's best mode holding. '
Although the court in Hybritech did not expressly address the issue
of whether intentional, as opposed to accidental, concealment is a
requirement for a best mode violation, the Federal Circuit did address this issue in Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc. 73 2 The critical
issue in Spectra-Physics was whether the patents disclosed the best
mode for attaching certain copper cups to a ceramic tube. The patents disclosed brazing as the preferred method of attachment. The
726. Id.
727. Id. The court continued, stating:
The embodiment comprising full width trailing members is an improvement on, and
thus the best mode of practicing, what has been conceded by Beloit [the assignee] to
be Hill's prior invention. This improvement was unquestionably known to Hill, who
participated in its development. Thus, 35 U.S.C. § 112, which requires an inventor
to set forth the best mode contemplated by him of carrying out his invention, required Hill in this instance to retain the description of full width trailing sheets in his
application when it was divided out of the joint application, regardless of whether it
was his invention. Under these circumstances, there is no reason to believe that
Hill's invention is anything more than Beloit has conceded.
Id.
728. 802 F.2d 1367, 231 U.S.P.Q. 81 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cerl. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
729. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1385, 231 U.S.P.Q
81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987).
730. Id. at 1368, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 81-82.
731. Id.
732. 827 F.2d 1524, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
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preferred brazing material was TiCuSil. 73 3 Although brazing using
this material was indeed the best mode known to the inventors at
the time of filing, the inventors knew at that time of a certain sixstage process for affecting the bond using TiCuSil. 73 4 Although this
six-stage process was not disclosed in the two patents, the district
court concluded that there was no best mode violation because the
patentees neither deliberately, intentionally, nor accidentally concealed brazing as the best mode of attaching the copper cups to the
73 5
ceramic tube.
In reversing the district court's holding, the Federal Circuit stated
that the best mode provision of section 112 requires disclosure of
the best mode "contemplated by the inventor," and is thereby a
subjective determination. 73 6 Only evidence of "concealment,"
whether accidental or intentional, is considered and the specificity
of the disclosure required to comply with the best mode requirement must be determined from facts that the inventor possessed at
the time of filing the application. 3 7The appropriate question then is
not how the inventor should disclose the best mode, but whether
the inventor has done so adequately under the statute. 73 8 Despite a
general reference to the best mode, the quality of the disclosure
may be so poor as to effectively result in concealment. 73 9 Far from
being a "production specification," Coherent did not disclose any
details about its brazing process. 740 This complete lack of detail effectively resulted in its concealment. 7 4 ' Thus, even accidental concealment may be sufficient for a best mode violation.
In DeGeorge v. Bernier,74 2 the Federal Circuit considered the best
mode requirement in an interference context. In finding no best
mode disclosure in the DeGeorge application, the Board stated that
733. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1536, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737,
1745 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 954 (1987).
734. Id. at 1537, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1745. The six-stage process, which is at issue because
the inventors failed to disclose it, also results in a copper-ceramic bond, but instead requires
six steps to do so (six brazing cycles). These steps involve brazing at specific temperatures
and pressures for specific times in a six-step process. Id The inventors explained that they
had disclosed the brazing method and TiCuSil as the preferred brazing material, but not the
six-stage process because the specifications of its steps were functions of its own factory's
ovens, which differ from other manufacturers' ovens, and were therefore meaningless in practice to provide. Id.
735. Id. at 1536, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1745.
736. Id. at 1535, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1744-45.
737. Id., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1745.
738. Id. at 1536, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1745.
739. Id.
740. Id. at 1537, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1745-46.
741. Id.
742. 768 F.2d 1318, 1324-25, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 762-63 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see supra notes
294-98 and accompanying text (discussing facts of case).
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"it was DeGeorge's responsibility to identify at [the time of] filing
the specific engineering level of MT/ST [word processor] with
which it was contemplated that the disclosed species should be employed rather then [sic] some other level." 74 3 In reversing the
Board, the Federal Circuit stated that a failure to meet the best
mode requirement should not arise from an absence of information
on the word processor because the properly construed count did
not include a word processor. 74 4 Thus, the court concluded that the
74 5
Board's finding of no best mode was clearly erroneous.
In Magdo v. Kooi, 74 6 the Federal Circuit reviewed a Board finding
of proper jurisdiction to consider a challenge concerning a best
mode question in an interference action. In reaching its decision,
the Board relied on Tofre v. Winchell, 74 7 in which the C.C.P.A. held
that the best mode requirement could be raised against an application in interference. 748 Contrary to the Board's view, the Federal
Circuit held that Tofe does not answer the question of whether a
challenge to the satisfaction of the best mode requirement may be
raised against a patent in interference. 74 9 That question, the court
stated, was not before the C.C.P.A. in Tofe and was not before the
750
Federal Circuit here.
In Christiansonv. Colt Industries Operating Corp.,751 the Federal Circuit addressed whether the best mode requirement was violated because Colt disclosed neither information on how to mass-produce
the invention nor information on sales to customers having particular requirements. 75 2 Christianson argued that the best mode, interchangeability with M-16 parts, was not disclosed. 753 The court held
that mass production or sales to customers having particular requirements was irrelevant to the best mode requirement.7 5 4 The
743. DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1325, 226 U.S.P.Q. 758, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
744. Id.
745. Id.
746. 699 F.2d 1325, 1330, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1033, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
747. 645 F.2d 58, 209 U.S.P.Q. 379 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
748. Magdo v. Kooi, 699 F.2d 1325, 1330, 216 U.S.P.Q. 1033, 1037 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (citing Tofe v. Winchell, 645 F.2d 58, 63, 209 U.S.P.Q 379, 384 (C.C.P.A. 1981)).
749. Id. at 1330, 216 U.S.P.Q. at 1037-38.
750. Id., 216 U.S.P.Q. at 1038. For interferences declared after the effective date of the
November 1984 amendment to 35 U.S.C. § 135(a), the issue in Magdo is rendered moot. Specifically, section 135(a) was amended to give the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences
jurisdiction over questions of patentability in addition to the previous jurisdiction the Board
had to determine priority of invention.
751. 822 F.2d 1544, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S.
800 (1988); see supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text (discussing facts of case in detail).
752. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 822 F.2d 1544, 1563, 3 U.S.P.Q:2d
1241, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 1987), vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 800 (1988).
753. Id.
754. Id.
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court stated that the interchangeability with M-16 parts did not appear anywhere as a limitation in any claim, and as Christianson conceded, the patents made no reference to the M-16 rifle. 7 55
Therefore, the court concluded that the best mode for making, using, and carrying out the claimed invention did not entail or involve
the M-16 rifle or interchangeability, but only related to the invention's use in any rifle. 75 6 The court found no testimony or evidence
in the record relating to the best mode of producing the claimed
inventions to indicate that any of the patents failed to meet that
75 7
requirement.
The Federal Circuit recognized that the district court's only basis
for invalidating Colt's claim to production trade secrets was its view
that failure to disclose them constituted noncompliance with section
112.758 The court found this to be legal error because there was no
evidence that Colt kept its inventions secret. Thus, the Federal Circuit reversed the summary judgment invalidating Colt's claims to
trade secrets misappropriation or to patent infringement. 7 59 "
In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States International Trade Commission,760 as in Christianson, the Federal Circuit considered whether a
difference between the manufactured product and the claimed product was pertinent to a best mode violation. Samsung, a manufacturer and importer of computer components, asserted that the
specification's failure to state any mode for boosting the wordline
voltage amounted to a best mode violation. 7 6 1 The court reiterated
that failure to disclose the best mode requires a showing that the
applicant knew of and concealed a better mode than that disclosed. 762 Samsung's admission that the inventors had not considered the "word boost" feature to be part of the best mode of their
invention refuted any argument that the inventor had known of and
7 63
had concealed a better mode than had been disclosed.
Moreover, the court noted that the specification did disclose a
mode for boosting the address voltage to a magnitude substantially
higher than the supply voltage, and that the applicant overcame any
755. Id.
756. lId
757. Id.
758. Id
759. Id. at 1563-64, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1256.
760. 871 F.2d 1054, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
761. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 871 F.2d 1054, 1061,
10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1257, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
762. Id. (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1384-85,
231 U.S.P.Q.2d 81, 94 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987)).
763. Id.
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suggestion that boosting circuitry was not adequately disclosed. 76 4
Finally, the fact that Texas Instruments may have manufactured a
DRAM (dynamic random access memory) containing a different or
better form of boosting means was not pertinent to whether the
specification disclosed the best mode contemplated by the inventor
in carrying out the invention. 76 5 The Federal Circuit affirmed the
Administrative Law Judge's determination that the record did not
show that the applicant knew of or concealed a better mode than he
7 66
disclosed.
1.

Concealment of the best mode as a basisfor a finding of unenforceability

The Federal Circuit has held that concealment of the best mode
can also render the patent unenforceable. In ConsolidatedAluminum
Corp. v. Foseco InternationalLtd.,767 the court held that the failure to
disclose the best mode and the disclosure of a fictitious and inoperable mode warranted a finding of invalidity for the patent-at-issue
and other related patents. 76 8 The inventions of the patents-in-suit
related to the manufacture and use of ceramic foam filters for mol76 9
ten metal, particularly aluminum.
After a six-week trial, a special master appointed by the district
court found one of the patents-in-suit, U.S. Patent No. 3,893,917
7 70
(the '917 patent), invalid for failure to disclose the best mode.
The special master found intentional withholding of the best mode
through the disclosure of a fictitious and inoperative embodiment
and consequently declared the '917 patent invalid and unenforceable. The special master found that in addition to certain claims of
the '917 patent being invalid over the prior art, selected claims of
five other patents were invalid in view of the prior art. 7 7 1 Finally,
the special master also found that certain claims of the '081 patent,
7 72
the '212 patent, and the '303 patent were valid and infringed.
Although the parties submitted objections to the special master's
findings, the district court held that in addition to the reasons stated
by the special master, the '917 patent was unenforceable for failure
764. Id.
765. Id.
766. Id.
767. 910 F.2d 804, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
768. Consolidated Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int'l Ltd., 910 F.2d 804, 809, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
769. Id at 806, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1482.
770. Id. at 806-07, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1482-83.
771. Id. at 806, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1482. The patents were U.S. Patent Nos. 3,962,081
('081), 4,075,303 ('303), 4,024,212 ('212), 4,024,056 ('056), and 4,081,371 ('371).
772. Id. at 807, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1483.
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to disclose prior art. 7 73 The district court further rejected Consolidated's argument that a failure to disclose the best mode cannot
constitute inequitable conduct.7 7 4 Lastly, the district court held that
the '081, '212, and the '303 patents, which the master found valid
and infringed, were unenforceable because of Consolidated's
'7 75
"broad pattern of inequitable conduct.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit concerned itself primarily with the
district court's holdings with respect to the unenforceability of the
'917, '081, '212, and '303 patents. 77 6 The Federal Circuit addressed
the issue of whether the district court committed error in holding
the '917 patent unenforceable for failure to disclose the best mode
and for disclosure of a fictitious and inoperable mode. 77 7 The district court stated that the failure to disclose the best mode, a statutory requirement, is "inherently material" and "reaches the
minimum level of materiality necessary for a finding of inequitable
conduct." 7 78 The district court said, however, that the intentional
failure to disclose the best mode will not constitute inequitable conduct in every case, because while unintentional failure to disclose
the best mode is inexcusable, inequitable conduct requires a
77 9
"threshold" level of intent.
The Federal Circuit rejected Consolidated's assertion that its failure to disclose the best mode was unintentional.7 8 0 Consolidated
argued that although the district court found intentional nondisclosure, it did not make the express finding of "intent to deceive" as
required for a finding of inequitable conduct by the case law. Consolidated further argued that the district court ignored evidence of
subjective good faith. 781 The Federal Circuit then explained how
Consolidated's argument misconstrued the court's statement in
Kingsdown Medical Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc.7 82 that "a finding
that particular conduct amounts to "gross negligence" does not of
itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct,
viewed in light of all of the evidence, including evidence indicative
773.
774.
775.

Id.
Id.
Id.

776. Id.
777. Id. at 808, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1484.
778. Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559, 223 U.S.P.Q.
1089, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985) and Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d 1727, 1745 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

954 (1987)).
779.
780.

Id.
Id.

781.

Id.

782. 863 F.2d 867, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1384 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (in banc), cert.
denied, 490 U.S.
1067 (1989).
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of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require a finding
78 3
of intent to deceive."
The Federal Circuit interpreted this language to require courts to
view the conduct involved in light of all the evidence and then ascertain whether that conduct when considered as a whole suggests a
sufficiently culpable state of mind to warrant a finding of the requisite intent to deceive. 78 4 In ConsolidatedAluminum, the Federal Circuit held that the district court properly made this determination in
light of Consolidated's intentional concealment of the best mode
and the disclosure of a fictitious and inoperable mode.78 5 Thus, a
finding of intentional concealment, under the mask of a fictitious
mode, is equal to a finding of intent to deceive for purposes of ineq78 6
uitable conduct.
In addressing the district court's finding that Consolidated's unclean hands with respect to the '917 patent rendered the '081, '212,
and '303 patents unenforceable, the Federal Circuit stated that this
appeal presented the court with the "first opportunity" to consider
the maxim "he who comes into equity must come with clean
hands." 7 7 To guide its review on this issue, the Federal Circuit
looked to the United States Supreme Court decisions of Keystone
Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co. 788 and Precision Instrument Manufacturing Co. v. Automotive MaintenanceMachinery Co. 78 9 The Federal Circuit noted that in both of these cases, the maxim was applied "only
where some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
' 790
the matter in litigation.
Consolidated argued that the application of inequitable conduct
considerations to the '081, '212, and '303 patents constituted an
abuse of discretion because mere relatedness of subject matter is
not a proper basis for such an application.7 9 1 The Federal Circuit
pointed out, however, that there was more than a "mere relatedness
of subject matter" in this case. Instead, the prosecution histories of
the patents-in-suit established that Consolidated's inequitable con783. Consolidated, 910 F.2d at 808-09, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1484 (quoting Kingsdown Medical
Consultants, Ltd. v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1384, 1392 (Fed. Cir.
1988)).
784. Id. at 809, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1484.
785. Id.
786. Id.
787. Id., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1485.
788. 290 U.S. 240 (1933).
789. 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
790. Consolidated, 910 F.2d at 810, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1485 (quoting Keystone Driller Co. v.
General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (emphasis omitted)).
791. Id. at 810, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1486.
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duct in prosecuting the '917 patent bore an "immediate and necessary relation to the equity" Consolidated sought, namely
enforcement of the '081, '212, and '303 patents. 79 2 The prosecution histories further revealed that Consolidated's concealment of
the best mode in the application for the '917 patent "permeated"
793
the prosecution of the other patents-in-suit.
Consolidated also argued that the Federal Circuit's decision in
794
SSIH Equipment S.A. v. United States International Trade Commission
read the Precision Instrument and Keystone Driller cases to require a
"fraud before the court" to render applicable the unclean hands
doctrine. 79 5 The Federal Circuit stated that Consolidated had taken
a statement in SSIH out of context, and that Consolidated's reading
of SSIH would place it at odds with Precision Instrument, which held
that conduct before the PTO so soiled the patentee's hands as to
render all the patents-in-suit unenforceable. 796 Moreover, the Federal Circuit rejected this argument as "an invitation to limit a flexi79 7
ble doctrine of equity to conduct occurring before the court."
The Federal Circuit explained that what it termed "inequitable conduct" is the unclean hands doctrine applied to particular conduct
before the PTO and held that to limit application of the doctrine to
conduct before the court would be contrary to Federal Circuit
798
precedent.
2.

In the context of obtaining the benefit of an earlier date under section
120

In Racing Strollers, Inc. v. Tri Industries, Inc. ,799 the Federal Circuit
decided that the best mode requirement is inapplicable to an application for a design patent. The defendant argued that the design
patent at issue was not entitled to the earlier filing date of a related
utility application, and that the plaintiffs' prior sales rendered the
design patent invalid under section 102(b).800 Defendant further ar792. Id at 810-11, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1486.
793. Id. at 812, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1487.
794. 718 F.2d 365, 218 U.S.P.Q. 678 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
795. Consolidated, 910 F.2d at 812, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1487 (discussing SSIH Equip. S.A. v.
United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 378, 218 U.S.P.Q. 678, 690 (Fed. Cir.
1983)).
796. Id. (construing Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach.
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818-19 (1945)).
797. Id. (citing Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245-46
(1933)).
798. Id. (citing J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1561, 223 U.S.P.Q.
1089, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 822 (1985)).
799. 878 F.2d 1418, 1420, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
800. Racing Strollers, Inc. v. Tri Indus., Inc., 878 F.2d 1418, 1419, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300,
1301 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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gued that the earlier utility application had not disclosed the best
mode of the design patent.8 0 ' The application for the design patent
at issue, filed April 14, 1986, stated on its face that the patent was a
division of the utility patent application filed October 22, 1984 and
now abandoned.8 0 2 The defendant, relying on In re Campbell,10 3 argued that an -application for a design application cannot be a division of the application for a mechanical patent and thus, the design
application is not entitled to the benefit of the mechanical applica80 4
tion's filing date.
The Federal Circuit first stated that as a generalized proposition,
the question as to whether the design application is entitled to the
prior filing date was incapable of being answered categorically "yes
or no" because each case depends on its own fact situation.8 0 5 For a
design patent application to claim priority from a utility patent application pursuant to section 120, the court required the invention
subsequently claimed to be disclosed in the manner required by the

first paragraph of section

112.806

The court next noted that the "best mode" requirement is not
applicable to a design patent because a design has only one "mode"
and can be described only by illustrations of its appearance.8 0 7 The
court further stated that in the case of an ornamental design, satisfaction of the remaining requirements of section 112 is "simply a
question of whether the earlier application contains illustrations," in
any form, which depict the ornamental design illustrated in the later
patent and claimed therein. 08 Therefore, the question of whether
the "divisional" design application gets priority over the utility application requires compliance with section 120, which in turn requires compliance with section 112, within which the detailed
factual questions to be resolved can be found. 0 9
In overruling In re Campbell, the Federal Circuit agreed with Judge
O'Connell's dissent in the case that it was wrongly decided on the
801. Id. at 1419-20, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1301.
802. Id. at 1418-19, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1300-01.
803. 212 F.2d 606, 101 U.S.P.Q. 406 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1959), overruled
by Racing Strollers, Inc. v. Tri Indus., Inc. 878 F.2d 1418, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1300 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
804. Racing Strollers, 878 F.2d at 1419, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1301 (citing In re Campbell, 212
F.2d 606, 609, 101 U.S.P.Q. 406, 409 (C.C.P.A.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 858 (1954), overruled by
Racing Strollers, Inc. v. Tri Indus., Inc., 878 F.2d 1418, 11 U.S.P.Q. 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
805. Id.
806. Id.
807. Id. at 1420, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1301.
808. Id.
809. Id., 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1301-02.
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basis of faulty and inadequate reasoning.8 10 Also, the court noted
that section 120 gives any applicant the right to have the benefit of
the filing date of an earlier application upon compliance with the
terms of section 120, which in turn incorporates the requirements of
section 112.811
In Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona, Inc.,812 the Federal Circuit discussed
the relative burdens of proof when an alleged infringer wants to
show that the patent owner has acquiesced in rejections under section 112 for failing to meet the enablement and best mode requirements by filing a CIP application.8 1 3 Again, in Pennwalt, the patent
owner was attempting to rely on an earlier application to antedate a
reference. The district court held that the claims of the patent were
not entitled to the filing date of a grandparent application under
section 120, not only because the grandparent application disclosed
different insecticides than the claims of the patent-in-suit, but also
because the grandparent application did not meet the enablement
and best mode requirements.8 1 4 Accordingly, the claims of the patent were only accorded the filing date of the parent application.8 1 5
The PTO rejected the claims of the grandparent application
816
under section 103 and section 112, first and second paragraphs.
The PTO based its rejection under the first paragraph of section
112 due to the specification's lack of an enabling disclosure and its
failure to set forth a best mode; the specification only described the
encapsulating material as a "polyamide" without setting forth a specific polyamide or a method of preparation.8 1 7 Following this rejection, the patent owner filed the parent application and abandoned
the grandparent application. The parent application described the
claimed invention in substantially more detail than did the grandparent application by setting forth, inter alia, the best mode, which
described methods of producing encapsulated insecticides with spe818
cific examples and a number of specific encapsulating materials.
The Federal Circuit stated that the patent owner presented no evidence rebutting the prima facie case of acquiescence in these en810. Id. at 1420-21, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1302 (discussing Campbell, 212 F.2d at 612, 101
U.S.P.Q. at 411 (O'Connell, J., dissenting)).
811. Id. at 1421, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1302.
812. 740 F.2d 1573, 222 U.S.P.Q. 833 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
813. Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona, Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1578-80, 222 U.S.P.Q. 833, 836-38
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see supra notes 580-87 and accompanying text (discussing Litton Sys., Inc. v.
Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 221 U.S.P.Q. 97 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
814. Pennwalt, 740 F.2d at 1577, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
815. Id.
816. Id. at 1579, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 837.
817. Id.

818. Id.
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ablement and best mode rejections.8 1 9 The court noted that, in fact,

the patent owner's own witnesses showed that acquiescence did occur. The patent owner was therefore estopped from arguing that
section 112 had been complied with in order to gain the benefit of

the grandparent application's earlier filing date under section
120.820
3.

Deposit of biologicalmaterial to satisfy the best mode requirement

In Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation,Inc. v. Genentech, Inc. ,821 the
court considered whether a failure to deposit an antibody to the
Factor VII:RP was a "best mode" violation. Genentech did not argue that Scripps had concealed any special manipulations or undisclosed techniques.8 2 2 Rather, Genentech's primary argument was
that because of the laborious nature of the process of screening
monoclonal antibodies, the inventors should have voluntarily placed
the antibody of Factor VII:RP in a depository and made it available
to the public. This antibody was the first effective antibody obtained
by Scripps' screening and was used by Scripps in carrying out the
claimed invention.8 23 Scripps did not dispute that the antibody was
indeed the first that had the described properties. In fact, three out
of the first seven antibodies screened had these properties, and all
were obtained by routine but admittedly time consuming
8 24
procedures.
The district court, in granting Genentech's motion for partial
summary judgment on this issue, made only the following findings
relating to concealment: (1) the inventors concealed the antibody;
(2) this antibody was the best mode for carrying out the invention;
and (3) a person of skill in the art would not have known "where to

obtain

it."825

Scripps did not dispute that the procedures by which

the inventors obtained the antibody were the procedures stated in
8 26
the patent specification, and the inventors' preferred procedures.
The Federal Circuit found no evidence that the antibodies used
by the inventors differed from those obtainable by the disclosed
process.8 2 7 Further, the court had previously acknowledged the la819.

Id.

820. Id. at 1579-80, 222 U.S.P.Q. at 836-37.
821. 927 F.2d 1565, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
822. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1579, 18
U.S.P.Q2d 1001, 1012 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
823. Id.
824. Id.
825. Id.
826. Id.
827. Id.
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borious nature of this work in Hybritech, Inc. v. MonoclonalAntibodies,
Inc. and In re Wands.82 8 The court noted that, in considering the
question of enablement in Wands, it declined to require the deposit
of antibody samples that could be obtained by screening following
the procedures in the specification. 8 29 The court further recognized
that in Hybritech it considered the issue of best mode in the context
30
of facts similar to those at bar.
The Federal Circuit noted that it held in Hybritech that the only
evidence even colorably related to concealment was Hybritech employees' testimony that sophisticated and competent people performed the screening and that the screening process was laborintensive and time consuming. This was not enough evidence to
prove concealment.8 3 1 Applying Hybritech to,the facts of Scripps, the
court reversed the finding of concealment and remanded with instructions to enter partial summary judgment for Scripps on this
8 32
ground.
IV.

THE SIXTH PARAGRAPH

A.

Introduction

The sixth paragraph of section 112 provides that "an element in a
claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function. '8 33 An element expressed in this
way is said to be in "means-plus-function" form, in "means-plusfunction language," or to constitute functional language.8 3 4 An element in that format "shall be construed to cover the corresponding
structure, material, or acts described in the specifications or
equivalents thereof. ' 835 "Means-plus-function" language has been
construed by the courts for determining both the patentability and
infringement of claims. 83 6 The former situation is discussed in the
828. Ma (citing Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc. 802 F.2d 1367, 1369, 231
U.S.P.Q. 81, 90 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 947 (1987) and In re Wands, 858 F.2d
731, 737-38, 8 U.S.P.O.2d 1400, 1406-07 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
829. Id.
830. Id. at 1579-80, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1012-13.
831. Id. (discussing Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1385, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 94).
832. Id. at 1580, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1013.
833. 35 U.S.C. § 112, 6 (1988). The entire text of the sixth paragraph reads:
An element in claim for a combination may be expressed as a means or step for
performing a specified function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in
support thereof, and such claim shall be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification and equivalents thereof.
Id.
834. See generally CHISUM, supra note 20, § 18.03[5] (discussing elements of means-plusfunction in interpretation and application of claims).
835. Id.
836. Id.
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section that immediately follows; the latter situation is discussed in
the section thereafter.
B.

Interpretationof "Means-Plus-Function"Languagefor Determining
Patentability

In In re Hyatt,8 3 7 the Federal Circuit affirmed the Board's rejection
of a claim which, although drafted in means-plus-function language,
was actually a single means claim that recited one element instead of
a combination.8 3 8 Although the claim listed several elements, these
83 9
elements merely described the same single claimed means.
While the language of the sixth paragraph contains no express prohibition against single means claims, the Board held that the sixth
paragraph, taken as a whole, implies that single means claims are
prohibited.8 40 The Board stated that this "implied prohibition" reflected the intent of the section 112 drafters. 8 4' The Board held
that because the applicant used "means-plus-function" without reciting a combination of elements, it was unclear what the applicant
intended to claim and thus warranted rejection under section 112,
8 42
second paragraph.
The Federal Circuit, however, held instead that the first para8 43
graph of section 112 provided the proper grounds for rejection.
837. 708 F.2d 712, 218 U.S.P.Q. 195 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
838. In re Hyatt, 708 F.2d 712, 712-13, 218 U.S.P.Q. 195, 195-96 (Fed. Cir. 1983). The
claim in question read: "A Fourier transform processor for generating Fourier transformed
incremental output signals in response to incremental input signals, said Fourier transform
processor comprising incremental means for incrementally generating the Fourier transformed
incremental output signals in response to the incremental input signals." Id. (emphasis in
original).
839. Id. at 714, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 197. The court noted that a claim must be read in accordance with the precepts of English grammar and that a mere recital of a multitude of elements
or claims is not determinative. Id. Furthermore, the appellant's denomination of every noun
in the claim as a separate element ignored the fact that these words function as a mere description of the single claimed means. Id Indeed, the appellant had admitted that the claim
was drawn to only a single element. Id.
840. Id. at 713, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 196.
841. Id. at 713-14, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 196. "The language [of paragraph six] does not go so
far as to permit a so-called single means claim, that is a claim which recites merely one means
plus a statement of function and nothing else. Attempts to evade this by adding purely nominal elements to such a claim will undoubtedly be condemned." Id. (quoting PJ. Federico,
Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 (1954)).

842. Id. at 713, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 196. The court noted the decision of the United States
Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals, which held that:
[I]t is our view that where an applicant uses the permissible claim format specified in
the last paragraph of 35 U.S.C. [§ ] 112, by implication the applicant regards his
invention to be a combination of elements. It follows that the recitation of a single
'means' or element would be an incomplete recitation of a combination and such a
recitation would therefore fail to particularly point out and distinctly claim 'the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.'
Id. (stating position of Board on first and record appeals).
843. Id. at 714, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 197.
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The court explained that "[tihe long-recognized problem with a single means claim is that it covers every conceivable means for achieving the stated result, while the specification discloses at most only
those means known to the inventor. '84 4 The court stated that,
under the sixth paragraph, means-plus-function language provides a
format narrow enough to avoid what used to be known as "undue
breadth," but it does not authorize claims that do not recite a combination. 84 5 On this basis, the court affirmed the Board's rejection
8
of the claim.

46

In In re Iwahashi,8 47 the Federal Circuit considered another argument of unpatentabilitym-that the claim "encompasses any and all
means for performing the functions recited therein." 848 The claim
at issue was directed to a computer auto-correlation unit. 84 9 On appeal, the PTO solicitor argued that the claim could be reduced to a
mere expression of algorithms, so was therefore a single means
claim.
The Federal Circuit stated that the claim at issue was a combination of means, all but one of which was a means-plus-function limitation. 85 0 The one exception was the recited ROM (read only
memory), a structural limitation. Because the sixth paragraph authorized this "combination" claim, the Solicitor's interpretation of
the claims was precluded.8 51
In In re Bond,8 5 2 the Federal Circuit held, in the context of prior
art analysis during patent prosecution, that a claim for a combination with means-plus-function elements must be analyzed under the
standard of the sixth paragraph.8 5 3 Such a claim must be construed
844. Id.; O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62, 112 (1853) (discussing impropriety of single
means claims as too broad).
845. Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 715, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 197; see In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909,
164 U.S.P.Q. 642, 645-46 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (assessing basis for undue breadth rejection).
846. Hyatt, 708 F.2d at 715, 218 U.S.P.Q. at 197-98.
847. 888 F.2d 1370, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1908 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
848. In re Iwahashi, 888 F.2d 1370, 1375, 12 U.S.P.O.2d 1908, 1911-12 (Fed. Cir. 1989);
see supra note 844 and accompanying text (discussing problem of single means claims that
encompass every conceivable means for achieving stated result).
849. Iwahashi, 888 F.2d at 1373, 12 U.S.P.O.2d at 1910. The claim read, in pertinent part:
[a] An auto-correlation unit for providing auto-correlation coefficients for use as
feature parameters in pattern recognition for N pieces of sampled input values Xn (n
0 to N - 1), said unit comprising:
[b] means for extracting N pieces of sample input values X, from a series of sample values in an input pattern expressed with an accuracy of optional multi-bits;
[c] means for calculating the sum of the sample values Xn and Xn - Z (t = 0 - P,
P<N);
Id.
850. Id.
851. Id. at 1375, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1912.
852. 910 F.2d 831, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
853. In re Bond, 910 F.2d 831, 833, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1566, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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to cover the corresponding structure, material, or act described in
the specification and equivalents thereof. Thus, prior art not identical to claimed structures could nevertheless anticipate those claimed
structures .854
Bond invented a remote turn-on feature for answering machines
whereby an owner forgetting to set the machine before leaving
home could dial home and set the machine to the answering mode
by letting the phone ring a fixed number of times.8 5 5 The specification taught that the seizure delay was implemented by digital means
using a microcomputer that seized the phone line only after pin 31
8' 5 6
went "high."
The Board affirmed the examiner's rejection based on the prior
art of patent owner Curtis, which disclosed a delay means that postponed line seizure by a set time after the machine was turned on by
remote. 5 7 The Board, however, made no finding that the delay
means claimed was structurally equivalent to that structure disclosed in the prior art.8 5 8 The Federal Circuit pointed out that the
delay means of the two devices were different; the Bond device used
a digital means, while the Curtis device used an analog means.8 59
Furthermore, the Bond delay device was triggered after the answering machine was set, while the Curtis device was apparently trig8 60
gered when the phone rang.
Because the Board made no finding that the Bond and Curtis devices were structurally equivalent, the decision regarding anticipation was deficient.8 6 ' The Federal Circuit vacated the anticipation
rejection and remanded the question of fact of structural equivalence to the Board. 62 The court instructed the Board to consider
854. Id.
855. Id. at 832, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1567. Bond's application included a claim to a combination of control means, a first circuit means, a second circuit means, and
delay means included in said control circuit means for delaying the seizure of said
telephone line by said second circuit means for a predetermined time interval after
said telephone answering machine has been set to said automatic answering mode so
as to permit the calling party to get off the line and avoid telephone charges.
Id. at 833, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1567.
856. Id.
857. Id. at 832, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1567.
858. Id. at 833, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1568.
859. Id., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1567-68.
860. Id. The court stated that:
While a "means-plus-function" limitation may appear to include all means capable of
achieving the desired function, the statute requires that it "be construed to cover the
corresponding structure, material, or acts described in the specification or
equivalents thereof."
Id., 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1568.
861. Id. at 835, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1569.
862. Id.
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first, whether the delay occurring in the Curtis device after activation of the answering mode and before seizure of the telephone line
was caused by a structure in that device, and second, whether this
863
structure was equivalent to that disclosed in Bond's specification.
Affirmative answers to both of these inquiries, asserted the court,
would mean that the claim was anticipated by the Curtis
8 64
disclosure.
C.

Claim Interpretationfor Determining Infringement

The Federal Circuit reversed the district court's determination of
noninfringement for a wheelbarrow in Radio Steel & Manufacturing
Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.8 65 Radio's patented wheelbarrow was
designed to be sold as a box of pieces to be assembled by the purchaser. 86 6 The disputed claim described a wheelbarrow in which
each handle was made of two pieces that adjoined end to end when
assembled. The two ends were then supported on their underside
by a cross brace between the handles and were bolted to the bottom
of the wheelbarrow's bowl. The cross brace was a straight piece
with three-sided channels at each end, into which the handles fit.
The claim also described the bowl, a wheel at the front end of the
handles, two legs with their upper ends connected to the handles,
86 7
and a "means" for mounting and attaching the various pieces.
MTD's wheelbarrow was virtually identical to Radio's, except the
cross bars were flat, lacking a channel for the handles. 8 68 Additionally, MTD used filler strips, which were shims fitting between the
8 69
handles and the bowl.
The district court held, inter alia, that MTD did not infringe Radio's patent.8 70 The district court stated that although the accused
device's cross brace was equivalent to the claimed cross brace, the
existence of the filler strips, not described in Radio's claim, was a
significant difference.8 7 1 The court noted that filler strips were de863. Id864. Id.
865. 731 F.2d 840, 849, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657, 664 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831
(1984).
866. Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 842, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657,
658 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984).
867. Id.
868. Id., 221 U.S.P.Q. at 659.
869. Id. at 843, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 659.
870. Id. at 842, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 659. The district court held the patent valid under section
102 and section 103 analyses. See Radio Steel Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 566 F. Supp. 609,
619, 220 U.S.P.Q. 35, 44 (N.D. Ohio 1983), modified, 731 F.2d 840, 221 U.S.P.Q. 657 (Fed.
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984). The Federal Circuit affirmed that portion of the district
court's holding. Radio Steel, 731 F.2d at 843-46, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 660-62.
871. Radio Steel, 731 F.2d at 843, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 659.
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scribed in Radio's specification. The district court declined, however, to read the "means" language of the claims to include the filler
8 72
strips.
The Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court's interpretation of the filler strips relative to the means language.8 73 Because
the disputed claim stated "means for securing the handle portions
in the channel section," the court stated that such a claim must be
construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts de8 74
scribed in the specification or equivalents thereof.
Furthermore, the court explained that where a claim states a
means for performing a function without reciting any specific structure for performing that function, the structure disclosed in the
specification must be considered and the patent must be construed
to cover both the disclosed structure and its equivalents.8 75
The court then examined the specification to see if the corresponding structure included filler strips.8 76 The specification disclosed that "the preferred practice of this invention wherein use is
made of filler strip 20 in the form of a wedge-shaped channel . . .
handle portions are secured... to the one piece filler strip on one
side and to the one piece leg member on the other side securely to
interconnect the handle portions .

.

. the filler strip, leg members

and additionally spaced portions of the handle sections. '8 7 7 In fact,
the district court itself found that one of the functions of the strip
was "[t]he rigid and secure assembly of the bowl, handle pieces and
leg members." 8 7 8 Noting this, the Federal Circuit held that the filler
strips described in the specification were covered in the means claim
language and that the MTD wheelbarrow infringed that claim.8 7 9
MTD further argued that because of its placement and triangular
shape, the filler strips performed the additional function of leveling
the bowl. 8 8 0 Rejecting MTD's argument, the Federal Circuit held

that the mere inclusion of additional features could not allow the
accused device to escape infringement. 8 8 ' Similarly, the court
found that an accused device containing the same feature as the pat872. Id.
873. Id at 848, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 663.
874. Id.
875. Id (citing Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 82, 193 U.S.P.Q.
449, 460 (Ct. C1. 1977)).
876. Id.
877. Id
878. Id. at 847, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 663.
879. Id. The Federal Circuit similarly held that the accused wheelbarrow infringed under
the doctrine of equivalents. Id.
880. Id. at 848, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 663.
881. Id., 221 U.S.P.Q. at 663-64.
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ented device cannot escape infringement simply because that feature performs an additional function not performed in the patented
88 2
device.
The court reversed summary judgment of noninfringement in
D.MI., Inc. v. Deere & Co. ,888 holding that the district court had misapplied the standards of paragraph six. D.M.I. sued Deere for infringing its patent that claimed a plow system with a means for
adjusting the plow units while the plow was in motion.8 8 4 Representative of the functional language at issue, claim 1 recites, "steering
means including compensating means for maintaining said steering
wheel .. . lateral settings of said plow units ..
"..-885
While the
"6means" language of the claims involved was discernible, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court failed to recognize this language as being separately definable.8 86 Further, the Federal Circuit
stated that while the district court looked to the specification for a
definition of "compensation means," it did not look to the specifi88 7
cation for a definition of "equivalents thereof."
The Federal Circuit stated that, although section 112 requires
patentees to disclose enabling means for their claimed function,
every possible means cannot be described or predicted. 88 8 Rather,
the court acknowledged that the sixth paragraph was written to
avoid a holding that a means-plus-function limitation would be read
as covering only the means disclosed in the specification.8 8 9 The
court reasoned that interpreting "means-plus-function" limitations
as being restricted to a particular means set forth in the specification
would nullify section 112's requirement that the limitation be construed to cover the structure described in the specification and its
equivalents. The court went on to state that patentees must disclose
in the specification some enabling means for performing the function set forth in the "means-plus-function" limitation. Thus, the
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment without considering whether the alleged infringing
means were equivalents of the specific means disclosed in the
890
specification.
882.
883.
884.
1985).
885.
886.

Id.
775 F.2d 1570, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1572, 225 U.S.P.Q. 236, 237 (Fed. Cir.
Id.
Id. at 1573, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 238.

887. Id.
888. Id. at 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 238.
889.

Id.

890. Id.
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The Federal Circuit further instructed that the equivalent means
analysis of the sixth paragraph should not be confused with the doctrine of equivalents analysis of infringement. 8 9 ' Under that doctrine, a district court would determine if the entirety of the alleged
infringing device performed "substantially the same functions in
substantially the same way, to achieve substantially the same result."' s9 2 The court stated, however, that sixth paragraph equivalent
means analysis is a different analysis, namely, "the sole question is
whether the single means in the accused device which performs the
function stated in the claim is the same as or an equivalent of the
corresponding structure described in the patentee's specification as
89 3
performing that function."
In Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co.,894 the Federal Circuit reversed and remanded a grant of summary judgment, holding that a substantial
issue of fact existed as to whether the accused device was equivalent
to the patented invention.895 Palumbo's patented knee brace was
designed to diagnose and treat patellar subluxation (kneecap dislocation) throughout a full range of knee motion. 89 6 The claims included means-plus-function language, such as: "means for bracing
the patella," "means for maintaining said patellar bracing," and
"means for causing said patellar bracing means positioned laterally."'8 9 7 The specification described one, embodiment comprised of
an elastic sleeve with a hole to align the kneecap, a kneecap bracing
pad next to the hole, two elastic sideways force-applying arms attached to the pad, and an elastic, position-maintaining counter-arm
attached to the bracing pad. 89 8 The two force-applying arms
wrapped around the knee, pushing the bracing pad medially. 899
891. Id. at 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 239.
892. Id (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608
(1950)).
893. D.M.I., 755 F.2d at 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 239.
894. 762 F.2d 969, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
895. Palumbo v. Don-Joy Co., 762 F.2d 969, 974-75, 226 U.S.P.Q. 5, 8-9 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
896. Id. at 971, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 5.
897. Id. Claim 1, for example, read:
A dynamic patellar brace for preventing subluxation of a patella throughout the
complete physiologic range of flexion and movement of the knee comprising:
means for bracing the patella;
means for maintaining said patellar bracing means positioned laterally of the patella throughout the complete physiologic range of flexion and movement of the
knee when the brace is in use, and;
means for causing said patellar bracing means positioned laterally of the patella to
apply a resultant force in the medial direction to the patella throughout the complete
range of flexion and movement of the knee when the brace is in use.

Id.
898.
899.

Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
Id. at 972, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
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The counter-arm wrapped around in the opposite direction, stabilizing the pad position throughout knee movement. 90 0 The accused
Don-Joy device had an inner sleeve with a hole for the kneecap similar to Palumbo's. 90 1 It also employed an outer sleeve placed centrally over the inner sleeve. The district court ruled that Palumbo's
claims were limited to the arms structure and that the Don-Joy
90 2
brace, because it lacked these arms, did not infringe.
The Federal Circuit, however, held that the means claims of
Palumbo's patent must be construed to include equivalents under
the sixth paragraph, and that such analysis involves a material question of fact.903 The court reiterated that an accused device performing the claimed function by a means specified in the disclosure, or
its equivalent, would be guilty of literal infringement, rather than
infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 90 4 The court noted
that both doctrine of equivalents analysis and literal infringement
analysis of the sixth paragraph involve Graver Tank concepts of
equivalents. 90 5
The court stated that the following should be considered in construing a "means-plus-function" claim: the language of the claim;
the patent specification; the prosecution history; other claims in the
patent history; and expert testimony.90

6

After that determination is

made, the scope of the "means" and its relation to the accused device is a question of fact.90 7 Dr. Palumbo himself testified as an expert witness and one skilled in the art that the padding, combined
with the friction between Don-Joy's inner and outer sleeve, accomplished the claimed function-stabilizing the kneecap during leg
movement. 90 8 The court held that Palumbo's conclusion that DonJoy's brace was equivalent was more than a mere conclusory statement. The court found this testimony to be enough to indicate that
a material question of fact existed, precluding summary
judgment. 90 9
900. Id.
901. Id. at 973, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 6.
902. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 7.
903. Id. at 974-75, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
904. Id. at 975 n.4, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 8-9 n.4.
905. Id. The court suggested that because Graver Tank preceded the 1952 Act, the underlying principles of Graver Tank could be used in a literal infringement section 112 analysis. Id.
The court suggeted that the interchangability test used in Graver Tank has been used in interpreting a "means-plus-function" claim for literal infringement. Id. (citing Lockheed Aircraft
Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 69, 193 U.S.P.Q. 449 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).
906. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 8.
907. Id., 226 U.S.P.Q. at 9.
908. Id. at 976, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 9.
909. Id.

728

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:621

The defendant in King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp.9 10 appealed
from a district court's determination of infringement, arguing that
the district court failed to make the required finding of equivalency
under the sixth paragraph. 9 1' The patents-in-suit related to an automated machine for loading audio or video tapes into closed cassettes. 9 12 Means-plus-function clauses appeared in several
claims. 9 13 The corresponding structure to these clauses described
9 14
in the specification was a "swing arm" device.
The Federal Circuit reiterated its holdings in Palumbo and D.M.I.
that the sixth paragraph calls for claim construction covering
equivalents of the disclosed embodiments, and that a number of factors may be analyzed in determining the breadth of equivalents: the
patent specification, prosecution history, other claims, and expert
testimony. 91 5 Examining the first three factors, the court noted that
the defendant produced no evidence that the claims should be limited to the swing arm embodiment. The Federal Circuit reviewed
the expert testimony, which purportedly provided the opinion of
one skilled in the art.91 6 The uncontested testimony of an expert,
who viewed the patented and accused devices, convinced the court
that the machines were equivalents. 91 7 The Federal Circuit maintained that the defendant failed to argue why the expert was incorrect or why his testimony was insufficient to support a holding of
literal infringement. 918
910. 767 F.2d 853, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
911. King Instrument Corp. v. Otari Corp., 767 F.2d 853, 858-59, 226 U.S.P.Q. 402,40506, cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The Federal Circuit upheld the district court's holding

that the "swing arm" patent was not invalid for obviousness and that the "shift lock" patent
was invalid due to the on sale bar of section 102. The court further found the "swing arm"
patent infringed. Id. at 860-61, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 406-07. The appellate court affirmed the lost
profits award and denial of King's attorney fees, but vacated and remanded the lower court's
holdings concerning damages for parts sales. Id. at 866-67, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 411-12.
912. Id. at 855, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 403.
913. id. at 862, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 408. Claim 2 is illustrative:
Apparatus for severing a leader tape that is attached at its opposite ends to two hubs
into two leaders and for splicing said leaders to the opposite ends of a length of use
tape obtained from a supply roll of said use tape, said apparatus comprising: a splicing station comprising a first stationary tape support member and second and third
moveable tape support members; means for alternatively shifting said second and third

support members... ; a knife operable to slit tape supported on said first and second
splicing head; meansfor holding saidsupply roll of use tape... ; selectively operable third
tape-holding means ... ; selectively operable tape applicator means ... ; selectively

operable tape-winding means... ; control means for sequentially operating the foregoing means ....

Id. (emphasis in original).
914. Id.
915. Id. (citing Palumbo, 762 F.2d at 975, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 8).
916. Id. at 862-63, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 408-09.
917. Id.
918. Id. at 863, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 408-09.
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The dispute in Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc. 9 19 involved endocardial leads for pacemakers. Contesting the jury's verdict of infringement, Intermedics argued on appeal that the jury instructions
should not have included matters of equivalency. 9 20 The Federal
Circuit upheld the jury verdict that Intermedics' product infringed
Medtronic's patent. The court held that because the jury was considering literal infringement of a means-plus-function claim, it was
necessary to instruct the jury so that they could properly undertake
an equivalency determination under the sixth paragraph. 92 1 The
jury could then consider expert testimony, prosecution history,
9 22
claim language, other claims, as well as the patent specification.
In Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States InternationalTrade Commission,9 23 the Federal Circuit held that technological changes made in
imported electronic calculators necessitated a finding of noninfringement, despite the fact that each of the recited means-plus924
function limitations read on the allegedly infringing devices.
Texas Instruments (TI) alleged unfair competition and unfair importation of certain pocket-size calculators based on infringement of
several claims of its patent, and petitioned the International Trade
Commission (ITC) for relief. Ultimately, the ITC adopted the Administrative Law Judge's finding that TI failed to sustain its burden
was infringed, either literally or
of proving that any patent claim 925
under the doctrine of equivalents.
TI's patent was to a "miniature calculator." 9 26 The court's representative claim contained three means-plus-function elements: (1)
input means including a keyboard with a single set of number and
command keys; (2) electronic memory, arithmetic, and transfer
means to respond to commands; and (3) display means. 9 2 7 The pat919. 799 F.2d 734, 230 U.S.P.Q. 641 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
920. Medtronic, Inc. v. Intermedics, Inc., 799 F.2d 734, 741, 230 U.S.P.Q. 641, 645 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1033 (1987).
921. Id. at 741-42, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 645.
922. Id. at 742, 230 U.S.P.Q. at 645.
923. 805 F.2d 1558, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
924. Texas Instruments, Inc. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 805 F.2d 1558, 156970, 231 U.S.P.Q. 833, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
925. Id. at 1561-62, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 833-34.
926. Id. at 1561, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 833.
927. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834. Patent claim 1 reads:
1. A miniature, portable, battery operated electronic calculator comprising:
a. input means including a keyboard for entering digits of numbers and arithmetic
commands into said calculator and generating signals corresponding to said digits
and said commands, the keyboard including only one set of decimal number keys for
entering plural digits of decimal numbers in sequence and including a plurality of
command keys;
b. electronic means responsive to said signals for performing arithmetic calculations on the numbers entered into the calculator and for generating control signals,
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ent specification, filed in 1967, set forth a detailed description of the
preferred means to perform each step of the claim.92 8 By 1984,
when the suit began, each of the recited means had undergone tech9 29
nological improvements.
TI argued on appeal that substantial evidence existed to support a
finding of infringement. 93 0 First, TI claimed that the invention, as
embodied in the accused devices, was fundamentally the same as the
patented calculator. 9 3 ' Additionally, TI maintained that its patent
represented a "giant step" in the technological development of
semiconductors and integrated circuitry, and in fact constituted a
93 2
step on which the entire hand-held calculator industry was based.
Furthermore, TI argued that the claims were not restricted to the
preferred embodiments described on the original filing date and
that the specification did not have to describe unforseeable technological changes. 933 Thus, TI asserted that its pioneering invention
should be granted broad protection, and that the patent should be
93 4
interpreted broadly.
The Federal Circuit instructed that infringement analysis, as a
matter of law, begins with determining the scope of the patent
claim. The infringement analysis, the court went on, continues with
a factual finding of whether the claims encompass the accused device. 93 5 This process is identical for both literal infringement and
doctrine of equivalents analyses. 93 6The court stated that literal insaid electronic means comprising an integrated semiconductor circuit array located
in substantially one plane, the area occupied by the integrated semiconductor array
being no greater than that of the keyboard, said integrated semiconductor circuit
array comprising:
i. memory means for storing digits of the numbers entered into the calculator,
ii. arithmetic means coupled to said memory means for adding, subtracting, multiplying and dividing said numbers and storing the resulting answers in the memory
means, and
iii. means for selectively transferring numbers from the memory means through
the arithmetic means and back to the memory means in a manner dependent upon
the commands to effect the desired arithmetic operation;
c. means for providing a visual display coupled to said integrated semiconductor
circuit array and responsive to said control signals for indicating said answer; and
d. the entire calculator including keyboard, electronic means, means for providing
a visual display, and battery being contained within a "pocket sized" housing.
Id.
928. Id.
929. lId at 1561-62, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834.
930. Id. at 1562, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834.
931. Id.
932. Id.
933. Id.
934. Id.; see also Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 415
(1908) (maintaining that patents for pioneering inventions merit broader protection than do
other kinds of patents).
935. Tevxas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1562, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834.
936. Id.
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fringement requires the accused device to embody every element of
the properly construed claim. 93 7 The court, following D.M.L, reiterated that whenever the claim describes a combination of functions, and each function is carried out by a means described in the
specification or an equivalent thereof, then literal infringement
93 8
exists.
The court stated that the sixth paragraph provides that when the
claimed invention is a combination of novel steps, all possible methods of carrying out those steps need not be described in the specification. 93 9 The court explained that properly construed claims cover
"equivalents of the described embodiments." 940 The court stated
that the rationale behind this rule is to provide the inventor of a
combination invention an equitable scope of protection that is not
dependent on a catalogue of alternative embodiments or examples
in the specification. 941 Therefore, the court stated that details for
performing each step should be included in the claims only when
needed to claim distinctly the invention, or to distinguish it from the
prior art.9 42 The court cautioned, however, that these principles are

not unlimited in scope, and reflect the equitable concept that claims
should be read to avoid enabling infringers to "practice a fraud on a
patent. ' 943 The court stated that the range of permissible
equivalents depends on the nature and extent of the invention and
may be interpreted more generously for a basic invention than for a
944
simple technological development.
The law does not require that those skilled in the art know about
asserted equivalent means of performing the functions claimed at
the time the patent application is filed.9 45 Rather, the court noted

that equivalence is to be determined as of the time the alleged infringement occurs, and even devices modified to the point that the
modification warrants independent patentability may still infringe
the basic patent. 94 6 Additionally, the court stated that the modifica937. Id.
938. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. at 834-35.
939. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
940.

Id. (citing King Instrument, 767 F.2d at 862, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 408).

941. Id. at 1563, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
942. Id. (citing In re Lundberg, 244 F.2d 543, 547-48, 113 U.S.P.Q. 530, 534 (C.C.P.A.
1957) and In re Arbeit, 206 F.2d 947, 958, 99 U.S.P.Q. 123, 131-32 (C.C.P.A. 1953)).
943. Id. (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(providing that purpose of doctrine of equivalents is to prohibit practice of fraud on patents)).
944. Id. (citing Continental PaperBag Co., 210 U.S. at 414 and Miller v. Eagle Mfg. Co., 151

U.S. 186, 207 (1894)).
945. Id.
946. Id. (citing Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1575,
224 U.S.P.Q. 409, 416 (Fed. Cir. 1984)); see American Hosp. Supply Corp. v. Travenol Labs.,
Inc., 745 F.2d 1, 8, 223 U.S.P.Q. 577, 583 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (arguing that ITC erred in deter-
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tion of an accused device will not avoid infringement if that device
947
has features of the claims or their equivalents.
TI asserted that the Commission construed the claims too nar94 8
rowly, limiting the claims to means illustrated in the specification.
TI argued that this was contrary to the instructions in D.M.L, in
which the court held that patent applicants need not describe, nor
predict, every conceivable means for performing a given function.9 49 TI maintained that the accused devices carried out each
step of the claims by means equivalent to those in the
specification. 95 0
The ALJ examined each step of the claims and made extensive
findings comparing the structure and operation of the accused devices with the patent specification. 95 ' Findings relating to structure
were generally accepted on appeal, while findings regarding operation and noninfringement were contested. 9 52 The ALJ found that
each accused calculator was miniature, portable, battery-operated,
and encased in pocket-sized housing (preamble and claim 1, clause
d); with a keyboard for entering numbers and commands (clause a);
an integrated semiconductor circuit located in substantially one
plane with memory, arithmetic, and transfer means (clause b); and a
visual display (clause c). 95 3 The ALJ also found that each function
clause in clauses a, b, and c was performed by the accused devices by
means not described in the patent, and that such means were not
9 54
equivalent to means described in the specification.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that although substantial evidence did not support each determination of the ALJ's determination of nonequivalence, when each element was considered
individually, and when the invention and accused devices were
mining equivalence at time of invention without regard to later advancements in art); Atlas
Powder, 750 F.2d at 1580, 224 U.S.P.Q. at 417 (reiterating that equivalency determination is to
take place at time of infringement).
947. Id.; see Radio Steel & Mfg. Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 731 F.2d 840, 848, 221 U.S.P.Q
657, 663-64 (Fed. Cir.) (holding that modification of feature to accomplish equivalent function, as well as appropriation of patented feature to perform additional function, constitutes
infringement), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 831 (1984); Amstar Corp. v. Envirotech Corp., 730 F.2d
1476, 1482, 221 U.S.P.Q. 649, 653 (Fed. Cir.) (emphasizing that accused device cannot escape infringement merely because it is more or less efficient or that it performs additional
functions), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 924 (1984).
948. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1564, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
949. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. at 835-36 (citing D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574,
225 U.S.P.Q. 236, 238 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
950. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q at 836.
951. Id.
952. Id.
953. Id.
954. Id.
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viewed as a whole, the accused devices did not infringe the properly
construed claims. 95 5
The Federal Circuit then reviewed the ALJ's analysis of each
means, starting with clause a-the input means. 95 6 The keyboard
described in claim 1 as "including only one set of decimal number
keys" was distinguished from the prior art keyboards during prosecution. 95 7 All of the accused calculators employed "one set of decimal number keys," which TI argued was the only critical limitation
to the input means. 9 58 TI argued additionally that the specific mode
of internal operation was not limited to that illustrated in the
959
specification.
The patent specification described a mechanism whereby pressure
on the key generated unique signals. 96 0 The accused devices, however, used a scanning matrix system, which periodically scanned the
keyboard sensing which key was depressed. 9 6 1 The ALJ found that
the keyboard systems were not equivalent because they did not operate in substantially the same way. 9 6 2 Reviewing the ALJ's findings,
the Federal Circuit held that the ALJ erred in construing the claim
by requiring that the means of performing the input be technologi96 3
cally as well as functionally identical.
After reviewing the remaining elements of the claim, the Federal
Circuit examined the invention as a whole. 964 The court agreed
with TI that the accused devices performed every function set forth
in the claims. 96 5 The court also agreed that the ALJ interpreted the
claims too narrowly, incorrectly limiting the claims only to means
disclosed in the specification. 9 6 6 The court stated that while the
scope of claims under the sixth paragraph is a legal determination,
equitable considerations must be weighed when determining the
breadth of means as it applies to rapidly changing and complex
technologies. 96 7 The court maintained that "when each changed
955. Id.
956. IdL at 1564-65, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 836-37.
957. Id. at 1564, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 836.
958. Id.
959. Id.
960. Id. at 1564-65, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 836.
961. Id. at 1565, 231 U.S.P.Q at 836.
962. Id.
963. Id., 231 U.S.P.Q. at 837. TI asserted that the invention was a combination of essential elements contained in the claims, and that the Commission erred in limiting the claims to
the specific input means illustrated in the specification, and then by deciding absence of infringement on that basis. Id.
964. Id. at 1568-71, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839-41.
965. Id. at 1568, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 839.
966. Id.
967. Id.
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means is considered separately, as part of the overall device as described by the inventors, substantial evidence may not support the
finding that the resultant device is not an infringement .... ,"968 The
court held, however, that there was no literal infringement when the
devices were considered as a whole. 9 69
The court reviewed the totality of changes in technology and held
that, when taken cumulatively, the differences distinguished the accused calculators from the contemplated invention and transcended
the fair range of equivalents of the patent. 97 0
Finding no literal infringement under the sixth paragraph, the
Federal Circuit considered whether infringement could be found
under the doctrine of equivalents. The court stated that the same
equitable considerations would apply under the doctrine. 9 7 1 First,
the court distinguished equivalency analysis under literal infringement from that under the doctrine of equivalents. In the literal infringement analysis of a claim including a means clause with respect
to paragraph six, the court explained that the accused device's structure, composition, or process is compared with that set forth in the
specification for accomplishing the same result. 97 2 In a doctrine of
equivalents analysis, however, the court stated that the accused device's structure, composition, or process is compared with the
claimed invention as a whole. 9 73 Further, the court stated that, irrespective of whether a given case involved literal infringement or infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, the same three-part
968. Id. at 1569, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840.
969. Id.
[I]t is the claimed invention as a whole that must be considered in determining
whether there is infringement by the accused devices also considered as a whole. It
is not appropriate in this case, where all of the claimed functions are performed in
the accused devices by subsequently developed or improved means, to view each
such change as if it were the only change from the disclosed embodiments of the
invention. It is the entirety of the technology embodied in the accused devices that
must be compared with the patent disclosure. Any other view distorts both the correct interpretation of the claims and their application to the accused devices.
Id. at 1569-70, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 840 (citing D.M.I., 755 F.2d at 1575, 239 U.S.P.Q. at 240).
970. Id. at 1571, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 841.
971. Id
972. Id at 1572, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 841.
973. Id. It appears that this approach was rejected in favor of an element-by-element analysis under the doctrine of equivalents by the Federal Circuit in Pennwalt Corp. v. DurandWayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 961 (1988). But see Malta v. Schulmerich Carillons, Inc., 952 F.2d 1320, 1327, 21
U.S.P.Q.2d 1161, 1166 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (upholding district court's grant ofJNOV on issue of
noninfringement). The Federal Circuit in Malta focused on the deficiency of the evidence that
might have been relied on by the jury to support the finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents: "what is clearly lacking in that testimony is a sufficient explanation of
both why the overall function, way and result of the accused device are substantially the same
as those of the claimed device and why the plastic/slotted plastic/felt arrangement is the
equivalent of the claimed buttons limitation." Id. (emphasis in original).
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test of history is used: whether the asserted equivalent performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to ac9 74
complish substantially the same result.
The court explained that the interplay between the doctrine of
equivalents and the permissible scope of the claims could be limited
by the prosecution history. 97 5 Furthermore, the court emphasized
that although the prior art and prosecution history are necessary
considerations in applying the doctrine of equivalents, these two
97 6
factors alone do not control the breadth of equivalents available.
The court held that because of the extensive technological advances
in all the claimed functions, the accused devices were not equivalent
9 77
and did not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.
In Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc. ,978 the Federal Circuit
affirmed a district court's failure to grant a judgment not withstanding the verdict of a jury's finding of infringement. 9 79 The patent at issue involved a device that isolated a defective terminal in
department store cash register computers, so that nondefective registers could still be used. 9 80 The patented invention automatically
sensed when a defective terminal ceased to send data, and consequently cut the terminal out of the loop.9 8 1 The accused device also
detected this lack of data. The accused device, however, upon sensing the defective terminal, switched all the terminals off and tested
98 2
each terminal to turn it back on.
The disputed claim included a "means for sensing the presence or
absence of output data at said output data terminals. ' 98 The Federal Circuit looked to the specification to determine if a reasonable
jury could have found the Micro Technologies system to use an
equivalent "means for sensing." 98 4 Micro Technologies argued that
this claim should be limited by drawings in the patent which illustrated each terminal with its own switches and sensor. 98 5 Micro
Technologies' device employed a single switcher with data sensors
mounted to a central panel. 98 6 The jury heard expert testimony
974. Texas Instruments, 805 F.2d at 1571, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 841.
975. Id.
976. Id. at 1572, 231 U.S.P.Q. at 841.
977. Id.
978. 813 F.2d 1196, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 2052 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
979. Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1202, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d
2052, 2056 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
980. Id. at 1197, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2053.
981. Id. at 1199, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2054.
982. Id. at 1198-99, 1 U.S.P.Q2d at 2053-54.
983. Id. at 1197, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2053.
984. Id. at 1201-02, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055.
985. Id. at 1201, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055.
986. Id. at 1202, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055.
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supporting the interchangeability and equivalence of the two sensor
systems. 98 7 The district court held that a reasonable jury could have
found that the sensor systems in the two devices were equivalent
"means for sensing" within the claim's scope of limitations. 9 88
Micro Technologies also argued that the claimed "switching
means" was not even present in its accused device. 98 9 The jury,
however, heard evidence that although both systems used the same
circuitry, the accused device had an additional switcher. In the
jury's opinion the circuitry was equivalent, and the court held that a
reasonable jury could have come to that conclusion. 9 90 Finally,
Micro Technologies argued that additional features so changed
their system as to make it operate in a noninfringing fashion. 99 '
Data Line countered with a step-by-step analysis identifying how
each limitation was met by the accused device. 9 92 The court agreed
with Data Line's analysis, holding that additional features did not
produce a product "radically different" enough to avoid a determination of literal infringement. 9 93
In Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co.,994 the Federal Circuit upheld the
district court's ruling that a device for securing a parked vehicle to
an adjacent upright structure using a rack-and-pinion mechanism
literally infringed a patent for an apparatus with the same purpose,
which recited a one-way locking ratchet-and-pawl. 9 95 The Federal
Circuit found literal infringement under the sixth paragraph of section 112.996
Kelley argued that Rite-Hite, during prosecution, narrowed
9 97
clause (d) of claim 1 to allow its approval over the cited prior art.
A prior patent issued to Taylor disclosed a nut-and-screw assembly
for raising his hook assembly. The district court held that the patent
was not limited to the ratchet-and-pawl mechanism and that
equivalent devices could be substituted. 99 8 Furthermore, the dis987. Id.
988. Id., 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055-56.
989. Id., I U.S.P.Q.2d at 2056.
990. Id.
991. Id.
992. Id.
993. Id.; see Radio Steel, 731 F.2d at 848, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 663-64 (holding that mere addition of features does not avoid infringement).
994. 819 F.2d 1120, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
995. Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 819 F.2d 1120, 1124, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1915, 1918 (Fed.
Cir. 1987).
996. Id. at 1122-23, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1916-17.
997. Id. at 1123, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1917.
998. Id. at 1124, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1917.
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trict court held that the Kelley and Taylor devices were equivalent to
the ratchet-and-pawl embodied in the patent.999
On appeal, Kelley argued that this nut-and-screw assembly was a
direct analog of Kelley's rack-and-pinion mechanism and that both
mechanisms were distinct from the one-way locking ratchet-andpawl set forth in the patent specification. 10 0 0 The Federal Circuit
agreed that the scope of asserted claims was not limited to the
ratchet-and-pawl mechanism. The Federal Circuit stated that, according to the rule from D.M., "where some claims are broad and
others are narrow, the narrow claim limitations cannot be read into
the broad."1 0 0 1 The court found no error in the district court's review of the specification and claims, prosecution history, or teach10 02
ings of the Taylor patent in construing the patent claims.
Holding that the Kelley device literally infringed the patented device, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's determination
that the ratchet-and-pawl was completely interchangeable with the
rack-and-pinion mechanism.10 03 In so holding, the Federal Circuit
reiterated the well-established notion that the interchangeability between two structures is an instrumental factor in determining
equivalence. 1004
Literal infringement of a claim including means-plus-function lan00 5
guage was found in Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurrv. Schubert & Salzer.1
10 0 6
Spindelfabrik concerned an open-end yarn spinning machine.
Yarn frequently breaks when first spun onto a spool; the patented
device automatically reconnected the broken strands in a process
called "piecing."' 10 0 7 To facilitate proper spooling during a piecing
operation, the plaintiff claimed an "auxiliary driven feed means,"
which borrowed rolls of intact yarn to guide pieced yarn back into
the packaging process.10 0 8 In reviewing the facts of record, the Federal Circuit found that the accused device performed the exact func999. Id.
1000.

Id. at 1123-24, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1917.
Id., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1918 (citing D.M.L, 755 F.2d at 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 239).
1002. l
1003. Id.
1004. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609 and Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States,
553 F.2d 69, 82, 193 U.S.P.Q. 449, 460 (Ct. Cl. 1977)). The court then affirmed the opinion
of the district court that Kelley's infringement was not willful. Id. at 1126, 2 U.S.P.O.2d at
1919.
1005. 829 F.2d 1075, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
1006. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr v. Schubert & Salzer, 829 F.2d 1075, 1086, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1044, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1063 (1988).
1007. Id. at 1078, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1046.
1008. Id. at 1085, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1052. The claim element in dispute was "auxiliary yarn
guide means for guiding the yarn between the spool and a yarn outlet of a spinning rotor of
the spinning assembly during piecing operation, said auxiliary yarn guide means including
auxiliary driven feed means for said yarn." Id.

1001.
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tion as the patented claim. 10 0 9 The court further found that when
the borrowed rolls were in their auxiliary position, they were the
equivalent of the structure disclosed in the specification. 0 1 0° Thus,
the Federal Circuit held that the accused device was a literal
infringement. 10 11
In Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.,' 0 12 the Federal Circuit
held there was no infringement, neither literally nor under the doctrine of equivalents. Pennwalt sued Durand-Wayland for infringing
the patent on its fruit sorter that separated fruit on the basis of
weight, color, or both. 0 1 3 Pennwalt claimed a sorter which conveyed fruit along a track with an electronic weighing device that produced a signal proportional to the fruit's weight. 0 14 The claim
included a signal comparison means, a clock means, a position indicating means, and a discharge means, each with a specified function.
The specification described a "hard-wired" network of electrical
components that performed each step of the claims. The sorter carried the fruit through the weighing device and on to an optical scanner that generated an electrical signal in proportion to the color of
the fruit. The signals from the weight and color sensors were combined, and the appropriate signals were forwarded to discharge the
fruit into a specified container.101 5
Durand-Wayland produced two devices accused of infringing.
The first device sorted by weight; the second device sorted by both
weight and color. 0 16 Both of Durand-Wayland's systems used
software as opposed to hard-wiring.' 0 ' 7 Pennwalt argued before the
district court that its claims read literally on the accused devices. 0 18
The district court held that the accused devices did not infringe any
of the claims at issue, neither literally nor under the doctrine of
equivalents. 0 19
1009. Id.
1010. Id at 1085-86, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1052; see D.M.I., 755 F.2d at 1575, 225 U.S.P.Q. at
239 (explaining that, in applying section 112's "means-plus-function" requirement, principal
question is whether single means in accused device, which performs same function as claim or
its equivalent, corresponds to structure described in patentee's specification as performing
that function).
1011. Spindefabrik, 829 F.2d at 1086, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1052.
1012. 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961
(1988).
1013. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 933, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1737,
1738 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (in banc), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
1014. Id.
1015. Id.
1016. Id.
1017. Id.
1018. Id. at 932-33, 4 U.S.P.Q2d at 1737-38.
1019. Id. at 933, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738.
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On appeal, Pennwalt asserted that the district court erroneously
went beyond the means-plus-function language of a claim limitation, comparing only the structure of the accused devices to the
structure disclosed in the specification. 10 20 The Federal Circuit,
however, agreed with the district court's statement that Pennwalt's
"test" for literal infringement would impermissibly encompass any
10 2 1
means that performed the function of a claim element.
The Federal Circuit held that the sixth paragraph of section 112
directs the district court to compare the accused structure with the
disclosed structure, and that a finding of identity or equivalence in
structure, as well as identity of function, is required for literal infringement. 10 2 2 Furthermore, the court stated that paragraph six
eliminated the possibility that all conceivable means of performing
0 23
the function specified in the claim literally satisfy that limitation.1
While encompassing equivalents of those disclosed in the specification, the court stated that the provision nevertheless acts as a restriction on the literal satisfaction of a claim limitation. 10 2 4 The
court emphasized that if the required function is not performed exactly in the accused device, then paragraph six equivalency is not
involved. 0 25 Furthermore, the court asserted that paragraph six is
not a factor under the doctrine of equivalents in determining
whether an equivalent function is performed by the accused
0 26
device. 1
Regarding a means-plus-function claim limitation, the Federal
Circuit stated that the burden of proof is on the patent owner to
establish that the structure of the accused device performing that
10 27
function is the same or equivalent to the disclosed structure.
The court considered Pennwalt's argument that an accused structure performing the claimed function is per se structurally
equivalent to be incorrect. 10 28 The court held that functional differences between the patented and accused devices negated a finding
0 29
of literal infringement.
1020. IE
1021. Id, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1738-39.
1022. Id. at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739.
1023. Id
1024. Id. (citing Data Line Corp. v. Micro Technologies, Inc., 813 F.2d 1196, 1201, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d 2052, 2055 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
1025. Id.
1026. Id.
1027. Id.
1028. Id.
1029. Id. The Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in looking for equivalent
functions in its section 112, paragraph six analysis. Id. at 936, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1740. The
Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court's findings of no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. at 939, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473.
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In Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc.,1030 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of infringement of a portable
flange facing machine.10 3 ' A flange is a rim at the end of a pipe; a
smooth flat-faced flange allows the pipe to be bolted to another
pipe. The means-plus-function claim at issue stated in part: "means
for releasably attaching said support column to said base; ... said
means for attaching comprising means for expanding said base internally of said support column after said base has been aligned relative to the tubular member for thereby locking said support
column to the base in alignment therewith and with the tubular
0 32
member."1
The defendant argued that this claim required a two-step installation, first aligning the base with the pipe, and then mounting the
base to the support column. 0 33 Because its machine could not perform the two-step installation, the defendant argued, it could not
infringe. The Federal Circuit disagreed, reading the claim to require expansion of the base within the column after alignment. 0 34
The court found no limitation on whether the support column was
mounted on the base before or after alignment. The court asserted
that while the patent specification did describe a two-step installation, nothing in the specification limited the claims to that interpretation. 0 3 5 The defendant also argued that the prosecution history
of the claim required the limitation of the two-step installation process.10 3 6 The court pointed out that the prior claim did not evolve
into the claim at issue. Additionally, the court found that the prior
and present claims were not dependent. 103 7
The court stated that claim interpretation is a matter of law, freely
reviewable on appeal. 0 3 8 In contrast, the determination of whether
an accused device is equivalent under the sixth paragraph is a question of fact, reviewable only under a clearly erroneous standard. 0 3 9
A finding of fact is clearly erroneous "when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
1030. 843 F.2d 1349, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1031. Durango Assocs., Inc. v. Reflange, Inc., 843 F.2d 1349, 1359, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d 1290,
1296 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1032. Id. at 1351 n.2, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1291 n.2.
1033. Id. at 1356, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294.
1034. Id.
1035. Id. at 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294.
1036. Id.
1037. Id., 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294-95. The court stated, however, that narrowing a claim during prosecution does not preclude the patentee from relying on the doctrine of equivalents in
all circumstances. Id. at 1358, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295.
1038. Id. at 1356, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1294.
1039. Id. at 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295.
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with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."1 0 40 The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding that the district
court followed the rules of D.M.I. and Pennwalt respecting equivalence analysis in finding literal infringement under the sixth
10 4 1
paragraph.
In United States v. Telectronics, Inc.,1042 the Federal Circuit, reversing the district court, held that the accused device literally infringed
the patent for a bone growth stimulator.10 43 The stimulators
worked by running a low current of electricity through the broken
bone, affecting bone cell growth. 10 44 The claimed device would
"avoid fibrous tissue formation." The accused device employed an
internal anode, and sought to avoid claim inclusion by arguing that
any implant would cause fibrous tissue growth. 0 45 While the district court agreed, the Federal Circuit ruled that the claim was directed toward avoiding or minimizing fibrous growth through
adjusting the electrical current. 0 46 The claim, therefore, was not
limited to the plaintiff's surface anode. 10 4 7 One claim included
means-plus-function language, reciting "means for connecting said
constant current means to the living being, such connection acting
to produce current flow into said fracture or defect."' 1 4 8 Thus, the
court maintained, the sixth paragraph instructs that specified struc0 49
tures and equivalents thereof may literally infringe the claim.'
The Federal Circuit held that the patent specification described
both surface and implanted anodes, thus supporting the district
050
court's findings of fact, and not requiring remand.
1040. Id. (quoting United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)).
1041. Id. at 1357, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1295 (citing D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570,
1575, 225 U.S.P.Q 236, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1983) and Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at
1739, and maintaining that in determining equivalence under section 112, critical question is
whether single means in accused device, which performs function stated in claim, is same as or
equivalent of corresponding structure described in patentee's specification as performing that
function); see Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1739 (stressing that in determining
equivalence, court must compare accused structure with disclosed structure, and must find
equivalent structure, as well as identity of claimed function, for that structure). The court
held, however, that the district court erred in its prior art analysis under the doctrine of
equivalents, and reversed that part of the decision. Durango, 843 F.2d at 1359, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1296.
1042. 857 F.2d 778, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989).
1043. United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 780, 786,8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1217, 1224 (Fed.
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1046 (1989).
1044. Id. at 780, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1218.
1045. Id., 8 U.S.P.Q2d at 1219.
1046. Id. at 781, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1219-20.
1047. Id.
1048. Id. at 782, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1220.
1049. Id.
1050. Id. at 784, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1222.
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The Federal Circuit held that substantial evidence existed to support a jury verdict of infringement in Snelman v. Ricoh Co. 10 51 The
patented device was a photocopy machine paper sorter. In dispute
was the interpretation of the recited means for positioning a deflector mechanism that shunted outcoming paper into specified
shelves. 10 52 Thejury heard expert testimony that the patented and
accused devices had structural elements that were equivalent, if not
identical, to the claim language. 10 5 3 The Federal Circuit also agreed
with the jury that the devices performed the same function, and that
language in the specification indicated that the means were
0 54
equivalent.
In Johnston v. IVAC Corp.,o10 55 the Federal Circuit held that in order
for a means-plus-function limitation to read on an accused device,
the device must perform the identical function. 0 56 Additionally,
the accused device must incorporate the means for performing the
function disclosed in the specification or a structural equivalent of
that means.' 0 5 7The invention at issue involved attaching a removable, disposable probe cover to the probe of an electronic thermometer.10 5 8 The patentee designed the probe with a flared sharp edge
that gripped the inside probe cover when it was slipped over the
probe, claiming a "means... for causing said sharp edge to inscribe
itself fixedly into said probe cover."' 0 59
In the district court, the defendant, IVAC, moved for summary
judgment for noninfringement based on affidavit and documentary
evidence that the corresponding element was a smooth metal ring
designed and constructed to perform a friction fit.' 0 60 Johnston

submitted attorney and inventor affidavits in response. The district
court considered these affidavits conclusory and nonprobative, find-

ing that the inventor made legal opinions about the meaning of
words and phrases in the claim that were inconsistent with the pros-

ecution history. 0 61 Based on arguments made during the patent
prosecution, the district court concluded that scratches incidental to
1051. 862 F.2d 283, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
1052. Snellman v. Ricoh, Co., 862 F.2d 283, 287, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1996, 1999 (Fed. Cir.
1988), ceri. denied, 491 U.S. 910 (1989).
1053. Id. at 287-88, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2000.
1054. Id at 288, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2000.
1055. 885 F.2d 1574, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1056. Johnston v. IVAC Corp., 885 F.2d 1574, 1580, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1382, 1386 (Fed. Cir.
1989).
1057. Id. at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386-87.
1058. Id. at 1576, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1383.
1059. Id. at 1578, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1384.
1060. Id.
1061. Id. at 1578-79, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1384-85.
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the friction fit did not equal the claimed term "inscribe." 10 6 2 The
district court granted IVAC's summary judgment motion, holding
that there was no genuine issue of fact and that the claim limitations
were not met by IVAC's probe cover, either exactly or by
06 3
equivalents.
On appeal, Johnston argued that the district court erred in failing
to apply the sixth paragraph analysis correctly before eliminating literal infringement.' 0 6 The Federal Circuit disagreed, holding that
the sixth paragraph does not set forth a separate test for infringement because an infringement determination involves all parts of
the claims. Rather, the court explained, the sixth paragraph provides guidance on how the means-plus-function part of a claim must
0 65
be interpreted within the overall infringement analysis.1
The court asserted that the sixth paragraph does not expand the
scope of a claim couched in means-plus-function language.10 66 Instead, it serves to "cut back" on the types of means which could
literally satisfy the claims. 10 67 The court stressed that paragraph six
does not affect the function recited in the claims and does not extend the claimed element to equivalent functions, stating,
"[piroperly understood section 112, paragraph 6 operates more like
the reverse doctrine of equivalents than the doctrine of equivalents
1 0 68
because it restricts the scope of the literal claim language."
Therefore, literal infringement can never be found under the sixth
paragraph if a function part of the element is not met literally in the
0 69
accused device.'
InJonsson v. Stanley Works,' 0 70 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant's automatic door opening
system did not infringe the patented system.' 0 7 1 The court, relying
heavily on the prosecution history, held that the plaintiff was estopped from broadening claims to cover the accused device. 0 72
1062. Id.
1063. Id.
1064. Id at 1580, 12 U.S.P.q.2d at 1386.
1065. Id
1066. Id.
1067. Id (citing Data Line, 813 F.2d at 1201, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055).
1068. Id. at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386-87 (citing Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1739).
1069. Id., 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1387. Additionally, the court held that without disputed factual
issues, claim interpretation is a matter of law. Id. at 1577, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1383. The court
also found no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id at 1580-81, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1387.
1070. 903 F.2d 812, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
1071. Jonsson v. Stanley Works, 903 F.2d 812, 821, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1871 (Fed. Cir.
1990).
1072. Id.
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The claimed invention involved an automatic door opening system
that employed diffuse light and multiple sensors to detect objects in
front of the door, triggering the door's opening. 0 73 To distinguish
the means claim "for emitting a diverging beam of diffuse radiation"
over the prior art, Jonsson argued that his invention used "diffuse
074
light, originating from many sources" to illuminate the object.1
Jonsson defined the term "diffuse" as "moving in many directions,"
107 5
created by a plurality of light sources pulsing at the same time.
The accused device, in contrast, used two sensors on each side of
076
the door that emitted light sources one at a time in pulse bursts.1
The Federal Circuit stated that Congress enacted the sixth paragraph to instruct as to how means claims, which might otherwise be
indefinite, should be interpreted. 10 77 The court noted that paragraph six actually cuts back on the types of means that could literally
satisfy the claim language.1078 In this case, the court held that the
patent specification and statements made during prosecution narrowed the means equivalents to exclude the accused device. 107 9 Because prosecution history estopped the finding of literal
infringement, the court held that it also estopped the finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. 1080
In Symbol Technologies Inc. v. Opticon Inc.,1081 the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the defendant infringed the
plaintiff's patented laser bar code reader. The bar code reader was
the type of aim-and-shoot scanner commonly employed at depart-

ment store registers. 08 2 The court held that the plaintiff established a prima facie case of infringement with expert testimony,
finding under paragraph six analysis that the accused device employed means equivalent to the patented means.10 8 3 The expert witness, using charts and drawings to point out equivalents, expressed
his opinion that the accused devices infringed. 08 4 The court held
1073. Id. at 814, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1865.
1074. Idt, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1865-66 (emphasis in original).
1075. Id. at 817, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1868.
1076. Id. at 815, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1866.
1077. Id. at 819, 14 U.S.P.O.2d at 1869 (citing Data Line, 813 F.2d at 1201, 1 U.S.P.Q2d at
2055); see also Johnson, 885 F.2d at 1580, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1386 (explaining that section 112,

paragraph 6 provides guidance in interpreting means-plus-function portions of claims within
overall infringement analysis).
1078. Jonsson, 903 F.2d at 819, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1869 (citing Data Line, 813 F.2d at 1201, 1
U.S.P.Q.2d at 2055)).
1079. Id. at 819-20, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1870.
1080. Id. at 821, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1871.
1081. 935 F.2d 1569, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1082. Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1572, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
1241, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1083. Id. at 1574-76, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244-46.
1084. Id. at 1574, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1244.
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that, because the defendant failed to cross-examine the expert witness, the evidence of equivalents was essentially uncontroverted 0 85
The district court ruled in the plaintiff's favor.10 86 On appeal, the
defendant challenged only the establishment of prima facie infringement. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of
prima facie infringement, and refused to review further any infringe87
ment analysis. 10
In Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc.,1088 the Federal Circuit reversed

the lower court's decision that Rexnord's conveyor product infringed claims 21 and 22 of Laitram's patent. The claimed invention
kept conveyed containers from tipping over. 1089 A modular plastic
conveyor belt with a raised rib construction allowed the container's
smooth transfer to and from the conveyor via a transfer comb.10 90
The conveyor belt was made of a plurality of plastic modules pivotally connected at their link ends.10 9 1 The focus of the dispute, which
involved the means for joining the link ends, was set forth in claim
21, subparagraph 2: "means for joining said pluralities [of link
ends] to one another so that the axes of said holes of said first plurality are arranged coaxially, the axes of said holes of said second
plurality are arranged coaxially and the axes of respective holes of
both pluralities of link ends are substantially parallel.

.".1092

Rexnord maintained that as a means-plus-function claim, subparagraph 2 should be interpreted in light of the specification according to paragraph 6.1093 Laitram argued that subparagraph 2
contained a recital of structure, and that such recital rendered the
interpretation under paragraph 6 inapplicable.10 94 While the district court accepted this argument, the appellate court did not.
Rather, the Federal Circuit held that a recital of structure would not
bar an analysis under paragraph 6.1095 The court stated that the
structural description in subparagraph two's joining clause only
specified the function of the means. 10 96 The court further explained
1085.

Id. at 1575-76, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1245-46 (citing Ricoh, 862 F.2d at 287,8 U.S.P.Q.2d

at 2000).
1086. Id. at 1575, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246.
1087. Id,at 1576, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1246.
1088. 939 F.2d 1533, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1089. Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1534, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1367, 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1991).
1090. Id. at 1534-35, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1368-69.
1091. Id. at 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.

1092. Id.
1093. Id.
1094.
1095.
1096.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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that the recited structure specifies only what the means-for-joining
1 0 97
does; it does not define the structure.
The Federal Circuit stated that under paragraph 6, a means clause
does not cover all means for carrying out a specified function. 10 98
In determining whether a claim limitation is met literally, the court
stated that one must compare the accused structure with the disclosed structure and find "equivalent structure as well as identity of
10 99
claimed function" for that structure to be literally infringed.
The court stated that the means-plus-function language must read
on the accused device." 100 Additionally, the patentee must prove
that the means of the accused structure, if differing from the described invention, is structurally equivalent to the means described
in the specification."10 '
The Laitram patent specification described link ends connected
by elongated bars, forming link elements." 0 2 The link elements
were then connected by cross members, forming an H-shape arrangement. Rexnord's structure had link ends connected by reach
bars, forming an undulating V-shape arrangement. 0 3 Being on a
molded plastic form, the V-shape arrangement lacked a grid struc1 10 4
ture joining link ends into link elements by cross members.
Thus, the court held, while the V-shape and H-shape structures per05
formed the same function, they were not equivalent." 1
Laitram argued that the doctrine of claim differentiation prevented reading the cross member (H-shape) limitation into one
claim merely because another claim specifically called for a cross
member." 10 6 The court held, however, that the interpretation of the
"means for joining" via a cross member arose from the specification, not from another claim." 0 7 Thus, the prohibition against
reading the limitations from a dependent claim into the independent claim was not violated." 0 8 Furthermore, the court held that
claim differentiation is a judicially developed guide to claim inter1097. l at 1536, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1369.
1098. Id., 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
1099. Id (quoting Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370 (emphasis in original)),
The court in Pennwalt stated "while encompassing equivalents of those means disclosed in the
specification, [section 112, paragraph 6], nevertheless, acts as a restriction on the literal satisfaction of a claim limitation." Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
1100. Laitram Corp., 939 F.2d at 1536, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
1101. Id.
1102. Id
1103. Id. at 1537-38, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1370.
1104. Id. at 1538, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.
1105. Id.
1106. Id.
1107. Id.
1108. Id.
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pretation that cannot override a statute.' 10 9 Finally, the court stated
that to hold the V-shaped and H-shaped structures ipso facto
equivalent simply because they perform the same function, effectively eliminates the statutory restriction of paragraph six.'110
Laitram challenged the sufficiency of the evidence of equivalency.
Even though Rexnord's expert admitted that the devices were "similar," and others testified that the link ends of both devices were
parallel, the court held that the necessary equivalency was not established. 1 1 1 Furthermore, the court held that Laitram did not meet
the burden of identifying a genuine issue of fact-structural
equivalency under the sixth paragraph-warranting remand.' 112
The Federal Circuit stated that the doctrine of equivalents, set
forth in Graver Tank, says that a device not infringing literally may
still infringe a claim "if it performs substantially the same function
1 3 To
in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.""'
function in "substantially the same way," every limitation of a claim
must be satisfied at least equivalently.' 11 4 Thus, the court stated
that Laitram needed to prove that Rexnord substituted an
1 115
equivalent for the required joining-means element of the claim.
The court held that even though the equivalency of the joining
means might not be as limited under the doctrine of equivalents as
under paragraph six, Laitram did not prove that the function of the
116
joining means read on Rexnord's reach bars.'
V.

THE THIRD, FOURTH, AND FIFTH PARAGRAPHS

Congress amended section 112 in 1965, adding a provision on
independent and dependent claims.'11 7 The 1975 amendment substituted more thorough instruction on independent, dependent, and
1109. Id.
A means-plus-function limitation is not made open-ended by the presence of another
claim specifically claiming the disclosed structure which underlies the means clause
or an equivalent structure. If Laitram's argument were adopted, it would provide a
convenient way of avoiding the express mandate of Section 112, paragraph 6.

Id.
1110. Id.
1111. Id. at 1538-39, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1371.
1112. Id.at 1539, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1372.
1113. Id.
1114. Id. (citing Becton Dickinson & Co. v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 922 F.2d 792, 798, 17
U.S.P.Q.2d 1097, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1115. Id.
1116. Id.
1117. Act ofJuly 24, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-83, § 9, 79 Stat. 259, 261 (current version at 35
U.S.C. § 112 (1988)). The original section 9 read: "A claim may be written in independent or
dependent form, and if in dependent form, it shall be construed to include all limitations of
the claim incorporated by reference into the dependent claim." Id.
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multiple dependent claims.' 8 This amendment took effect in 1978
when the Patent Cooperation Treaty came into force. 1'19 Multiple
independent claims were allowable only in patent applications filed
after that date.
The Federal Circuit's interpretations of paragraphs three, four,
and five of section 112 have not addressed these paragraphs by
name, although several opinions have discussed their subject
matter.
In In re Nielson,' 120 the Federal Circuit held that as to dependent
claims, the Board did not err in holding that they stood or fell with
the independent claims because they were not argued separately. 112 1 The court, however, held that the Board erred in rejecting dependent claims that were argued separately. 1 2 2 Similarly,
in In re Fine,' 12 3 the Federal Circuit held that dependent claims were
nonobvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 if the independent claims from
which they depended were nonobvious. 1 124
In In re Beaver, 1 125 the Federal Circuit held that the applicant preserved the independent appeal of rejected dependent claims by arguing them separately before the Board. 1 26 The court said that the
applicant's arguments for his subordinate claims, which were mini1118. Act of Nov. 14, 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-131, § 112, 89 Stat. 685, 691 (current version at
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988)). These provisions now comprise section 112, paragraphs three, four,
and five:
[3] A claim may be written in independent or, if the nature of the case admits, in
dependent or multiple dependent form.
[4] Subject to the following paragraph, a claim in dependent form shall contain a
reference to a claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation of the
subject matter claimed. A claim in dependent form shall be construed to incorporate
by reference all the limitations of the claim to which it refers.
[5] A claim in multiple dependent form shall contain a reference, in the alternative
only, to more than one claim previously set forth and then specify a further limitation
of the subject matter claimed. A multiple dependent claim shall not serve as a basis
for any other multiple dependent claim. A multiple dependent claim shall be construed to incorporate by reference all the limitations of the particular claim in relation to which it is being considered.
Id.
1119. Patent Cooperation Treaty, Pub. L. No. 94-131, § 112, 89 Stat. 691 (1975) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1988)). The treaty became effective on Jan. 24, 1978. 35 U.S.C. § 112
(1988).
1120. 816 F.2d 1567, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1121. In re Nielson, 816 F.2d 1567, 1572, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (citing
In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 991, 217 U.S.P.Q. 1, 3 (Fed. Cir. 1983)) (noting that claims not
argued separately stand or fall with those that are).
1122. Id. at 1570-71, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1526-27; see In re Kulling, 897 F.2d 1147, 1149-50, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1056, 1057-58 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (holding that because applicant did not separately
argue merits of dependent claims those claims stood or fell with independent claim).
1123. 837 F.2d 1071, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1124. In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1076, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1596, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1125. 893 F.2d 329, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1126. In re Beaver, 893 F.2d 329, 330, 13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1409, 1410-11 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
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mal by nature, automatically included previous arguments made
1 12 7
with respect to the main claims by the action of paragraph four.
In Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 1 128 the Federal Circuit
instructed that, generally, when independent and dependent claims
are argued together for validity and infringement purposes, the dependent claim "stands or falls" with the independent claim.1 129 The
Federal Circuit refined the application of this rule in Shelcore, Inc. v.
Durham Industries, Inc.," 130 defining different roles for the appellate
and trial courts. The court explained that in the context of validity
at the trial court level, the presumption of patent validity requires
the challenger to submit evidence establishing the invalidity of each
claim asserted to be invalid, regardless of the independent or dependent nature of the claim. 13 1 The "stand or fall" rule, the court
asserted, is properly applied by the PTO for pending or appealed
claims, in which the applicant must overcome the rejection of each
claim."1 32 The court said that the application of the rule by the Federal Circuit, in cases such as Perkin-Elmer, was one of convenience
because at the appellate level the court was guided, not by the presumption of validity, but by findings and conclusions of the district
33
court.11
In Hartness International,Inc. v. Simplimatic Engineering Co. ,1134 the
Federal Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to consider that a dependent claim included all the limitations of the claim
from which it depended, with an additional limitation in determining the novelty and nonobviousness of the dependent claim. 1 13 5
The court said that because the independent claim was nonobvious,
1127. Id. The court held, "[t]hat [the applicant] did not repeat, in his argument for the
subordinate claims, everything he had said in arguing his principal claims did not convert
'dependent' claims into nonentities." Id., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1411.
1128. 732 F.2d 888, 221 U.S.P.Q. 669 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
1129. Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Computervision Corp., 732 F.2d 888, 898, 221 U.S.P.Q. 669,
677 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 857 (1984).
1130. 745 F.2d 621, 223 U.S.P.Q. 584 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
1131. Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc. 745 F.2d 621,624,223 U.S.P.Q. 584, 586 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
1132. Id. The court explained that this notion was codified in 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982),
which provides that "each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or multiple
dependent form) shall be presumed to be valid independently of other claims; dependent or
multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid
claim." Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1982)).
1133. Id. at 624-25, 223 U.S.P.Q. at 586-87. But see N.V. Akzo v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co., 810 F.2d 1148, 1152, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1704, 1708 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that because
each claim contained certain limitation found not to be critical, basis for rejecting broadest
claim would have applied to all claims and district court did not err in failing to address claims
separately).
1134. 819 F.2d 1100, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1826 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1135. Hartness Int'l, Inc. v. Simplimatic Eng'g Co., 819 F.2d 1100, 1108, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
1826, 1831 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
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"[a] fortiori, [the] dependent claim was nonobvious (and novel) because it contained all the limitations of [the independent] claim, plus
6
a further limitation.""13
Similarly, in Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp.,' 1 1 37 the Federal Circuit held
that a claim relating to an improved brake means for an agricultural
bagging machine was nonobvious and thus invalid, and that its two
dependent claims were invalid for the same reason. The court held
that because the manual brake described in the patent performed
the same function as a hydraulic brake, the invention was obvious as
a matter of law."138 The court also held, however, that the two dependent claims, which were not argued separately, were invalid because there was no independent basis for their validity. 1 39
In Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier,Inc.,"

40

the Federal Circuit held

that dependent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims
on which they depend are also found to have been infringed. In
Wahpeton, the jury failed to answer special interrogatories of infringement or noninfringement concerning independent claims on
which several more claims depended. 14 1 The jury, on the other
hand, found noninfringement of the dependent claims. 1 42 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that it was useless to ask the jury about the
dependent claims because an answer about the independent claims
would have been dispositive." 143 The court stated that "[o]ne may
infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim dependent

on that claim. The reverse is not true. One who does not infringe
an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on (and
thus containing all the limitations of) the claim." '" 4 4
Furthermore, the court explained that damages would be unaffected by verdicts concerning dependent claims once the verdicts
concerning independent claims were answered. 1 14 5 While realizing
1136. Id
1137. 857 F.2d 1418, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1138. Ryco, Inc. v. Ag-Bag Corp., 857 F.2d 1418, 1425, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1323, 1329 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
1139. Id.; see Newell Co. v. Kenny Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 757, 768-69, 9 U.S.P.Q,2d 1417,
1426-27 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that, where patentee failed to argue validity of dependent
claims on main claim separately, trial court properly found dependent claims invalid for obviousness), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989); Environmental Instruments, Inc. v. Sutron Corp.,
877 F.2d 1561, 1568, 11 U.S.P.Q.2d 1132, 1138 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (holding that claim dependent on claim found obvious is invalid when its patentability was not argued separately).
1140. 870 F.2d 1546, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1141. Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1552-53, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d
1201, 1207-08 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1142. Id. at 1553, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1208.
1143. Id.
1144. Id. at 1552 n.9, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207 n.9 (citing Teledyne McCormick Selph v.
United States, 558 F.2d 1000, 1004, 195 U.S.P.Q. 261, 264 (Ct. Cl. 1977)).
1145. Id. at 1553, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1208.
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it would make no sense to appeal the noninfringement finding of the
dependent claims, the court remanded for determination of the independent claims. 1146 Additionally, the court instructed that "[i]f
validity were in issue, dependent claims might serve a useful role,
for a necessarily narrower dependent claim may be valid when the
114 7
claim from which it depends is not."
In Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates,' 148 the
Federal Circuit raised the possibility that dependent claims may be
infringed even if the claims on which they depend are not infringed.
This possibility arises in circumstances where the doctrine of
equivalents is asserted and where the prior art restricts the scope of
the doctrine of equivalents for the independent claim in a way that
could not apply to the dependent claim.1 149 The court said that because of the limitations in the dependent claims, which were narrower than the independent claims, the dependent claims might not
encompass the range of equivalents that included the prior art.'1 50
The court in Wilson, however, found that the dependent claims did
not infringe under the doctrine of equivalents. 1 5 1 The Wilson court,
however, leaves open the possibility for another day that, contrary
to Wahpeton, a dependent claim, as well as the independent claims,
may be infringed even if the independent claim associated therewith
is not infringed.
CONCLUSION

This concludes a review of the decisions interpreting section 112
handed down during the first ten years of the Federal Circuit's history. Although one can argue to what extent the Federal Circuit has
satisfied its mandate to bring uniformity to the patent law, a degree
of consistency in enunciating the various legal principles undergirding the different subdivisions of section 112 has no doubt been
achieved.
Nevertheless, it will be clear from the decisions that, as is true for
many areas of patent law, compliance with the various requisites of
section 112 is highly dependent on the particular circumstances of
each case. The factual nature of such inquiries thus imposes a burden on those who prepare and prosecute patent applications to use
1146. Id. at 1556, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1210.
1147. Id. at 1552 n.10, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1207 n.10.
1148. 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d 1942 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
1149. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684-85, 14
U.S.P.Q.2d 1942, 1948-49 (Fed. Cir.), cer. denied, I11 S. Ct. 537 (1990).
1150. Id. at 686, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1949.
1151. Id., 14 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1949-50.
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the utmost care to comply with the several requirements of section
112. Those patents that are litigated, moreover, will present ever
new challenges to the judge or jury as each grapples to apply section
112 to the specific facts under consideration.

